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INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation deals with the rights of minorities in Bulgaria and 
Greece while providing an overview about their changing perception.  Both 
countries are evaluated based on their progress on minority rights, the role 
of nationalism and the impact of the European integration process.  
 
Speaking about minorities is still one of the most sensitive issues in 
Southeast Europe. Because of its historical background, in terms of minority 
population, the region has one of the most diverse structures in Europe. 
Often this diversity caused some small scale conflicts and even led to the 
wars. But Bulgaria and Greece are two unique examples where minority 
issues did not go toward violent conflicts in the beginning of 1990s. Was it 
because of the state policies or other reasons stemming from the structure 
of the minorities? Both countries have a compact Turkish/Muslim population 
settled in border regions, but relatively peaceful minority.  
 
Following the creation of Greece and Bulgaria as independent states, 
protection of minority rights became a crucial issue in order to prevent forced 
migration or assimilation of the population belonging to minorities. However, 
the way how nationalism was shaped in both countries, affected not only the 
treatment of minorities, but also their integration into the society. By adding 
the impact of the adoption of different political systems in the post-Second 
World War period, the issue of minority rights developed differently in 
Greece and Bulgaria.  
 
In the case of Greece, minorities did not find the chance to get fully 
integrated due to strongly exclusionist structure of the Greek national identity 
which constantly worked on the idea of ‘otherness’ of the Muslim/Turkish 
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minority in Thrace.1 This period became widely shaped with the revisionist 
ideas of treaties signed with Turkey for the protection of minority rights. The 
content of nationalism and its stance towards the minority in Thrace, 
deepened the segregation between Muslim/Turkish and Orthodox Greek 
populations. Eventually, this environment which was characterized with a 
highly sensitive inter-ethnic rhetoric, legitimized the unequal treatment of 
Muslim/Turkish minority in Greece. The rights that were guaranteed by the 
Greek Constitution, were curtailed through additional internal regulations. 
Education, economic and social policies were widely shaped in line with 
these legal changes.  
 
 The situation in Bulgaria was relatively different. Bulgaria formed its 
national identity on the same features as Greek one, and Bulgarian 
language, culture and Bulgarian Orthodox Church became its core. 
Meanwhile, when the country decided to adopt communism, this 
automatically affected the concept of Bulgarian nationalism and 
accommodation of minorities as well. The initial exclusion of the Orthodox 
Church, constituted a big step towards modernization of Bulgaria, which was 
supposed to help for the integration of national minorities. In 1950s and 
1960s, this policy proved its success during the intensive economic progress 
in Bulgaria. On the other side, it began to decline when the situation of the 
Turkish minority deteriorated due to the assimilation policy launched in the 
form of ‘name changing campaign’.   
 
 The changes in 1990s affected both countries. The intensity of the 
Europeanization process became catalyzer for further democratization in 
Greece and Bulgaria. For Greece, this process followed partially the 
acceptance of the political and democratic integration with the EU, since 
before this, Greek authorities perceived European integration as only an 
                                                 
1 See Mitja Zagar, The Ethnic Rleations, Nationalism and Minority Nationalism in South-Eastern 
Europe, in: Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order, (Ed.) Michael Keating & 
John McGarry, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 331.  
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economic policy by ignoring its political aspect. The limited modernization in 
Greece brought some changes to the Muslim/Turkish minority in Thrace. 
Meanwhile, Bulgaria’s transition from communism into democracy brought 
also political changes that resulted with the EU membership in 2007. 
Although limited, by restoring the rights of the Turkish minority, Bulgaria’s 
European integration process, established new conditions for the integration 
of Turks into the society.  
 
Bulgaria and Greece are especially chosen case studies of this work 
in order to give an overview of the different effects of minority integration 
methods and to examine the level of European integration and the role of 
the Europeanization process on the rights of minorities. Greece as an old 
EU member and Bulgaria as a new member state are also good examples in 
order to see the contribution of the negotiation process for the EU 
membership.  
 
Minority rights movements in Europe made a peak in 1990’s after the 
fall of communism. All Eastern European countries were interested in further 
integration with Europe hoping to become members of the European Union. 
Meanwhile, most of them had problems with their minorities and some 
unsolved border issues. Having demand for membership from so many 
states, forced EU to adopt some standards for the democratization which 
eventually targeted human rights. The emphasis on human rights made 
necessary further discussion of minority rights as well. Consequently, 
Copenhagen Criteria were adopted by the EU as new standards to be met 
by the applicant countries to gain candidate status.  
 
In spite of all modernization efforts in the region, still many issues 
regarding the rights of minorities are continuing to be a taboo in the social 
and political lives of both countries. Probably in some aspects today the 
level of the rights is better than the past years, but the implementation is 
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below the average. This dissertation aims to give an explanation for the 
reasons behind this reluctance and its roots in the past.  
 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
 Theoretical structure of the work is designed in a way to compare 
both countries regarding their policies towards Turkish/Muslim minority and 
how it has been changed under the effect of major political challenges. 
Turkish minority in Bulgaria and Muslim/Turkish minority in Greece are taken 
as the subjects of present work, since they are the only officially recognized 
minority by both countries. The presence of other minority groups in both 
countries is fact, however, they are not officially recognized, and therefore, 
they are excluded from the scope of this work. This approach is designed to 
provide information on how the protection of recognized minorities evolved 
throughout the history, and how it became affected with the European 
developments that took place in the region.   
 
 Turkish and Muslim minorities are selected from both countries as 
independent variables in order to see how their treatment differs from 
country to country. Turkish minority in Bulgaria and Turkish/Muslim minority 
in Greece had close relations until 1950’s when the border between two 
states begun to be strictly controlled after Bulgaria became communist. 
Nevertheless, the fall of communism showed that so many things changed 
in social, religious and cultural features of both minority groups. Therefore, 
their situation has been examined along the political developments in 
Greece and Bulgaria. 
 
 Part of the work tackles also Pomaks – Muslim community that 
speaks a dialect of Bulgarian – since they have been for a long subject of 
controversy because of their ethnic self-identification as Turkish. Ethnic self-
identification became major problem in Greece, while in the past Bulgaria 
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embarked three different assimilation processes aiming to change the ethnic 
consciousness of Pomaks. They are partially subject of this study in order to 
support part of the arguments regarding the effects of nationalism on the 
integration of minorities.  
 
  It seems that Europeanization efforts are partly overwhelmed by the 
historical facts. So it depends on the political conditionality and historical 
security perceptions of countries to implement European regulations and 
new minority rights standards. This argument is evaluated via 
implementation of the cross-border cooperation projects in the region, 
involving Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey.   
 
From the aspect of minority rights, EU negotiation process might be 
seen as a missed opportunity for the further liberalization of minority rights in 
Bulgaria. The European Commission and Bulgaria avoided the discussion of 
rights and situation of Turkish minority, which has been perceived as the 
most sensitive political issue. 
 
 As a country that did not pass through the same procedure as 
Bulgaria, Greece continued the treatment of minority in Western Thrace 
according to the regulations accepted by the Lausanne Treaty. Non-
recognition of the ethnic Turkish character of the minority in Thrace followed 
with the systematic denial of the contemporary European regulations 
pertaining to the rights of minorities.  This attitude automatically excluded the 
rights offered by the European Framework Convention for the Protection of 
Minorities.  
 
 Nevertheless, cross-border cooperation and its limits in the region 
have been tackled to give an insight on the impact of the European 
integration in regional development. Since minorities are concentrated in 
border regions, cross-border cooperation and its institutionalization have 
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been accepted as a criteria for the evaluation of the success of 
Europeanization process.   
 
 Apart from comparing minority rights standards in Bulgaria and 
Greece, this work analyses the hypothesis whether different political 
systems adopted by both countries resulted with some positive and/or 
negative changes in the conditions of minorities. It further claims that 
education and educational policies are the basis of coherent strategy for the 
integration of minorities.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
 This work has been conducted on the grounds of multidisciplinary and 
cross disciplinary approach due to the complexity of the problems. Another 
approach that it develops is perceiving nationalism as a historical 
phenomenon rather than only contemporary one.  
 
 Policy analysis is the main method used in the whole work. However 
Sociological approach is also used in order to define minority problems. 
Methods of Social Anthropology are seen as a tool to explain the 
persistence of cultural traditions in minority groups of both states and the 
responses to the political and social phenomena. Legal methods are used to 
define the standards and availability of the protection mechanisms for 
minorities.  
 
 Greece and Bulgaria are two independent variables while the 
treatment of minorities is dependent variable. Meanwhile, in order to abstain 
from making abstract generalizations and too many theoretical descriptions, 
a case oriented strategy has been used where necessary and vice versa. 
Since case oriented strategy sometimes might have the tendency to focus 
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on many examples, it would be possible to use variable oriented strategy in 
order to give theoretical explanation to some cases.  
 
 Primary resources from Bulgarian state archives have been used in 
order to support the arguments. At the moment there are no documents 
available from the Greek State archives and therefore secondary resources 
like books, newspapers and some published documents are used. 
Bibliography consists widely from the secondary resources such as books, 
newspapers, journal articles, conference and seminar presentations in 
Bulgarian, English and Turkish languages.  
 
 
Contribution  
 
 This dissertation has been prepared in order to contribute into the 
field of minority  and area studies in Southeast Europe. It is unique work that 
examines the impact of nationalism on the rights of minorities, while tackling 
the historical struggle between nationalism and minority rights in Bulgaria 
and Greece. Moreover, evaluating the progress made during the European 
integration process, gives an additional opportunity to measure the impact of 
the Europeanization process per se.  
 
Studying the progress of cross-border cooperation between Bulgaria 
and Greece, and in some parts including an analysis about Turkey, it is 
contributing into the literature by explaining some issues related with 
minorities living in border regions.  
 
Another contribution of the present work is, following the line of 
multidisciplinary and cross-disciplinary approach, it aims to explain the 
complexities of the problems that are stemming from historical and social 
issues in both countries. Hence, the problems of minorities have been 
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evaluated in a way that would give different perspectives based on social, 
economic and political aspects.   
 
There are many arguments also regarding the accommodation of 
minorities in communist and liberal democratic systems. This dissertation 
also evaluates the topic in order to show the weaknesses and strong points 
of both systems by offering an in-depth analysis on the daily life of minorities 
in Bulgaria and Greece. It could be a good example also to make 
comparison with today’s migration problems in Europe and the integration of 
immigrant groups. 
 
 
The Flow of the Work  
 
 First chapter has been designed to give a clear perspective how 
minorities emerged in Bulgaria and Greece, the way how nation states were 
created. It also emphasizes on the evolution of the international and 
European standards for the protection of minorities by discussing the 
struggle to find a universal definition for the term ‘minority’. The wars in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century that occurred in the area 
generated the need to provide minority rights for people who were left within 
the national borders of new states. Therefore, the search of a common 
definition for minorities originated back then, when the famous advisory 
opinion of the PCIJ on Greco-Bulgarian Communities case was announced. 
 
 The second chapter deals with nationalism, and its evolution under 
the conditionality of different political systems in both countries. Deteriorating 
conditions of the Turkish/Muslim minorities, have been explained through 
the heavy presence of nationalism. Extraordinary conditions in Greece and 
measures that contradict with the basic principles of the Constitution, have 
been analyzed through different practices that took place in Western Thrace. 
The establishment of the communist regime in Bulgaria and the strategies 
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towards the integration of the Turkish minority are another topic of the 
chapter, where systematic assimilation and forced migration of the Turkish 
minority in Bulgaria  is examined.  
 
 The third chapter aims to explain the reasons behind the change that 
brought some freedom to minorities. It provides an in-depth analysis on how 
social and political conditions in Bulgaria forced politicians to adopt more 
liberal minority rights policies. An additional focus has been made on the 
resilient character of nationalism that has been conceived as a factor limiting 
proper liberalization of minority rights in Bulgaria and Greece.    
 
 The content of the fourth chapter is about the progress of cross-
border cooperation and its evolution in the Bulgarian-Greek border region. 
Due to minority groups living in the region, Turkey is partially included in this 
chapter as a kin-state, to give an overview how bilateral relations and history 
are defining the flow of cross-border cooperation between the neighboring 
countries. 
 
 Finally, the fifth chapter is comparing the progress of the integration of 
Turkish and Muslim minorities in both countries, by making certain 
references to the events that took place and affected the role of minority 
members. Bulgaria and Greece are compared with regards to their 
educational policies, measures of social inclusion, and political participation 
of minorities. Furthermore, the chapter addresses, in how far variations in 
these categories are stemming from the differences in communist and liberal 
democratic systems.   
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
DEFINING MINORITIES IN BULGARIA AND GREECE AND THE 
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS 
 
 
1.1. THE ERA OF MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL TREATIES: 
CREATING MINORITIES OUT OF NEW NATION STATES BULGARIA 
AND GREECE 
 
 It was not before the second half of nineteen century, the issue of 
minority rights, which has been long time discussed, to take a legal form. At 
the time of conflicts and wars, Balkan states started to draw borders beyond 
their ethnic lines which did not make them exempt from the formation of 
minority rights systems. However, this system was imposed by the big 
powers as it was on the Ottoman Empire. Russia’s Pan-Slavism policy 
started to give its results thanks to the support of the Orthodox Church-
which was the protector of all Eastern Orthodox citizens of the Ottoman 
Empire. With the inclusion of the wars, in late nineteen century, the “Eastern 
question” became one of the major issues of the European History. The 
independence of the Balkan states, and the expansion of their borders at the 
expense of the Ottoman Empire, raised concerns among the European 
powers, since the Russian influence in the Balkans was increasing rapidly. 
In short time, violent conflicts turned to a complicated diplomatic game of the 
“Eastern question”1, where the balance between new powers was to be 
created through territorial regulations.  
 
 Deepening of segregation among the communities in the Balkans 
was taking place through a large scale armed conflicts, which were 
                                                 
1 Mary Neuburger, The Orient Within Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in 
Modern Bulgaria, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2004, p.34. 
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controlled by the elite  circle of people in Bulgaria2 and Greece. Mainly 
European powers were in charge of designing the nation building of new 
states in the Balkans. According to them the dominant position of the 
Orthodox church and its central role, was the key of success in this 
process.3 Balkan nations such as Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians had 
different languages but they were all unified under the Orthodox Patriarchate 
of Constantinople. Situation of the villages in the Balkans was really mixed 
as any ethnic group was not  able to form a majority in the area where it 
existed. Moreover, there was religious division even among the nations who 
spoke the same language like Bosnian Muslims speaking Serbian and 
Pomaks who speak a dialect of Bulgarian.  
 
 Bulgarians were praying together with Greeks and the prayer was 
conducted in Greek language. Among these ethnic tensions in the region, in 
the second half of the nineteenth century, Bulgarian Exarchate was created 
as a result of the ferman signed by the Sultan. This action gave the pave to 
more aggressive actions of nation building in the area. Greece became 
independent in 1830 occupying the Peloponnesus Peninsula and was in 
deep need to enlarge her territory towards north in order to protect herself 
from the Slavs and regain historical Greek lands. 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish 
war marked the change of the situation in the Balkans. For the first time in 
the history Turks were becoming a minority in the areas where they live as a 
result of the Ottoman withdrawal.  
 
 Newly established states in the Balkans were reluctant to offer 
certain rights for the religious or national minorities, since the acceptance of 
their presence would harm the nation building process.4 Creating such 
                                                 
2 Ibid., p.34.  
3 Paschalis M.Kitromilides (a), “Imagined Communities and the Origins of the National Question in 
the Balkans”,  European History Quarterly, Vol. 19 (1989), p. 150.  
 the name given to the order of the Sultan in Ottoman Empire.  
4 Renee Hirschon, History’s Long Shadow: Lausanne Treaty and Contemporary Greco-Turkish 
Relations, in: In the Long Shadow of Europe: Greeks and Turks in the Era of Postnationalism, (Eds.) 
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communities free of external intervention would lead to certain disorders by 
accepting their presence in the newly created states. Moreover, this would 
be contradictory with the idea of national homogeneity, which was the main 
motive of autonomy at first, and independence in a later stage. Both Greece 
and Bulgaria first started the formation of their national identity inside the 
Ottoman “millet system” and later on claimed certain territory with some 
autonomous features. However, after deepening their societal integration, 
these processes ended up with the formation of independent nation states-
with some minority groups. Recognition of a certain minority group would 
ipso facto state that these countries are not homogenous. The main fear 
behind was the potential claims of these minorities which would lead to a 
secession, similar to the one from the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, minority 
rights were ignored and massive migration of Turks from the Balkans took 
place in nineteenth century. When the size of the population was large and 
difficult to manage, recognition of certain rights for minorities was imposed 
on the new nation states in the Balkans. The Treaty of Berlin from 1878 is 
important, being the first multilateral Treaty signed on the rights of minorities. 
 
 
1.1.1. 1878 Berlin Treaty: Imposing Minority Protection on Bulgaria 
 
 After the Russo-Turkish war, the greatest concern was the new 
balance in the Balkan Peninsula. Russia forced Ottomans to sign the San 
Stefano Treaty which had very harsh conditions for the Ottoman State. San 
Stefano Treaty was dealing with the new situation of the borders, but there 
was no single provision for the rights of minorities/communities to be found. 
Since Russian claims for starting the war were based on the rights of the 
Bulgarian Orthodox minority, it was considered weird not including 
regulations for the rights of the Turkish/Muslim minority remained within 
Bulgarian borders as a result of this war. Creation of “Great Bulgaria” 
                                                                                                                                          
Othon Anastasakis, Kalypso Nikolaidis, Kerem Oktem, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, p. 
80.  
15 
 
according to the San Stefano Treaty, resulted with the opposition of the 
European Powers, with Great Britain ahead. Although, in the first instance, 
British interference was justified with the lack of the minority regulations in 
San Stefano Treaty5, the main motive was the creation of Great Bulgaria 
reaching three seas. There was no country in Europe willing to see a strong 
Slavic state, satellite of Russia in the region. Therefore they urged for a new 
treaty to be signed, and gathered together at the Berlin Conference. The 
Treaty of Berlin signed in 1878, was much different than the Treaty of San 
Stefano. First, it reduced the size of the Great Bulgaria, and created an 
autonomous Bulgarian principality under the control of the Sultan. The 
Treaty of Berlin signed between Germany, Austria, Hungary, France, Great 
Britain, Italy, Russia and Turkey, prohibited discrimination on religious 
grounds in Bulgaria. Moreover, recognition of the newly established Balkan 
states was conditional on their adherence to the non-discrimination principle 
on the grounds of religion. Article 5 of the Treaty, dealing with the 
recognition of Bulgaria, states the following requirements: 
 
The difference of religious, creeds and confessions shall not be 
alleged against any person as a ground for exclusion or incapacity in 
matters relating to the enjoyment of civil and political rights, admission 
to public employment, functions and honours, or the exercise of the 
various professions and industries in any locality whatsoever. The 
freedom and outward exercise of all forms of worship shall be assured 
to all persons belonging to the State, as well as to foreigners, and no 
hindrance shall be offered either to the hierarchical organization of the 
different communities, or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs.6 
 
                                                 
5 The Treaty of Berlin and the Convention of Constantinople , Union of Conservative and 
Constitutional Associations, Westminster, 1878.  
6 Francesco Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities, New York, United Nations, 1991, p. 3; and The Treaty of Berlin and the Convention of 
Constantinople, p. 9.  
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 As it can be understood from the Article above, non-discrimination 
covers a wide range of social and political issues, mainly focusing on the 
religious diversity of the citizens of newly established Bulgarian State. After 
signing the Treaty of Berlin, new task for Bulgaria was to make this 
regulations part of her internal legislation via Tarnovo Constitution. Tarnovo 
Constitution, with the article 37, accepted in 1879, was the first Constitution 
of Bulgaria indicating the Eastern Orthodoxy as the official religion of the 
country. Meanwhile, Article 38 was regulating the religious orientation of the 
Bulgarian Prince, stating clearly that the Prince of Bulgaria, as a Head of 
State must be a follower of the Orthodox faith. The only exception of this 
rule, was the religious orientation of the first Prince of Bulgaria, who was 
allowed to be from a different religious background, but his successors were 
strictly obliged to be followers of the Bulgarian Orthodox faith.7 This situation 
can show the importance of the Orthodox religion in Bulgarian national 
identity. Respectively Articles 41 and 42 regulate the worship of Bulgarian 
citizens and foreigners of non-Orthodox Christian faith, stating that they are 
free to practice their religion in Bulgaria. Another aspect of the Article 42 was 
defining the autonomous status of other religions in Bulgaria.  
 
 Nevertheless, the Treaty of Berlin had also another regulation on the 
rights of ethnic minorities. Article 4 of the Treaty stated the following:  
  
In the districts where Bulgarians are intermixed with Turkish, 
Romanian, Greek and other populations, the rights and interests of 
these populations shall be taken into consideration as regards the 
elections and the drawing up of the organic law.8  
 
 This issue of ethnic minorities was also regulated in the Tarnovo 
Constitution, as minorities from non-Bulgarian origin were named as 
                                                 
7 Full text of the Tarnovo Constitution in old Bulgarian version see here: 
http://www.kingsimeon.bg/downloads/Turnovska_Konstitucia.pdf  (access: 11.11.2012). 
8 Francesco Capotorti, p. 3.  
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“Bulgarian citizens from foreign background”. These two articles, regulated 
the very first principles of the minority rights protection in Bulgaria and gave 
a better status to the Tarnovo Constitution. With being aware that the 
recognition of the independence is conditional on the adoption of minority 
protection rules, Bulgarian officials started to defend the idea that the newly 
created state, is not aimed to be the home of only Christian Bulgarians, but 
they wholeheartedly indicated that, Bulgaria is home to all people living in 
her territory. This is how Bulgarian minority protection started from the 
establishment of the new Principality.  
 
 Together with the Treaty of Berlin, there was also another document 
signed between the great powers Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy, France, 
Great Britain, Russia and Turkey. Concluded between aforementioned 
states, the International Convention of Constantinople from 1881, regulated 
the rights of the Muslims left within Greek territories. Article 8 of the 
Convention stated the rights of the Muslim community as follows:  
 
Freedom and the outward exercise of worship shall be assured to 
Mohammedans(Muslims) living in the territories ceded to Greece. 
There shall be no interference with the independence and hierarchical 
organization of the Mohammedan communities at present existing, or 
which may be formed, nor with the management of the funds and 
buildings appertaining to them. No hindrance shall be offered to the 
relations of such communities with their spiritual chiefs on religious 
matters.9 
 
 In terms of civil and political rights, Greek side, accepted the equal 
treatment of minority members with the rest of Greek citizens. As it can be 
seen from the Article mentioned above, the organization of the minorities 
was mainly based on religious division and their rights were normally 
                                                 
9 Francesco Capotorti, p. 3.  
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guaranteed through multilateral conventions or treaties. With the Convention 
of Constantinople in 1881, Mufti was formed as an official institution dealing 
with the organization of religious and social life of the Muslim minority in 
Greece. This is how, by enlarging her territory northwards, Greece started to 
be bound with minority regulations after her independence in 1830. The 
issue which was becoming more important was the ethnic division of the so-
called religious minority. This problem was waiting for its turn in political life 
of the new nation states in the Balkans.  
 
 
1.1.2. Balkan Wars in 1912-1913: Towards More Solid Borders and 
Minority Rights Regime 
 
 After having created their national states, Bulgaria and Greece started 
to plan new actions in order to enlarge their territories at the expense of the 
Ottoman Empire. However, this time the main reason for the expansion was 
the strategic importance of the so-called lands which were still under the 
Ottoman rule. In order to justify their demands for more lands they started to 
publish statistic data about the composition of Balkan population. Usually 
they were using the Ottoman statistic data in order to prove their claims, but 
population records were distorted on papers to serve the propaganda for 
further extension of borders10 of newly independent nation states in the 
Balkan. Division of the Ottoman millet system was based on religious ground 
and not on ethnicity. But often the statistics issued by Bulgaria and Greece 
and referred to the Ottoman census records, were showing the ethnic or 
linguistic origin of the people living in the concerned areas. This was one of 
the proofs how statistics was used to justify territorial claims. The idea 
behind this philosophy was simple: after defining the borders of new nation 
states, Greece and Bulgaria, the next stage was to deal with people living 
there. They were either be accepted as co-nationals or excluded as 
                                                 
10 Justin McCarthy, “Muslims in Ottoman Europe: Population From 1800 to 1912”, Nationalities 
Papers, Vol. 28, No. 1. (2000), p. 29. 
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foreigners.11 As a result of this, geographical division of the borders, was to 
be completed with the mental or imagined divisions.   
 
Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Bulgaria agreed to launch a war 
against the Ottomans in order to enlarge their borders. As a result of the 
First Balkan War, which took place in 1912, Bulgaria managed to get access 
to the Aegean sea by occupying Western Thrace and Greece managed to 
conquest Thessaloniki. This change of the borders affected mostly the 
Turkish communities since these areas were mainly settled by them.12 
Massive migrations started towards Turkey, which caused destruction of the 
Muslim population in the Balkans as a result of starvation, diseases and 
massacres conducted by the irregular Bulgarian and Greek groups.   
 
 Meanwhile, between the allies of the First Balkan War, there was a 
disagreement regarding the share obtained from the Ottoman territories. 
Mainly Greece and Serbia were not satisfied with what they have obtained 
from the war and therefore declared war against Bulgaria. Ottoman Empire 
used the same opportunity in order to get back Edirne from Bulgarians. As a 
result of the Second Balkan War in 1913, peace treaties have been signed 
with Bulgaria and Greece in order to secure the rights of the Turks and  
Muslim subjects remaining out of the Ottoman borders.  
 
 Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria and Turkey signed at Istanbul,  
September 30, 1913, offered certain rights to the Muslim population who 
stayed in Bulgaria. Article 8 of the Treaty, states that “Muslim subjects of 
Bulgaria” shall enjoy the same social and political rights as citizens from 
Bulgarian origin. Freedom of religion and its distinct character has been 
preserved. Moreover, for the first time, it is indicated that “The name of His 
Imperial Majesty the Sultan as Caliph, shall continue to be pronounced in 
                                                 
11 Mary Neuburger, p. 13.  
12 W. L. G. Joerg, “The New Borders of the Balkan States and Their Significance”, Bulletin of the 
American Geographical Society, Vol. 45, No. 11. (1913), p. 827-829. 
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the public prayers of Muslims”.13 This article is very important to see the role 
of the Caliph and its influence on the Turkish/Muslim population in Bulgaria. 
The election of Mufti, who is the religious leader of the Muslim community in 
Bulgaria, is agreed to be done by the direct election of the Bulgarian 
Muslims. After the Balkan Wars, the rights of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria 
were regulated more detailed, indicating clearly, social, political and religious 
aspects of their daily life.  
 
 Second Balkan War had also different effect on the Muslims left within 
Greek borders. The Treaty of Peace Between Turkey and Greece was 
signed at Athens, November 11, 1913. According to the Peace Treaty of 
Athens, Muslims who reside in the territories which became Greek with the 
recent wars, were given the right to choose their citizenship, to stay in 
Greece or to emigrate to Turkey. The immunity of property rights of the 
Muslims who became Greek subjects was confirmed. Regarding the 
religious life, similar to the Treaty signed with Bulgaria, the Treaty of Athens 
indicates that, civil and political rights of the Muslims are assured as well as 
their equal treatment with citizens from Greek origin. Pronouncing the name 
of the Sultan as Caliph, during the public prayers of the Muslims has been 
accepted by the Greek side.  Muslims are given the right and autonomy in 
terms of their religious regulations. But the most important article is the one 
that deals with the election of Mufti as religious leader of Muslim community. 
According to Article 11 of the Peace Treaty of Athens, it is explicitly stated 
that, “the Muftis, each within his own community, shall be elected by Muslim 
electors”.14 This last phrase is significant to  the organization of the religious 
life in Greece, since Mufti’s are able to exercise also some legal acts which 
are officially recognized by Greek authorities.  
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Treaty of Peace Between Bulgaria and Turkey, Istanbul, 30 September 1913.  
14 The Treaty of Peace Between Turkey and Greece, November 11, 1913, Article 11.  
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1.1.3. 1919 Neuilly Treaty 
 
 After the end of the First World War, Bulgaria had to sign Neuilly 
Peace Treaty as a defeated country. Bulgaria entered in to the War in order 
to complete her territorial claims toward south, west and north. However, 
being a defeated country had very bad consequences for Bulgaria. Bulgaria 
lost Western Thrace, her exit to the Aegean Sea. But more important were 
the tough conditions of a Peace Treaty which was punishment of Bulgaria’s 
national and territorial aspirations. Neuilly Treaty, signed in 1919, not only 
had regulations on the new borders of Bulgaria, but also for the rights of 
minorities. Fourth part of the Neuilly Treaty, including the Articles from 49 to 
57, was dedicated to minority rights in Bulgaria. With the Article 49, 
superiority of Neuilly Peace Treaty regulations, pertaining to the rights of 
minorities in Bulgaria is assured. Bulgarian part accepts that no official 
action or amendment shall be in conflict with the principles indicated on the 
Treaty. Bulgaria accepts the equal treatment of her citizens, and prohibits 
discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion and language. The freedom 
of religion is guaranteed for all Bulgarian nationals.15  
 
 The Peace Treaty of Neuilly had more conditions beyond offering 
equal treatment to the minorities in Bulgaria. For the first time in Bulgarian 
history, Muslim/Turkish minority has had distinct rights in terms of schooling, 
language issue and separate religious organization, which before was 
regulated with the Treaty of Berlin. Restrictions of using another language 
than the Bulgarian in public, private, religious worship, schooling or for 
publication purposes are prohibited. Defense at courts in mother tongue, 
other than Bulgarian has been secured with the Neuilly Treaty. Moreover, 
Bulgarian nationals from different religious and language backgrounds are 
granted the right to open and manage their own educational establishments 
                                                 
15 Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria, and Protocol and 
Declaration signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine, 27 November 1919, Section IV, Minority Protection.  
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at their own expense, where they can work and study in their mother tongue. 
It is stated that, the right to have teaching in mother tongue does not prevent 
authorities from making obligatory learning Bulgarian at schools.16 It can be 
said that the Neuilly Treaty was creating very liberal system for the Turkish 
minority in Bulgaria as Turks were the only minority to benefit from such 
regulations. Nevertheless, the flow of the political developments in Bulgaria 
would turn this to a struggle, resulting with the denial of the rights of Turkish 
minority.  
 
 
1.1.4. 1923 Lausanne Treaty and the Recognition of  Muslim/Turkish 
Minority in Greece (Western Thrace) 
 
 The end of the First World War, changed the situation of Muslim 
minorities in Greece very deeply. First, the Treaty of Sèvres was signed by 
the Ottoman Empire in August 1920, which due to its harsh conditions was 
not accepted by the National Grand Assembly in Ankara and by Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk. Second reason was the Greek campaign to occupy Izmir and 
western Turkey. However, when the Greek troops were forced to withdraw 
from Turkish lands, new Treaty with more acceptable conditions was signed 
as a result of Lausanne Conference held in 1923.  
 
 The Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923 
put an official end to the war between allied powers and Turkey. Apart from 
recognizing the existence of new Turkish Republic, Lausanne Treaty made 
some regulations on the rights of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey, which 
were applicable for the Muslim minorities in Greece. Section 3 of the 
Lausanne Treaty, including articles from 37 to 45, deals with the protection of 
minorities in Greece and Turkey. According to Lausanne Treaty, the rights of 
the Muslim/Turkish Minority in Greece are indicated as follows: 
                                                 
16 Ibid., Articles 53-55.  
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- Greece accepts that, her future legal regulations and actions shall 
not be in conflict or interfere with the stipulations of Lausanne 
Treaty (Article 37). 
- The Greek Government undertakes to assure protection of all 
inhabitants regardless of their nationality, language, race or 
religion. All inhabitants of Greece shall enjoy free exercise of their 
religion either in public or private (Article 38). 
- Greek nationals from non-Greek origin are entitled to the same civil 
and political rights as the citizens from Greek origin. All inhabitants 
of Greece, regardless of religious orientation, shall be equal before 
law. There should not be any discrimination as to admission to 
public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of 
professions and industries. Restrictions on use of another 
language other than Greek, in private, public, in the press are 
prohibited (Article 39).  
- Muslim minorities of Greece shall enjoy the same treatment and 
security in law. Additionally, they shall have the right to establish 
and manage at their own expense, any charitable, religious and 
social institutions and schools with the right to use their own 
language and to freely practice their religion.  
- In places where considerable proportion of minority population 
lives, Greek Government shall provide initial assistance that 
primary education is offered to children in their mother tongue. 
However, this does not prevent the Greek Government from 
making the teaching of Greek language obligatory. In addition to 
this, it is stated in the Lausanne Treaty that in towns and districts 
where there is a significant number of minority members, they shall 
be provided with public funding from the State in order to conduct 
their educational, religious and charitable activities (Article 41).  
- The Greek Government is under obligation to ensure the protection 
of mosques, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the 
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Muslim minorities in Greece (Article 42).17 
 
In fact articles which are briefly indicated above are valid in the same 
way for the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. Hereby with the Article 45, 
Greek Government, accepts to be bound with the minority regulations of the 
Lausanne Treaty regarding the Muslim minority in her territory. Regarding the 
territorial scope of minority rights in Greece there is no certain limit indicated 
in the section of minority rights of the Lausanne Treaty. However, Greek 
Governments limited the use of minority rights and regulations accepted at 
Lausanne only with Western Thrace. Main reason for this might be signing 
the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations 
at Lausanne, January 30, 1923. This case will be examined below in line with 
the situation of Lausanne Treaty. Although the issue at the time of the 
conference was not focusing so much on the territorial scope of rights, there 
were certain doubts about the situation of Muslim properties in Greece. As a 
result of the discussions made at Lausanne, “Declaration Relating to Moslem 
Properties in Greece” was signed by the Greek representative Eleftherios 
Venizelos.18 According to this declaration, Greek Government declares that, 
there shall be no infringement of rights to property held by Muslims in Greece 
who left Greece before 1912 and were not subject of the population 
exchange agreement signed at Lausanne. But up until now, there is no 
certain information on how many people were allowed to go back to Greece 
in order to deal with the property left before 1912.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923.  
18 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ix_-declaration-relating-to-moslem-properties-in-greece.en.mfa (access: 
15.11.2012)  
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1.2. POPULATION EXCHANGE AS A METHOD TO PREVENT MINORITY 
ISSUES 
 
 The very first idea of a population exchange emerged as a result of 
the Balkan Wars and the First World War, which have concluded not only 
with territorial changes, but also with the massive migration waves. In fact, 
years before the First World War, newly independent states in the Balkans, 
under the effect of their glorified historical accomplishments, tried to recreate 
their national states on the European part of Ottoman Empire. However, 
such kind of process made it necessary the confrontation not only against 
Muslims, but also between Orthodox Christians. Ottoman “millet system” 
was based on a religious division. Therefore Orthodox Christians were 
accepted as one group, and the Orthodox Church was responsible for the 
safeguarding of community. After the French Revolution, the national groups 
started to be defined by common race, culture and language which was 
embedded in the national consciousness of the Balkan nations.19 First effect 
of the segregation showed itself not with the territorial independence, but 
with the division of Orthodox Churches. Bulgarians were conducting the 
worship in Greek together with Greeks at the Greek Orthodox Church. This 
situation started to change after the Greek independence in 1830. Gradually, 
the request for creation of an independent Bulgarian Orthodox Church was 
intensified. This nationalization of the church/religion became official with the 
“ferman” (irade-imperial order) of the Sultan on 28 February 1870, as a 
result of which Bulgarian Exarchate was created.  
 
 Preservation of the collective Christian identity was the task of the 
Orthodox Church in the Balkans during the Ottoman rule. However, with the 
time passed this non-national profile of the Church has changed. Discourse 
of the religious belonging was politicized by nationalism20, which was the 
                                                 
19 A. Triandafyllidou & A. Paraskevopoulou, “When is the Greek Nation? The Role of Enemies and 
Minorities”, Geopolitics, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2002), p. 79.  
20 Paschalis M. Kitromilides (a), p. 178.   
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reason for deeper segregations and led to national Orthodox Churches, 
being perceived as pillars of new national identities in the Balkans. 
Ecumenical character of the Orthodoxy was abandoned and culminated in to 
perception of a direct link between Orthodoxy and national belonging. 
Balkan Wars were the first direct confrontation of these newly created 
national identities, where political side of the construction was reshaped. 
Balkan Wars were also important to underline the significance of territorial 
belonging, while kin communities left on the other side of the border were 
considered as potential areas to expand in the future, embedding irredentist 
incentives in the idea of national belonging.  
 
 Maltreatment of minority groups were perceived as causes of new 
wars and there was an effort to prevent this by making minority treaties, 
through which the rights of minority groups would be guaranteed. Minority 
treaties, as a method to protect the rights of people belonging to racial, 
ethnic and religious groups21 was used until the beginning of First World 
War. The fact that Greek identity was defined with common kinship based 
on race, religion and culture, and embedded with the idea to liberate lands 
where other Greek people live, created an irredentist movement in the 
Southeast Europe. Bulgaria started to follow the same model, and both 
countries did not hesitate to fight with each other in order to realize their 
national goals. Despite this Greek irredentist movement, emblazoned with 
the ideas of Hellenism looked like directly threatening Turkey, Bulgaria also 
perceived a threat due to her expansionist aims. This policy itself was the 
reason of the tendency to see minorities as fifth column and to get rid of 
them in order to prevent further irredentist movements.  
 
 In line with the developments above, after the First World War first 
population exchange agreements were signed between Bulgaria and 
                                                 
21 Richard B. Bilder, Can Minorities Treaties Work?, in: The Protection of Minorities and Human 
Rights, Ed. Yoram Dinstein, and Mala Tabory, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992, p. 59-
60.  
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Greece, Turkey and Greece in order to put an end of further territorial 
expansions. Despite there is a tendency to see the Greek-Turkish population 
exchange as first of its kind in the modern history of Europe, in reality, 
Bulgarian-Greek population exchange signed in 1919 as a convention 
attached to Neuilly Treaty, is the first agreement in Europe regarding the 
mutual emigration of minorities. Greek-Turkish population exchange is the 
second one signed as a convention attached to Lausanne Peace Treaty in 
January 1923. The only difference between the two conventions involving 
reciprocal emigration and mutual exchange is the type of migration. In the 
Bulgarian-Greek case, emigration of minorities was of voluntary character, 
and in the Greek-Turkish case it was compulsory for everyone except the 
Greeks in Istanbul and Turkish/Muslim minority in Western Thrace.22 
However, after Greece’s Asia Minor catastrophe, emigration of Bulgarians in 
Greece took compulsory form due to the immigration of Greeks from Turkey. 
Attempts to create additional minority treaties for those who opted to remain 
in Bulgaria and Greece failed, which dramatically changed the population 
structure and social movement in the Bulgarian-Greek borderland. 
Consequently, after the wars in order to expand borders, population 
exchange has been accepted as the last solution to prevent irredentist 
movements in the area. In fact the idea to transfer populations was a 
methodology imposed by the nationalist movements of newly established 
Balkan states, as a result of which, the idea of a nation state to create 
homogeneous nations was to be realized through the international law.23 It 
became a general tendency of nation states Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey to 
clear up the ethnic composition of populations by migration, in order to 
prevent wars and future border changes. 
 
                                                 
22 A. A. Pallis, “Racial Migrations in the Balkans during the Years 1912-1924”, The Geographical 
Journal, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Oct., 1925), p. 319.  
23 Konstantinos Tsitselikis (a), Exchange of Population: A Paradigm of Legal Perversion, in: The 
Protection of National Minorities by Their Kin-State, European Commission for Democracy Through 
Law, Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, 2002, p. 135.  
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The Bulgarian-Greek reciprocal migration process was subject to 
many discussions regarding the scope of migration and its effect on the 
property rights of people who emigrated. Convention for the reciprocal 
emigration signed in 1919 between Bulgaria and Greece, was the first 
population exchange implemented by the League of Nations. Suddenly this 
process had led to a litigation at the Permanent Court of International 
Justice(PCIJ) which resulted with the famous “community definition”, 
reflecting formation of minority identities in the area at that time. In the 
Turkish-Greek migration case the main issue to solve was the meaning of 
the term “établis” (settled) in order to find out who was exempted from the 
provisions of the Convention for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish 
populations. Both cases will be analyzed below in detail.  
 
 
1.2.1. Bulgarian-Greek Convention for Reciprocal Emigration  
 
 For strategic reasons Bulgaria aimed to have an exit to the Aegean 
Sea. Initial unification with Eastern Rumelia gave the opportunity to Bulgaria, 
to pursue her goals for further expansion of the borders. First and Second 
Balkan Wars were very important to realize this aim, and as a result of both 
wars, Bulgaria secured an access to the Aegean Sea with the annexation of 
Western Thrace, where significant Bulgarian population was living. But the 
result of the Firs World War changed everything dramatically. First, Bulgaria 
lost the war and had to sign Neuilly Peace Treaty, and the control of 
Western Thrace was ceded to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. In 
1920, with the Treaty concerning Thrace, signed in Sèvres, Principal Allied 
and Associated Powers ceded the area to Greece, which effectively became 
Greek territory in 1924 after the ratification of Treaty by Greece.24 Second, 
attached to the Neuilly Peace Treaty, a Convention for the Reciprocal 
                                                 
24 Stephen P. Ladas, Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey, New York, The 
Macmillan Company, 1932, p. 44. 
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Emigration between Bulgaria and Greece was signed regarding the 
voluntary emigration of national minorities.  
 
 First article of the Convention for Reciprocal Emigration recognized 
the right for emigration of those people who belong to racial, religious and 
linguistic minorities of the respective states, Bulgaria and Greece.25 But the 
issue to divide and define the people who are covered with the provisions of 
the convention, turned to be a really problematic one. Living for centuries 
together, Bulgarians and Greeks were mixed, having many things in 
common. It was difficult to define the real target of the convention, based on 
the indicators such as race and language. At the time when the Convention 
was signed, race was used to indicate the cultural and ethnic peculiarities of 
people. During the Ottoman rule in the area, villages and settlements were 
all mixed in a way that single ethnicity was not dominant in one place. 
Despite this fact, people from different ethnic background, who lived 
together for long time, were talking the more important language in the area. 
Therefore, there were cases in some rural areas, where people from 
Bulgarian background were going to the Bulgarian Church for worship but 
speaking in Greek. Same was valid for Greeks in Macedonia and some 
other areas where Bulgarian was perceived as important language.26  
 
However, during the second half of nineteenth century, there was a 
segregation between the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul and the 
supporters of a separate Bulgarian Orthodox Church. In 1870, after the 
creation of Bulgarian Exarchate in Istanbul, religious affiliation of the 
followers of Orthodox religion in both countries changed also on national 
grounds, which made the distinction more clear.27 Following this process, 
membership to both national churches-Bulgarian and Greek, turned to be an 
                                                 
25 Convention for the Reciprocal Emigration Between Bulgaria and Greece, signed at November 27th, 
1919, Article 1.  
26 Stephen P. Ladas, p. 77-79. 
27 Stephen P. Ladas, p. 78.  
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indicator of national affiliation as well. Therefore, religion was the most 
efficient way to make distinction between Greeks and Bulgarians. 
 
 After having clarified the borders of Greek state and eligible people 
based on race, language and religion, the next stage of the work was to 
implement the provisions of the Convention for Reciprocal Emigration. Since 
provisions of emigration stipulated under the Convention were voluntary, 
applications for emigration were really limited. Meanwhile, Bulgaria was 
reluctant to apply the provisions of the Convention, and attempted to 
preserve the existence of Bulgarian population in Greece, mainly in regions 
like Macedonia and Western Thrace.28 Bulgaria was planning that large 
number of Bulgarians concentrated in Greek territory, would support her 
claims for the revision of territorial changes made in Neuilly Treaty, which 
would help to accomplish her irredentist aims. On the other side, Greece, 
tried to encourage such migrations in order to strengthen her sovereignty in 
the newly acquired territories. The influx of Greek people into Macedonia 
and Western Thrace would help the country to change the demography in 
the areas which were newly annexed to Greece.  
 
 Mixed Commission was created in 1920 which was in charge to 
manage the migration process between both countries and to collect the 
declarations of migration. But first declarations were collected in 1922, two 
years after its creation. By June 1923, 197 declarations of Greek families in 
Bulgaria, and 166 of Bulgarian families in Greece were registered.29 Still 
Bulgarian part was more in favor to offer minority protection to Greeks who 
are staying in Bulgaria, and to ensure reciprocally the same rights for the 
Bulgarian minority in Greece. But the existence of minorities was perceived 
as a threat by the Greek part. This threat apprehension had its external and 
internal justifications for the Greek Government at the time. First, tolerant 
                                                 
28 Theodora Dragostinova (a), “Navigating Nationality in the Emigration of Minorities between 
Bulgaria and Greece, 1919-1941”, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 23(2009), p. 186.  
29 Stephen P. Ladas, p. 104-105.  
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policies of the Agrarian Union and the Government of Stamboliyski towards 
the Greek minority in Bulgaria30 were not welcomed by the Greek 
Government, as this was simply interpreted as potential for a voluntary 
assimilation of the Greek population in the future. Privileged economic and 
intellectual status of the Greek minority in some cities like Plovdiv and 
Burgas, and the existence of mixed marriages between Greeks and 
Bulgarians31, were considered among the other motives to ease the 
voluntary assimilation process of the Greek minority in Bulgaria.  
 
 Second aspect of the Greek approach was shaped along the lines of 
national security and strengthening the Greek component in recently 
acquired lands Macedonia and Western Thrace. Strong presence of 
Bulgarians in these areas was accepted as a threat to the future of Greek 
sovereignty in the region. Creation of a nation state took a form which could 
not tolerate anymore presence of a minority. Initially, the attempts to create 
minority rights mechanism in both countries failed. Representatives of 
Greece and Bulgaria, Politis and Kalfoff signed two protocols to set up a 
legal minority protection. However, they never came into force, as the Greek 
National Assembly rejected both documents.32 Despite some arguments that 
Greece was the only country in favor to set up minority protection33, it is 
obvious that, on the other side, support for reciprocal emigration was bigger.  
 
 Bulgarian minority living on the border with Bulgaria became the first 
target of the migration wave. As a result of small scale conflicts created 
through the organized cooperation between the Greek Government and 
Greek Orthodox Church, Bulgarians living in border areas started to 
emigrate.34 Suddenly their move forced also Greeks living in Bulgarian lands 
to emigrate to Greece. There were disorders and violation of the voluntary 
                                                 
30 Theodora Dragostinova (b), Between Two Motherlands: Nationality and Emigration Among the 
Greeks of Bulgaria, 1900-1949, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2011, p. 131.  
31 Theodora Dragostinova (b), p. 124. 
32 Konstantinos Tsitselikis (a), p. 137. 
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principle of the migration process itself. Meanwhile, formation of nation state 
created deeper segregations among the members of community, which 
imposed on them the choice of certain ethnic identity and their country of 
citizenship. This conflict started to escalate after the Greece’s Asia Minor 
disaster, when Greeks started to emigrate from Turkey. They were seen as 
“potential colonizers” for the new Greek territories like Macedonia and 
Western Thrace where Hellenic component was weak.  
 
 Emigration of people in both countries created the problem with 
property ownership which was really challenging for the Mixed Commission. 
Cases with Bulgarian refugees who had to leave Greek lands after 1906 
became really problematic with the inflow of the Greeks coming from Turkey. 
Because Bulgarian refugees who left Greece earlier without being able to 
liquidate their properties. According to the Convention for Reciprocal 
Emigration, those who left Greece earlier, were given the opportunity to 
return, or to retain property rights in Greece. However, migration of Greeks 
from Asia Minor made the issue really complex one. Most of them settled in 
the abandoned Bulgarian houses or started to use their properties which 
made impossible the return of Bulgarian refugees. Moreover it was 
perceived as threat to keep the property ownership rights in Greece with the 
Bulgarian citizenship.35 Extending migration was perceived as the only way 
to solve the issue regarding property and minority rights. Removing mixed 
ethnic groups was accepted as the main solution to prevent the irredentist 
claims, since the existence of minorities per se and granting them special 
rights was unacceptable for the new nation states, which were still in the 
process of nation building.  
 
 Failure to ensure minority rights to the Bulgarians in Greece and 
Greeks in Bulgaria, resulted with the escalation of the reciprocal emigration. 
                                                 
 Asia Minor Disaster is the name Greeks use for the defeat of the Greek Army in 1922 in the Greco-
Turkish War (1919-1922)  and the subsequent expulsion of Greek presence from Asia Minor 
35 Stephen P. Ladas, p. 92. 
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As a result of this process, Convention for the Reciprocal Emigration, which 
was regulating only voluntary emigration, but when all the process became 
deliberately forced, there was nothing left to do except property liquidation 
for the emigrants in both parts. In the end of this period, it is estimated that, 
46.000 Greeks left Bulgaria for Greece and 92.000 Bulgarians moved from 
Greece to Bulgaria.36  
 
 
1.2.2. The Importance of the Greek-Turkish Population Exchange   
 
 The end of the First World War did not bring the peace itself to 
Turkey. Soon after the ceasefire Turkey was occupied by the allied powers. 
However, then most important aspect of this occupation was done by 
Greece. Greek troops came to Izmir in May 1919 and started to expand their 
control over central Anatolia. In fact this move was backed by the British 
Empire both logistically and politically. When Brits had to withdraw from 
Anatolia and occupied parts of Istanbul, their hopes were to be realized by 
Greeks. After the end of the First World War, British policy towards Near 
East was directed by group of people who were under the effect of 
“Philhellenism”.37 This idea to recreate ancient Greece along Byzantine 
traditions, incorporating romanticism, gave the last shape to the idea of  
Neo-Hellenism, which had many supporters among the British politicians. 
Existence of “Greater Greece” as close British ally in the region, was 
perceived as the only solution to secure the British influence in this area for 
long term. 
 
                                                 
 Unfortunately not all people were able to follow the process through Mixed Commission created. 
Escalation of the migration wave was not a peaceful process, contrary, it was a process involving 
violent actions to force people leave their homeland. This was the case for Bulgarians living in the 
border areas of Greece, and Greek communities living in central and Black Sea regions of Bulgaria.  
36 Konstantinos Tsitselikis (a), p. 137.  
37 Erik Goldstein, “Great Britain and Greater Greece 1917-1920”, The Historical Journal, Vol. 32, 
No. 2. (1989), p. 339.  
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 Turkish denial of harsh conditions of the Sèvres Treaty, and 
opposition towards Greek occupation, changed political situation in the 
region dramatically. First, with the Greek occupation of Western Anatolia, it 
became obvious that Greeks are continuing their irredentist aims and will do 
so in the future until they form Greater Greece. Second, collaboration 
between local Greek population and Greek occupation forces, created 
distrust between Turks and Greeks.  
 
 After the defeat of Greece in 1922 in Western Anatolia, Greek troops 
left Izmir. With the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkey started to 
negotiate new conditions for the peace treaty to be signed at Lausanne. 
However, before the conditions of permanent peace were decided, separate 
Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations 
was signed at Lausanne, January 30, 1923.  
 
 According to the VI. Convention signed at Lausanne, compulsory 
exchange of Muslim population in Greece and Greek population in Turkey 
was agreed by Turkey and Greece.38 Meanwhile, there were some 
exceptions regarding the compulsory exchange of minorities: according to 
Article 2 of the Convention, Greek inhabitants of Istanbul and Muslim 
inhabitants of Western Thrace were exempt from the provisions of the 
Convention. Greco-Turkish Convention for population exchange was 
different from the Greco-Bulgarian one, as migration of minorities was 
compulsory in the first case and voluntary in the second one.39 However, 
due to internal conditions of the Greek social and political life, voluntary 
character of the migration in Greco-Bulgarian Convention, changed to the 
compulsory one as a result of some violent events, which took place mainly 
in regions like Macedonia and Thrace. With the massive influx of Greek 
refugees from Turkey, Bulgarian minority in Greece was forced to emigrate. 
                                                 
38 Lausanne Peace Treaty VI. Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations 
Signed at Lausanne, January 30, 1923, Article 1.  
39 A. A. Pallis, p. 319.   
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 The exchange of the populations in both sides was based on religious 
orientation according to the Article 1 of the Convention Concerning the 
Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations. However, there were 
significant problems that arose, when the eligible ones were to be 
designated. Terms like “Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion” 
and “Greek nationals of Muslim religion”’ turned to be very vague to detect 
the target group along the Ottoman ethnic mixture. Existence of Muslim 
Albanians in Greece and Armenians, Syrians, Russians, Romanians of the 
Greek Orthodox faith became a real question while managing the migration 
process.40 Turkish and Greek delegations agreed to exempt Albanian 
Muslims from the exchange, after a discussion of the case with the Mixed 
Commission. Nevertheless, when it came to define the eligibility of the 
different ethnic subjects whose religious orientation was perceived to be the 
Greek Orthodox Church, Mixed Commission decided to follow a different 
pattern. In its decision on 31 May 1927, Mixed Commission stated clearly 
that, Article 1 of the Convention pertaining to the criteria of “Greek Orthodox 
religion” is not applicable to all Eastern Orthodox Religions.41 In order to 
justify this decision, Commission referred to the national divisions which 
occurred during the nineteenth century from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of 
Istanbul like Greek Orthodox Church, Bulgarian Orthodox Church etc.  
 
 In fact this was quite correct when referring to the very nature of the 
exchange of populations, since Turkey wanted to discard mainly the Greek 
population and prevent Greek irredentism. Therefore, target group was not 
the followers of certain belief, but mainly ethnic Greeks. In the Greek side, 
Asia Minor Disaster had really big impact on the social and political life. It 
marked the end of the ideal to reestablish the Hellenic State which might 
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incorporate Istanbul and Western Anatolia, where traditional Greek 
population was living.42  
 
 When migration started, soon first written complaints were forwarded 
to the Mixed Commission. Turkish delegation was complaining from the fact 
that properties of the Turkish/Muslim minority in Western Thrace were 
seized by the Greek Government for the purposes to accommodate Greek 
refugees coming from Asia Minor. By the year of 1924, 8245 rooms in rural 
houses and 5590 rooms in urban houses were occupied by Greek refugees 
coming from Turkey. In addition to this 127 mosques and Muslim schools, 
667 stables and granaries belonging to Muslims were seized to 
accommodate Greek refugees.43 Simply, Greek Government had a great 
difficulty to accommodate all refugees and therefore decided to use Western 
Thrace as first step before they were sent to their final destination 
Macedonia in order to increase Greek presence there. To achieve this aim 
they had to wait the area to be cleaned from Muslims who were to leave for 
Turkey, and force the Bulgarian minority to leave the country as part of 
Greco-Bulgarian Convention for Reciprocal Emigration.  
 
 Lausanne Peace Treaty ended the conflict between Greece and 
Turkey. As part of the compulsory population exchange, 1,300,000 Orthodox 
Greeks left Anatolia for Greece and 500,000 Greek Muslims migrated from 
Greece to Turkey.44 Migration of kin minority groups, was certainly perceived 
as a tool to strengthen “national character” of these newly established nation 
states by creating more homogenous populations. For Turkey, this was 
realized by getting rid of Greek irredentist presence, while for Greece it was 
in the form of settlement of newly acquired territories by ethnic Greeks 
coming mainly from Anatolia and Bulgaria.  
                                                 
42 Onur Yildirim, “The 1923 Populations Exchange, Refugees and National Historiographies in 
Greece and Turkey”, East European Quarterly, XL, No. 1(2006), p.45.  
43 Stephen P. Ladas, p. 478.  
44 Nora Fisher Onar & Meriç Özgüneş, “How Deep a Transformation? Europeanization of Greek and 
Turkish Minority Policies”, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 17(2010), p. 
113.  
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1.2.3. League of Nations as an International Actor to Manage Minority 
Rights and Exchange of Minorities between Bulgaria-Greece and 
Greece-Turkey 
 
 League of Nations was created as a result of the Paris Peace 
Conference after the First World War. The main goal of its creation was to 
solve disputes between states without violence. Apart from this it was 
considered to be an organization where states, were discussing problems 
created with the harsh conditions of Peace Treaties that ended the War. 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was created as an 
organization attached to the League of Nations, where binding decisions or 
advisory opinions on international issues were given to countries which 
submitted requests. 
 
 Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey often applied to the PCIJ in order to 
solve misunderstandings and disputes over the treaties signed after the war 
and mainly on the issues of minority exchange and interpretations of the 
respective treaties. Minority treaties were signed with defeated states, and 
League of Nations had a supervisory role in monitoring the treaties and 
implementation. It was during this period that minority rights enjoyed 
popularity in the international arena and the legitimation of international 
protection via League of Nations was achieved.45 
 
 During the implementation process of the provisions pertaining to the 
exchange of minorities in Lausanne Treaty, Greece and Turkey submitted a 
request for advisory opinion to define the status of “établis” (settled or 
established) people who had to be exempted from the compulsory 
                                                 
45 Hurst Hannum, The Concept and Definition of Minorities, in: Universal Minority Rights: A 
Commentary on the Jurisprudence of International Courts and Treaty Bodies, (Ed.) Marc Weller, 
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exchange.46 This was perceived as the last solution to end disputes on the 
status of people who were part of the compulsory exchange or not. 
 
 However, the most important advisory opinion given by the PCIJ was 
on the question of the Greco-Bulgarian “Communities” submitted by the 
Greek and Bulgarian governments. Neuilly Treaty resulted with significant 
territorial changes for Bulgaria as Western Thrace was given to Greece. 
Convention for the Reciprocal Emigration was based on voluntary migration, 
and with the process following it changed to compulsory one, eradicating the 
presence of Bulgarian minority in Greece. Meanwhile both states had a 
dispute on the term “Community” used since it was perceived only as legal 
body by the Greek side while Bulgarian part was insisting that it possesses 
ethnic character as minority group.47  
 
 In its decision on the “Greco-Bulgarian Communities” case, PCIJ 
unanimously decides that; “Community” is a group of persons living in a 
given country or locality, having a race, religion, language, and traditions in a 
sentiment of solidarity, with a view of preserving their traditions, maintaining 
their form of worship, securing the instruction and upbringing of their children 
in accordance with the spirit and traditions of their race and mutually 
assisting one another.48 Despite the fact that this definition was made solely 
as an interpretation of the term community in Greco-Bulgarian case, it is still 
important to have a definition how minorities were defined in the Balkans in 
early twentieth century. 
 
 Another important issue raised by PCIJ, was about the main reason 
of minority exchange between Bulgaria and Greece. Convention for 
Reciprocal Emigration was interpreted as a way to eliminate or reduce 
                                                 
46 PCIJ, Series B-No.10, February 21, 1925. This advisory opinion gave clear indication to Greece and 
Turkey how the status of established people was to be defined.  
47 List of questions drawn up by the Greek Government, PCIJ, Series B-No.17, July 31, 1930. 
48 PCIJ, Series B-No.17, July 31, 1930; Malcolm N. Shaw, The Definition of Minorities in 
International Law, in: The Protection of Minorities and Human Rights, Ed. Yoram Dinstein, Mala 
Tabory, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992, p. 8-9.  
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irredentist movements in the Balkans, which were sources of conflict 
between new states.49 However, there was different remark made regarding 
the presence of minorities which were not subject of exchange. While 
discussions between Bulgaria and Greece were continuing amid flow of 
refugees from both sides, PCIJ decided that, the existence of minorities is a 
question of fact; it’s not a question of law.50 As a result of this comment, both 
states focused to clear up their territories from minorities rather than to 
discuss the issue of their presence.  
 
 The League of Nations Minority Treaty system worked well for some 
period, for some minorities in special cases. However, it failed to show 
certain sustainability in the whole process51. As part of Neuilly Treaty, 
Bulgaria had already embarked to set up minority protection system. Sèvres 
Treaty had similar provisions for minorities in Greece. Nevertheless, after 
signing the Convention for Reciprocal Emigration, the atmosphere of mutual 
distrust, made it impossible for both parties to implement minority rights. 
Moreover, as a winner of the First World War, Greek Government, perceived 
minority clauses to be imposed only on losers52 like Bulgaria, and therefore 
they were free either to accept them or not.  
 
 This unilateral perception of Greek Government changed only after 
the war with Turkey, as a result of which Lausanne Peace Treaty was 
signed in 1923. In terms of minority rights, Lausanne Treaty imposed certain 
obligations both on Turkey and Greece regarding their minorities, although 
certain minority groups were not included in this framework of protection. 
Lausanne Treaty is still important with being main basis of minority 
protection system in Greece and legally recognizing Muslims as the only 
minority group in the country. This process made significant change in lives 
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51 Javaid Rehman, The Weaknesses in the International Protection of Minority Rights, The Hague, 
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52 Theodora Dragostinova (b), p. 155.  
40 
 
of Turks/Muslims living both in Bulgaria and Greece, who used to be a single 
unified community under the Ottoman rule, now was divided by borders. 
Turks in Bulgaria were enjoying minority rights provided with Neuilly and 
previously signed treaties, and Turks/Muslims in Greece were protected with 
Lausanne Treaty.   
 
 Until the Second World War, Bulgaria and Greece tried to implement 
some minority rights regulations while being fully engaged with their nation 
building processes. Disputes created by the different interpretation of signed 
treaties were solved via League of Nations or Permanent Court of 
International Justice. However, unequal character of these obligations on 
different countries created mistrust towards the League of Nations Minority 
System in general, which was perceived as an intervention in the internal 
affairs of some countries.53 With the outbreak of Second World War, 
progress in minority rights stopped, since stability and security were even 
more fragile. The next stage of the international involvement on the rights of 
minorities was to be started after the end of the Second World War.   
 
 
1.3. THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS DEALING WITH 
THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES AND THE NEED TO DEFINE MINORITY 
 
 The end of the Second World War marked the beginning of very 
important period regarding human rights in general and minority rights in 
particular. It was necessary first to define and accept universal human rights 
in order to make progress on the rights of minorities. Minority rights emerged 
in late nineteenth century were more of collective character enabling all 
members of the minority to enjoy these rights simply because they are 
belonging to specific minority group. However, with the adoption of liberal 
democracy this tendency has changed parallel with the political philosophy 
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at that time. Individual and his perception as a member of a group became 
more important motive to claim such rights.  
 
 Adoption of Universal Human Rights created discussion also on the 
rights of minorities which has changed their perception in a different way. 
Initial change in the focus of international community from group rights to 
individual human rights, made it necessary to update the system of minority 
rights protection. Therefore first problem to discuss was the target of such 
rights, which made it crucial to invent unique minority definition that would be 
valid globally. In this case it would be more efficient to adopt such clear 
definition in order to ease the process of its application on the group 
concerned.  
 
 However, due to different opinions of countries with significant 
minority populations, process of minority definition was not successful as 
much as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This process of 
transition from group/collective to individual minority rights will be evaluated 
below in detail with the special focus on the study of rights of persons 
belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities conducted by UN 
representative Francesco Capotorti  
 
 
1.3.1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
 Adopted on 10 December 1948 by the United Nations General 
Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights constitutes the basis of 
the rights of all people in the world. Nevertheless, similar to the Charter of 
the United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not contain 
any specific reference to the rights of minorities.54 There was a certain 
hesitation to include such term, as this had been perceived as an obstacle to 
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42 
 
the international scope of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Therefore there was no reference made on the rights of minorities. Instead 
of this, the General Assembly, confirmed that United Nations will be 
engaged with the issue in the future.55  
 
 When general human rights were accepted, situation of minorities 
started to be discussed more. Minority’s different background from the 
majority of the population, created doubts whether it enjoys the same human 
rights as the majority of people in terms of belonging to different community 
and its survival. First, the initial differentiation of minority groups was defined 
based on three different criteria: language, religion and culture.56 On top of 
this division was the anticipation that minorities are connected to the state 
with citizenship and they are in a non-dominant position. Hence they would 
need additional regulations in order to be able to participate in the social and 
political life and to protect their identity.  
 
 Some authors argue that minority rights are an integral part of the 
international protection of human rights.57 However, in terms of human 
rights, this can be only very modest offer, as minorities might need additional 
norms to protect their identity and to be able to participate equally in the 
social and political structures. Therefore this may create some arguments; 
whether minority rights are privileged rights or not, or if accepting such rights 
is not in conflict with the equality principle of the constitution. In fact adopting 
such rights does not constitute directly a privilege, but rather they are 
complementary to the general human rights.58  
 
 Criteria of non-discrimination became to be supported as the main 
idea in the post Second World War period in order to be widely supported by 
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the international community. Distinction between group rights and individual 
rights, created segregation among the states. There was an argument that 
group rights might pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the state59, 
especially if the minority is living in a compact area. The most contested 
aspect was the right to self-determination which was acknowledged mainly 
to the groups. In case of claim for secession, states would have legitimate 
reasons to put limitations with the motive to sustain national security and 
territorial integrity.60  
 
 Meanwhile, there was also terminological change adopted in 1950s. 
Previously in all treaties made during the League of Nations time and also in 
the first years of United Nations, the term “racial minorities” was widely used. 
This term was replaced with the new one “ethnic minorities” in order to refer 
to all minorities globally; religious, cultural, biological etc. The reason behind 
this change was the belief that, the term racial minorities had only physical 
connotation while referring to minorities.61 Thus this update in terminology 
has been perceived to embrace the complexity of the new international 
system.   
 
 
1.3.2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
Struggle to Define Minorities 
 
 Adopted on December 16, 1966, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) is the first important document which refers directly 
to minorities. Article 27 of the ICCPR granted religious, linguistic and ethnic 
minorities the right to enjoy their culture, religion and language. The full 
version of the article is as follows:  
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In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own 
language.   
 
 As it can be understood from the way how the article was structured, 
rights granted here were on individual basis. Nevertheless, it does not 
change the nature of the benefit; the only strength that had been made was 
on the issue of a membership to certain minority group. The term national 
minority was deliberately avoided,62 and instead of it minorities were divided 
in three main groups as religious, linguistic and ethnic.    
 
 Another important aspect of ICCPR is the article 26 which focuses on 
the issue of non-discrimination. It is explicitly indicated that the law shall 
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective 
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. Despite the presence of non-discrimination 
principle in article 26, it is important to have special focus and direct 
reference on minorities63 which is indicative that non-discrimination principle 
in international human rights system is not enough to ensure full protection 
to minorities.64   
 
 The fact that article 27 of the ICCPR makes a reference to minorities, 
but does not indicate their rights in detail, creates new discussions. 
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Definition of minorities becomes the most problematic issue as it will make 
the target of these specific rights more clear. In order to solve this problem, 
UN Sub Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, appointed Francesco Capotorti to conduct a special study on the 
question of minorities, with the aim to find world wide valid definition of the 
term “minority”. The results of the study were published in 1977. So far this 
work is the most comprehensive UN report on this topic.  
 
 The scope of the study is limited with the interpretation of article 27, 
which makes the issue of definition most problematic one. The phrase “in 
those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exists” gives an 
idea about the need of special regulations to persons belonging to minority 
groups.65 But the argument that, such additional regulations might be in 
conflict with principles such as equality and non-discrimination is denied with 
the fact that these regulations are complementary to the general human 
rights and not replacing them. The nature of minority rights could be 
described best, as rights granted to minorities, helping them to preserve 
their own identity while living in peace together with the rest of the 
population.  
  
 Furthermore, an explicit expression such as “in those States in which 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist” is perceived as a direct 
obligation on the contracted parties to recognize the existence of such 
groups in order for article 27 to be applied. Such recognition of a group does 
not influence the existence of this minority in international law (“since 
existence of minorities is not a question of law, it is a fact”), but it may help 
to improve the situation of the group significantly. This type of direct 
recognition provides concrete basis for the protection of minority rights.66 
However Capotorti does not agree with the fact the application of article 27 
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of the Covenant to be limited only with the states which officially recognize 
minorities. According to his opinion this situation may lead to arbitrary 
deprivation of minorities in those countries from the benefits granted by 
article 27 of the ICCPR.67 
 
 With the aim to conduct the study, Special Rapporteur Capotorti 
adopted the following minority definition:  
  
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in 
a non-dominant position, whose members - being nationals of the 
State - possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing 
from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a 
sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, 
traditions, religion or language.68   
 
 Some Governments submitted their opinions regarding the definition 
which Capotorti created for the purposes of this study. Observations 
submitted by the Bulgarian and Greek Governments were almost reflecting 
their policies towards minorities. In its opinion, Greek Government states 
that Caportorti’s definition of minorities is vague, and the characteristic 
features should be distinctive for the group concerned to be clearly 
distinguishable as separate from the majority.69 It is indicated that definition 
provided, does not consider the groups recognized as minorities with an 
international treaty or agreement. In other words the Government needs to 
hold the monopoly to recognize a group as such as minority via international 
agreement, where political will of the state is more independent to grant 
such recognition. Signing process of Lausanne Peace Treaty (in which 
Greek Government recognized Muslims in Western Thrace as the only 
minority in Greece) and tough negotiations before signing it could be a good 
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example for this case. Greek Government argues that, the term “a group 
numerically smaller than the rest of the population” is not clear enough to 
describe a minority per se without considering the geographical area where 
the group lives.70 The last statement of the Greek Government may have 
different implications in case when minority constitutes the majority in the 
geographical area where it lives. However, the Government ignores the fact 
that the subject groups or minorities are compared with the general 
population of the country-citizens, not the regional one or based on its 
regional concentration.  
 
  The opinion of the Bulgarian Government regarding Capotorti’s 
definition was rather short. According to Bulgarian Government, no generally 
accepted definition of “minority” exists. This view is based on the assumption 
that, due to the complex situation of minority problems in the world, a global 
definition of the term “minority” may lead to misinterpretations, considering 
some specific conditions in different states.71  
 
 In the end of the study, Capotorti states that, despite the definition he 
presented was criticized from different aspects, criteria, such as presence of 
a group which has distinct ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics 
different than the rest of the population of the state, is the most objective 
one, and can not be neglected. Therefore according to him, this criteria 
could be the basis for a world-wide definition of the term “minority”.72 The 
reason behind the reluctant attitude to be bound by an international legal 
order is mostly related with the intervention into internal affairs due to 
minority problems. According to Capotorti, most states prefer to be free in 
terms of minorities, since the issue is often connected with the national 
security. Existence of international regulations, opens the door to 
interference in internal affairs - which was the perception inherited from the 
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League of Nations minority protection system. Capotorti recommends that, 
in order to increase the standards of minority protection, more regional or 
bilateral arrangements should be made.73  
 
 
1.3.3. Other Important International Conventions and Regulations 
Dealing with Minorities  
 
 During the Cold War, despite relations between leading powers were 
strained, there was significant progress made in the area of human rights 
with the leading role of international organizations. Apart from ICCPR, 
second important document dealing with minorities was the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination adopted 
on December 21, 1965. Article 1 of the convention clearly states the scope 
of racial discrimination which is described as follows:  
 
In this Convention, the term "racial discrimination" shall mean any 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an 
equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life. 
 
 After article 1, following stage of the convention describes the 
obligations of state parties to ensure the equal treatment of all citizens. 
These obligations are making the convention as a good example to improve 
the rights of people who were disadvantaged in the past.74 However, the 
most important feature of the convention is to embrace ethnic, national or 
racial minorities with the term “racial discrimination”.  
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 Once again, here the argument focused on the issue of non-
discrimination and positive regulations dealing with minorities and to which 
extent these regulations are compatible with the equality principle accepted 
in constitutional documents. The answer concentrated on the different 
character of minority rights as a common ground to ensure the equality to 
disadvantaged groups that suffer due to the lack of such regulations.75 To 
preserve their distinct identity, to be able to participate equally in the social 
and political life, and at the same time to continue its peaceful coexistence 
with rest of population, such positive regulations are of immense importance 
for minorities.  
 
 Another important document was adopted in 1992, soon after the fall 
of Communism. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities could be accepted as a good 
progress in the area. It is important that, for the first time, apart from ethnic, 
linguistic and religious minorities, the term national minorities is used in a 
United Nations (UN) based document. With an emphasis on the protection 
and promotion of minority identities, this declaration, highlights the key factor 
of minority rights. Moreover, this document is making a reference on the 
protection of “cultural identity” in order to adapt the international regulations 
into changing global situation.76   
 
 Establishment of a mandate as UN Independent Expert on minority 
issues, which is directly in charge of minorities, has been accepted as 
another progress made in the area of minority rights. Briefly, the mandate of 
the Independent Expert was established by the UN Commission on Human 
Rights in 2005. Promoting implementation of the Declaration on the Rights 
of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities was the main motive for the creation of the mandate. Protecting 
minorities, protection and promotion of minority cultures, applying the gender 
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perspective in his/her work are among the other duties of the Independent 
Expert.77 
 
 While conducting his/her work, Independent Expert is requested to 
consider the work and opinion of non-governmental organizations (NGO) 
which are working on the same issue. Moreover, Independent Expert is 
requested to make consultations with the Governments. However, the fact 
that the visit of the Independent Expert is conditional to the invitation of the 
Government concerned, brings some limitations to the scope of the 
mandate.78 For instance, in a country where the rights of minorities are 
violated, such work would not take place, since the visit of the Independent 
Expert is conditional to the invitation of the Government.  
 
 The issue of minorities is still among the most sensitive topics in the 
world. Several conventions at international level clearly provide a framework 
for the rights of minorities and minority protection. Despite the fact that 
international community could not reach a consensus on a binding definition 
of minority, there are already neutral criteria how to detect their presence in 
a given country. Obviously, unique conditions in every country make it 
essential to have a special approach in order to find the best solution.79 
Nevertheless, to reach consensus internationally might be difficult most of 
the time. Therefore regional organizations could also contribute in the 
progress of minority issues.   
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1.4. MINORITY RIGHTS REGULATIONS IN EUROPE 
 
For long time Europe has been the place where wars erupted due to 
ethnic tensions. Delicate balance of powers  in Europe had been perceived 
as a way to secure peace in the early twentieth century. Nevertheless, 
ethnic tensions in the Balkans became the first spark of the big catastrophe. 
Minority protection system created as part of the League of Nations 
regulations targeted mainly Eastern European countries, which regarded it 
as a tool of international community to interfere in their internal affairs. This 
situation was another reason for the failure of the League of Nations minority 
protection system, which was working only for certain minority groups in 
specific countries. Therefore, post Second World War period was unique in 
terms of adopting instruments that would be valid for all countries. However, 
apart from international regulations, significant amount of initiation came up 
from regional organizations as well. Europe became more engaged with 
regional human rights regulations to achieve the peace and security in the 
continent.80  
 
Compared to the international regulations, European aspect of 
minority rights has more advanced system. Starting with the formation of 
Council of Europe in 1949, a new impetus was given to the formation of 
more solid human rights regulations in Europe. End of the Second World 
War and adoption of several international documents outlined above, 
created new incentives in Europe to deepen liberal values regarding human 
rights. Being the first European intergovernmental organization, Council of 
Europe became the center of new human rights regulations. It should not be 
confused with the Council of European Union which is an institution 
connected with the EU. 
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1.4.1. European Convention on Human Rights 
 
 Adopted on November 4, 1949, European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) is the most important document in Europe dealing with 
human rights. It constitutes the basis of the European human rights system. 
Council of Europe (CoE) took the initiative to prepare a human rights system 
similar to the one created by the UN with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.  
 
 ECHR was created as a result of efforts described above. However, 
as a system it was more different. With the article 19 of the convention, 
establishment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) was 
accepted in order to observe the application by contracted parties of the 
rights granted. Indeed this enforcement  made it different than the UN 
system, which also brought a significant success to the European human 
rights system.81  
 
 After the fall of communism, European human rights system 
undergone some changes as well. Aspirations of Eastern European 
countries towards an integration with western organizations such as NATO 
and EU, became the new motivation of this change. Initial update in the 
standards of the European human rights system has been adopted, to make 
it more systematic the inclusion of Eastern European countries into western 
organizations. Member states of the European community, accepted 
protection of human rights as the basis of European co-operation which 
were to be spread in other countries in Europe and neighboring states.82  
 
 ECHR does not have positive minority rights provisions. Article 14 
which deals with the prohibition of discrimination - similar to other 
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international regulations - mentions “association with national minority”, 
which is the only direct reference to minorities.83 Here the main assumption 
is that, minorities are granted the same rights as the majority which are 
stipulated in ECHR, and through the principle of non-discrimination, they are 
entitled to claim these rights. States’ arguments whether minorities are 
officially recognized or not, does not affect their eligibility. International Law 
has a clear stance towards the existence of minorities with the following 
principle: decision whether minorities exist in an country or not is not a 
question of law, it is a fact.84 Aforementioned principles constitute the basis 
of the judgments of ECtHR.  
 
 The lack of positive minority regulations became leading discussion 
within the European human rights system. CoE summits were often dealing 
with the issue to provide positive minority regulations. However, due to 
ideological differences between countries, regulations dealing with minorities 
were simply blocked.85 In 1993, Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE, 
proposed a definition of national minority to be added to the protocol of the 
ECHR,86 which was not approved for further consideration. This situation 
showed that, it is still difficult to make progress on common definition of 
minorities, even at regional level. States prefer to be the last ones to decide 
whether certain minority in their territory exists or not.  
 
 
1.4.2. The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 
 
 Perhaps it would be an exaggeration to see the European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) as an instrument which grants 
specific rights to minorities. However, it is necessary to consider this 
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document as a different aspect of minority rights. ECRML was adopted on 
November 5, 1992. As it can be understood from its name, it focuses on the 
linguistic rights of minorities. Article 1 of the ECRML gives clear definition 
about the term “regional or minority languages”. Two main principles are 
underlined to define a given language as regional or minority language:  
 
1. A language that is traditionally used “within a given territory of a 
State by nationals of that State who form a group numerically smaller 
than the rest of the State's population”.  
2. It must be different from the official languages of the State (dialects 
of the official languages of the State and languages of the migrants 
are not included in this category).87 
 
Nevertheless, it is crucial to state that ECRML does not provide direct 
rights to minorities, but it rather focuses on the aspect of their protection and 
promotion.88 Despite its limited scope, so far both Greece and Bulgaria did 
not sign the Charter. There might be several reasons for this action. One of 
them is the association between language and ethnic identity. Linguistic 
diversity issues are often linked with ethnic and cultural diversity.89 This 
relationship leads to the fact that protection and promotion of minority 
languages is actually an act to improve the conditions of minorities and their 
linguistic rights which is also affecting their cultural situation.  
 
 In places where minority issues are really sensitive, improving the 
conditions of a certain minority group is mostly confronted with the fear of 
increasing separatism and secession.90 In this type of environment where 
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minority issues are extremely connected with the national security of the 
state, political volition is also limited. The objective fact that language is a 
constructed border between minority and majority,91 is used in a negative 
way to protect the status-quo which is most of the time formed against 
minorities and constitute certain limitations on the use of their languages in 
education, social or political life.  
   
In spite of its positive content which is directed to regulate the use of 
minority languages, its less binding character and the lack of provisions to 
submit a petition reduced the effect of the ECRML in Europe. Signatory 
States were usually countries without serious minority problems. Therefore, 
it should not be wrong to state that, ECRML could not realize the hopes 
invested in it.  
 
 
1.4.3. Copenhagen Criteria 
 
 One of the most discussed topics in Central and Eastern European 
countries in 1990s were the so called Copenhagen Criteria. Creation of such 
criteria was the result of an increasing demand for EU membership from 
Eastern European states with different human rights standards. 
Copenhagen Criteria were adopted in 1993 as a result of Copenhagen 
European Council. There are three different aspects of these criteria; 
political, economic and legal. Meeting the political criteria, that refer to 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities is accepted as prerequisite to 
start negotiations for EU membership.  
 
 Copenhagen Criteria were perceived somehow as common ground of 
standards for Eastern European countries with different democratic 
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standards and complex minority issues. Council of Europe became main 
promoter of the connection between democracy and human rights which 
was also including minority rights.92 This initiative made it once again 
obvious that, human rights are not enough to protect minorities. This 
‘differentiation’ between human rights and minority rights, made it necessary 
to establish more solid standards to protect minorities. It was clear that, 
minorities need different regulations to be protected, at least something 
additional to human rights in order to sustain peaceful co-existence with the 
rest of the population.93  
 
 The role of the European Community was really significant regarding 
the problem of democratization, improving the standards of human rights 
and minority rights in Eastern Europe. Different methodology has been 
adopted to foster the democratization or the so-called “Europeanization” of 
ex-communist countries. Clear set of systems was established to avoid 
direct intervention in their national policies pertaining to minorities. While 
countries which undertake certain reforms regarding minorities were 
supported with assistance by the EU, states which neglected such reforms 
and followed policy of systematic violation, were denied to deepen the co-
operation with the EU.94   
 
 Copenhagen criteria were successful to evaluate the progress in 
different countries and their bid for EU membership. Nevertheless, there are 
still discussions going on regarding the different treatment of certain 
countries and their problems with minorities even after the EU membership 
which makes it necessary to revise Copenhagen Criteria or to reduce the 
political influence upon their interpretation.   
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1.4.4. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
 
 Adopted on February 1, 1995, Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), is the most important document 
accepted by CoE regarding the rights of minorities. This document is legally 
binding for the states which signed and ratified it. In fact, it is quite 
meaningful to see the scope of minority rights in the first article of the FCNM 
which states that ‘minority rights form an integral part of the international 
protection of human rights’.95 This can be accepted as officially declaring the 
difference between human rights and minority rights.  
 
 Monitoring system through regular state reports has been established 
for signatory states, which is regulated by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe. There is certain criticism directed towards the method of 
evaluation with reports prepared by states. According to the Convention, 
within one year of its entry into force, states are required to submit report 
giving information on the first legal measures taken to implement the 
principles of the Convention.96 Since these reports are prepared by the 
states, their objectivity and function was already questioned. To alleviate 
these critics, Advisory Committee to the FCNM, invited NGOs to participate 
in the preparation process of these reports. Moreover, additional meetings 
and consultations with national institutions were stipulated for the Advisory 
Committee in order to reflect more efficiently the preparation process of the 
initial reports.97  
 
 FCNM, guarantees only individual rights and not collective rights to 
national minorities. This could be seen as a result of the growing tendency to 
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accept minority rights as individual rather than collective rights.98 Another 
lack of the Framework Convention, is the definition of the term ‘national 
minority’, which leaves large room for the interpretations of the states.  
 
Most of the signatory states submitted their reservations on how the 
principles of the FCNM will be applied. Within the framework of this work, 
attitudes of Bulgaria and Greece are important to analyze. Greece signed 
the Convention in 1997 but not ratified, which made it not applicable in 
Greece. FCNM was signed by Bulgaria in 1997 and entered into force in 
1999. It was for the sake of the Europeanization process in Bulgaria, since 
EU membership was the main target for the political elite, who knew that 
negotiations for EU membership would not start without initial ratification of 
the FCNM. In a special declaration containing the ratification instrument, 
Bulgarian Government described its reservation as follows: Confirming 
its……….desire for the integration of Bulgaria into the European 
structures……….National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria declares 
that the ratification and implementation of the FCNM do not imply any right 
to engage in any activity violating the territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
Bulgaria……….. .99 This statement has the potential to be accepted as very 
indicative for the general situation of minority rights in Bulgaria which will be 
evaluated in the next stages of this work.  
 
Nevertheless, ambiguities in the FCNM and reservations made by 
countries are accepted as normal, considering the political sensitivity of 
minority issues in Europe. Somehow ambiguous character of the Convention 
and interpretations made by the states, are accepted as a bridge connecting 
states with FCNM and its general principles regarding minority rights.100 The 
idea behind is very simple; once states become part of the Convention, 
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possibility to improve the situation of minorities will be larger compared to 
countries which did not sign the Convention. 
 
 
1.4.5. OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities 
 
 It was during the crisis in Yugoslavia when the idea to create mandate 
of a High Commissioner on National Minorities came. Perception that wars 
erupt as a result of interstate conflicts was replaced by the tragic events in 
Yugoslavia, which showed that internal problems may create large scale 
violent conflicts. Hence in 1992, OSCE decided to establish the post of High 
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), in order to act as an 
instrument for conflict prevention in an early stage of conflict which involves 
national minorities.   
 
 Creation of the post of HCNM, was accepted as success, since a 
coherent institution was established to deal with serious issues involving 
minorities in the OSCE area. However, his/her role was more acting as a 
mandate to protect peace and stability by cooperating with the governments, 
and not to secure rights and protection for minorities.101 Even with this focus 
to prevent violent actions involving minorities, Governments, had certain 
reservations regarding the post of HCNM fearing that it may affect the 
recognition of some minorities or support secessionist movements. But later, 
States which had some reservations regarding the HCNM, changed this 
opinion since his/her role was more acting as ‘early warning’ or as ‘conflict 
prevention’ tool in cases which involve national minorities.  
 
 In his/her work, HCNM was not immune from critics. Some blamed 
HCNM with double standards and different treatment of minority problems in 
Europe. Supporting national autonomy in some cases and discouraging it in 
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others, created discussions around the objectivity of the position of 
HCNM.102 In fact this position was created with the aim to prevent violence 
and to improve the conditions of minorities in OSCE area. Existence of 
problems which possess complex character in each state made it necessary 
to have different approaches, which resulted with such accusations. 
 
 While carrying his/her work HCNM is meeting not only with the 
Governments but also with other parties involved in the conflict. In addition 
to this, Commissioner meets with NGOs, press and local activists in order to 
get the best insight of an ongoing problem. This, can give an idea regarding 
the goal of the Commissioner to balance the interests of the States with the 
demands of national minorities.103 Perhaps both parts would never be 
satisfied, but at least a point of compromise could be reached only with 
peaceful negotiation.  
 
 HCNM does not need invitation from States in order to visit and 
observe the situation. However, a previous contact with the state is required. 
At this point he/she is free to conduct his/her duty and to collect information 
from individuals or NGOs. Somehow this situation would allow HCNM to 
work in an environment where different dynamics of the problem will be 
examined in order to prevent culmination into a violent conflict.104  
 
 The mandate of HCNM which was created to prevent violent conflicts 
involving national minorities, was a response to the violent dissolution in 
Yugoslavia. Changes which occurred in the last years made it necessary to 
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reconsider the needs of minorities and perhaps to revise the functions of 
existing institutions with the aim to increase their role.  
 
 
The Fate of Minority Rights in Europe as Conclusion 
 
 It can be anticipated from this work that minority rights issue and its 
historical evolution in Europe are quite complex. Formation of unique 
standards is often obstructed with the arguments referring to the complexity 
of national minority cases in Europe. However, one thing is clear: even the 
most neutral human rights might be denied to minorities if States interpret 
them as dangerous to the territorial integrity etc.  
 
 Pertaining to minority rights in Bulgaria and Greece the issue of high 
threat perception prevents every attempt to offer more freedom to minorities. 
Treaties signed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century granted 
certain rights to the Turkish/Muslim minorities in Bulgaria and Greece. They 
were respected for some period, and afterwards adjusted to the national 
policies of both states. It is not understandable how a simple issue of minority 
definition is perceived as a threat to state sovereignty (considering the 
comments sent by Greece and Bulgaria regarding the study of Francesco 
Capotorti in 1970s), since treaties which both states signed with the Ottoman 
Empire and later on with Turkey, made a clear definition of minorities as 
target of the rights granted. In other words, today the influence of the history 
is more powerful, which is continuously re-interpreted referring to current 
conditions.105 This attitude is creating tensions between minorities and 
majorities in countries with significant minority population.  
 
 Minority regulations were not new for some States. However, with the 
initiation of the United Nations to bring more specific rights to minority 
                                                 
105 Renee Hirschon, p. 74. 
62 
 
groups, some countries started their actions as it was their first attempt to 
offer such rights or to recognize specific group in their territory as minority. As 
a result vague international regulations were interpreted in different way 
which blocked progress of minority rights in some countries. Existence of 
basic human rights was accepted enough for minorities, without considering 
the need to preserve their distinct identity.  
 
 ICCPR could be accepted as the most innovative document of its time 
referring directly to minorities. Although Capotorti’s work to reach a common 
definition on minorities was contested, it is important to show the situation of 
international legal instruments of the time.  
 
  Despite the existence of problems in some countries, Europe still 
remains as the most successful area for minority rights regulations. It can be 
a good example for the success of regional engagements in this area. 
Partially fall of communism and partially EU membership incentive, became 
catalyzers for the progress in minority rights. However, one must bear in 
mind the difference between European regulations and internal differences of 
the European Union. These peculiarities influenced also the difference of the 
standards of minority protection in EU member states. Only Eastern 
European countries passed through such evaluation in 1990s. Old member 
states like Greece and France did not follow this process, and still do not 
answer to most of the criteria pertaining protection of national minorities.  
 
 In terms of minority rights, most EU documents refer to OSCE or CoE 
documents. This reflects the lack of adequate EU regulations or policy 
regarding minority rights. Accepting EU wide provision on minorities seems to 
be a real tough job, since most countries prefer to have the last decision 
regarding minorities in their territory. In the meantime it is very common to 
see EU pushing candidate countries for further democratization and respect 
to human rights and protection of minorities. This issue is being criticized by 
some people with the argument that, minority rights is used as a tool to 
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intervene in the internal affairs of states or following double standards. 
Existence of such criticism may limit the impact of the EU on the rights of 
minorities in general.  
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
DISCOURSE OF GREEK AND BULGARIAN NATIONALISM TOWARDS 
THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES 
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION TO GREEK AND BULGARIAN NATIONALISM AND 
THE ISSUE OF MINORITY ACCOMMODATION 
 
Nationalities became existent only when a given group became limited 
with certain borders such as language, culture and religion. In cases where 
such kind of demarcations were not present, their invention was included in 
the agenda as a tool to divide multi-ethnic empires. Nationalist revolution in 
France, had been accepted with hopes, and welcomed as a new universal 
ideology to bring peace to Europe. However, nineteenth century witnessed a 
shift of nationalism, from liberal humanitarianism to aggressive exclusivism1, 
in some cases to irredentist claims, like in the case with the Balkans. As Liah 
Greenfeld says, after being spread across Europe, newly emerging national 
identities were no longer part of the original context, but rather trying to 
imitate the already existing idea within their own case.2 Hence for Greece 
and Bulgaria it would take the form of different movement in order to ensure 
the independence and segregation they wanted, and to sustain the distinctive 
character of the national identities that were emerging. This led to initial 
transformation of nationalism, which at the beginning was perceived as 
internal freedom and turned into independence from other groups and 
marked with strong invisible borders.3 Consequently, nationalism became 
more exclusive through the invention of specific language, certain sensitivity 
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on the perceived culture, customs and territorial affiliation that were claiming 
the unique character of such group.  
 
In multi-ethnic states, this movement could be identified as ethnic 
nationalism like in the case of Ottoman Empire. Nationalism, which was 
originally a political idea based on liberal theories, started to be perceived as 
loyalty within a group that was connected with blood and common goals for 
the future.4 The next stage of the process culminated into a claim of territory 
which was also directed by romantic feelings. However, due to the 
simultaneous resurgence of different national groups, at this stage, the most 
striking issue was to face overlap in the territorial claims of different nation 
states. In the Balkans, the First Balkan war was done to get some land from 
the Ottoman Empire, but the Second Balkan war erupted as a result of an 
overlap of claims over newly occupied areas.  
 
Violent conflicts in nineteenth and twentieth century showed the other 
peculiarity of the nationalism in the Balkans, irredentism. Based on Western 
European Christian traditions, nationalism in the Balkans, took the form of 
ethnic nationalism in pursuit of irredentist goals, aiming to unify other kin 
groups within its borders.5 This situation might be due to the big influence of 
the Russian Pan-Slavism and German Romanticism in the Balkans and their 
nation building processes.6 Nationalism and ethnicity were perceived as 
having the same meaning, while possessing some ethnic characteristics 
such as language, culture and religion became indicators for affiliation with a 
certain group.  
 
Greeks were the first nation to declare independence from the 
Ottoman Empire. Politically they were ruled by the Sultan in Istanbul and for 
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Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 330.  
6 Liah Greenfeld, p. 14.  
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all other aspects of social life they were connected to the Patriarchate. The 
Patriarchate in Istanbul was the head of all Orthodox Christians in the 
Ottoman Empire. However, for Greeks, due to its historical profile and 
language, Orthodox Church and Patriarchate were considered as national 
heritage.7 But this did not change the fact that Greek Orthodox Church was 
the first one to separate from the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul, with 
the aim to realize its national goals and to become a national church. The 
dilemma in this process of separation came to the fore when Bulgarian 
Orthodox Church was accused with being “schismatic” during the Bulgarian 
national awakening. Eventually, this schismatic character of Bulgarian 
Orthodox Church turned into conflict and competition between Greece and 
Bulgaria to establish their hegemony in the Balkan peninsula.  
 
Main reason behind the Greek awakening and their leading position in 
the Ottoman Empire for nation building, was not due to the intensity of the 
Turkish oppression, but it was rather a result of the good communication with 
Western Europe and the existence of national intellectuals who initiated the 
process and supported it morally.8 They tried to adopt European nationalist 
idea into the Greek case by making some changes in it. After the invention of 
contemporary Greek language, works of classical authors were translated 
with patriotic reflections in order to create a link between ancient Greece and 
Greece to be reborn.9 Furthermore, this was an initiative to create a culture 
associated with the new language, aiming to imbue the newly created 
identity.  
 
Bulgarian nation building process followed the same methodology like 
Greek one. Bulgarian elite was the leading factor in the process, encouraging 
the use of Bulgarian language among Bulgarians and strongly focusing on 
                                                 
7 Hans Kohn (b), The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background, New York, The 
Macmillan Company, 1946, p. 535.  
8 Ibid., p. 537. See also: Paschalis Kitromilides, Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy, Vermont, 
Variorum, 1994, p. 193.  
9 Hans Kohn (b), p. 541.  
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the distinct character of Bulgarian culture.10 All these efforts were made to 
prove the historical continuity of the Bulgarian nation.11 Paisii Hilendarski’s 
book ‘Istoria Slavianobalgarska’ (Slavic-Bulgarian History) was one of the 
most important works on the Bulgarian history, where Bulgarian history was 
glorified through different examples. Paisii, strongly criticized those 
Bulgarians who use Greek in their daily life and worship, he underlined the 
rich history of Bulgarian culture and language.12 On the other side, Turkish 
rule in the Balkans was depicted as slavery in Paisii’s work, and Turks were 
accused of committing massive assimilation against Bulgarian population 
during the four hundred years long Ottoman rule.13 It is necessary to stress 
the point that not only Turks, but also Greeks were described as foreign to 
Bulgarian culture. Due to importance of Greek in the Balkan peninsula 
among people who were doing trade, Paisii stressed the point that Greek 
was widely spoken among Bulgarians as well, even with the motive that 
some Bulgarians deliberately were using Greek because they were ashamed 
of Bulgarian language and culture. To encourage the use of Bulgarian 
language, Paisii makes references to Bulgarian history dating back to the 
seventh century, as an example to express the superiority of Bulgarian 
culture. Past conflicts and struggles of dominance in the Balkans between 
Greeks and Bulgarians is tackled in detail by Paisii, in order to indoctrinate 
the distinction between both nations.14   
 
 The second half of the nineteenth century was the period which saw 
tough competition between Greek and Bulgarian nationalists to expand their 
area of influence, or in other words to spread nationalism beyond their 
borders reaching other Christian citizens of the Ottoman Empire. This was 
important for both Greeks and Bulgarians as a spiritual preparation stage for 
future irredentist steps, which were foreseen to realize their national ideals. 
                                                 
10 Gabriela Petkova-Campbell, “Nineteenth-century Bulgarian private collections”, Journal of the 
History of Collections, Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 246.  
11 Alex Toshkov, p. 281.   
12 Paisii Hilendarski, Slaviano-Balgarska Istoria, Sofia, Balgarski Pisatel, 1972, p. 42. 
13 Ibid., p. 46, 142, 146. 
14 Ibid., p. 152.  
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Macedonia and Thrace became centers of Greek and Bulgarian nationalist 
competition.15 Religion and educational attainment were main tools for the 
desired expansion, aiming at the assimilation of people in geopolitically 
important areas.  
 
 In her book, Imagining the Balkans, Maria Todorova denies such 
accusations for assimilation in the Ottoman Empire. According to Todorova, 
there was no high degree of social integration in the Ottoman Empire, which 
was due to lack of feeling for belonging to a common society. Religious and 
social affairs of the Christians were regulated by the Patriarchate in Istanbul 
while they were only politically governed by the Sultan, where bureaucracy 
was the only connection between State and peoples. Therefore she thinks 
that, the existence of such disintegrated system itself is enough to 
understand that assimilation of populations was not the ultimate goal of the 
Ottoman Empire.16 However, such exaggerations were used just to intensify 
the feelings of people who were target of these stories. Applying Said’s 
Orientalism in the Balkans, Todorova argues that Western influence in the 
Balkans created the critic of Ottoman backwardness and ‘otherness’ while 
installing the idea of national consciousness over the pillars of glorified 
ancient past like in the case of Greece. These actions were perceived as 
another reflection of the Western style for dominating, restructuring, and 
creating its influence on the East.17  
 
 National revivals of Greece and Bulgaria had almost parallel 
methodology which was tackled by Ernest Gellner. Nationalism started to be 
spread by the elite who was working hard to review the language18 and 
create connections between the history and culture of both nations. As a 
result, nationalism became the new guard of the culture and language it 
                                                 
15 Victor Roudometof (a), Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic 
Conflict in the Balkans, Westport, Greenwood Press, 2001, p. 112.  
16 Maria Todorova (a), Imagining the Balkans, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 163.  
17 Ibid., p. 3-12; See also Neophytos G. Loizides, “Religious Nationalism and Adaptation in Southeast 
Europe”, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 37, No. 2(2009), 203-227.   
18 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1988, p. 55-56.  
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invented out of nations. Again it just shows the vicious circle of nationalism, 
since cultures and traditions it claims to defend and revive are often its own 
inventions.19 Nevertheless this can help to understand better the different 
stages of Greek and Bulgarian revivals. Reinvention of culture and publishing 
material dealing with the national past can be considered as the first stage of 
national revival of Greece and Bulgaria. Once this story was spread around 
and became accessible for masses, the attachment to a territory became key 
factor for the creation of independent states. In the case of Balkans, where 
violent conflicts took place in nineteenth and twentieth century, the motive of 
expansion was often justified with the aim to unify the rest of the nation which 
was left behind national borders at the time of independence. But during the 
process of national revivals, both Greece and Bulgaria, claimed frontiers as 
with their greatest  national expansion before the Ottoman presence and 
often disregarded the ethnic component of these areas.20 The territorially 
non-homogenous structure of the Ottoman Empire, made it difficult to create 
nation states out of it. Therefore wars for independence were seen as the 
only way to create this homogeneity and conduct ethnic cleansing or to get 
rid of people who were excluded from the newly constructed national 
identities.  
 
In the Greek and Bulgarian national revival process continuity of the 
culture was defended with the thesis that cultural traditions and language 
were preserved in spite of Ottoman oppression, which automatically made 
Muslims and Turks ‘other’. After the wars for independence big part of the 
Turkish population in both countries was forced to migrate to Turkey. At the 
time when their number was very large and difficult to maintain forced 
migration, then additional solutions were searched to arrange migration or 
exchange of populations as it was described in chapter 1 of this work. 
 
                                                 
19 Ibid., p. 56.  
20 Hans Kohn (a), p. 46.  
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 With the creation of Greece and Bulgaria, the only sizeable minority 
left in both countries was Muslim/Turkish minority. Meanwhile, unfolding 
character of nationalism was spread towards post-Ottoman space, and 
consequently as a result of Ataturk’s revolutionary steps, Turkey emerged as 
the latest nation state in the region. Turkish nationalism had its inevitable 
effects on kin communities left beyond the borders of the new nation state. 
Although Turkey acted always as protector of minority rights for the 
Muslim/Turkish minorities in Greece and Bulgaria, the main problem occurred 
with the interpretations of the process, while those minority groups started to 
acquire an ethnic consciousness in addition to their religious belonging. This 
was not welcomed both by Greece and Bulgaria, which were willing to keep 
their minorities’ ties with Turkey at religious level. Cultural and ethnic 
differences were seen as a threat to the nation state which was still 
upgrading. Several agreements were already made between Greece and 
Ottoman Empire, and later on Turkey as well as between Bulgaria and 
Turkey in order to secure decent protection for the rights of Muslim/Turkish 
minorities in Greece and Bulgaria. However, from time to time they had to be 
updated according to the changing status or due to breaches occurred in 
previously made ones. Often nationalism or ignorance was blamed for the 
bad condition of the Muslim/Turkish minorities in Greece and Bulgaria. This 
brought the criticism that, nations which declared their independence and 
were “released from oppression”, became oppressors of minorities living in 
the new nation states.21 The most striking aspect of this oppression was not 
its strength but its systematic structure, which became part of the system of 
new nation states and continuously enhanced with the time passing despite 
the increase of democratic and liberal values in the world. Detailed 
perspective of this mechanism, with its unique features and examples, will be 
tackled below in detail.  
 
 
                                                 
21 Ibid., p. 82.  
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2.2. GREEK NATIONALISM AND ITS HISTORICAL EVOLUTION: 
CONSTRUCTING TURKISH/MUSLIM MINORITY AS THE “OTHER” 
 
 Examining the process of Greek nationalism and its ultimate goal, is 
crucial to understand the basis of segregation in contemporary Greek 
society and persistence of some problems pertaining to minorities and 
Greek national identity. It is clear that the concept of ‘Hellas’ was not 
produced by Greek community in Ottoman Empire, but rather invented by 
European intellectuals with the idea of magnificent past of ancient Greece 
and spread by Greek elite educated in western world.22 Therefore this 
philosophy played a crucial role in Greek revival, by giving rise to 
Philhellenism and the Neohellenic  Enlightenment, which created modern 
Greece by reinterpreting its past. Accomplishments of ancient Greeks were 
seen as the basis of European civilization, which was also ensuring 
intellectual and economic superiority for Greeks under the Ottoman rule. 
They were now assigned with the duty to revitalize this success by 
reinstating Greece through the revival of Greek national identity.23 Even at 
the time when religious affiliation was abandoned – accused of being 
backward - with an aim to proceed towards European style of modernization, 
Philhellenism became a movement which embraced nationalism, religion, 
culture and romantic sentiment with a vision to increase its area of influence 
in the Balkans.24   
 
 Reinterpretation of Byzantine and Ottoman tradition became one of 
the biggest dilemmas of Neohellenism. Due to the heavy influence of religion 
in  both, they were regarded as backward and inappropriate for the ideal of 
                                                 
22 Spyros A. Sofos and Umut Ozkirimli (a), Contested Geographies: Greece, Turkey and the 
Territorial Imagination, in: In the Long Shadow of Europe: Greeks and Turks in the Era of Post 
Nationalism, (Eds.) Othon Anastasakis, Kalypso Nicolaidis & Kerem Oktem, Leiden, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, p. 20. 
23 Ioannis D. Stefanidis, Stirring the Greek Nation: Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-
Americanism in Post War Greece, 1945-1967, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007, p. 37. 
24 Maria Todorova (a), p. 70.  
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Neohellenism.25 Avoiding Byzantine and Ottoman traditions, would allow 
new Hellas to reach its ancient glory. Orthodoxy was to blame for the 
backwardness of Greek people, and therefore modernization would be 
achieved only with secular state structure.26 Nevertheless, Greek citizenship 
was still subject to religious discrimination, allowing only Christian subjects 
of the Ottoman Empire to acquire it and excluding Muslim population.  
 
 The idea to abandon Orthodoxy was also strongly supported by those 
who wanted to bring European liberalism in Greece. In rural areas where 
literacy was not really high, religion was the main marker of identity. 
Therefore the National Church of Greece was established with the aim to 
create state controlled religion, and not to be controlled by the Patriarchate 
in Istanbul who was a civil servant of the Ottoman Empire. However, the 
second part of the nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of a 
conservative movement, which was in favor of Orthodoxy and restoration of 
the ties between independent Church of Greece and Patriarchate of 
Constantinople.27  
 
 Historical, political and religious aspects of Greek identity were still 
lacking some connections to justify the continuity between ancient and 
contemporary Greece. Apart from the religious dimension of contemporary 
Greek identity, the real problem was to give an explanation for centuries 
long uninterrupted continuation of Greek nation. Thus, Greek elite, with 
Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos ahead, was engaged to rehabilitate Greece’s 
Byzantine past. According to Paparrigopoulos, Hellenic identity was 
comprised from classical and Christian elements, which were 
complementing each other.28 As a result of this, Orthodoxy became the key 
                                                 
25 Victor Roudometof (a), p. 102. 
26 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis (a), “Redefining the Nation: Shifting Boundaries of the ‘Other’ in Greece 
and Turkey”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 47, No. 1 (2011), p. 169.  
27 Paschalis Kitromilides (a), Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy: Studies in the Culture and 
Political Thought of South-Eastern Europe, Vermont, Variorum, 1994, p. 10 (XII).  
28 Neophytos G. Loizides, p. 208. 
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factor of Greek national identity, while the National Church of Greece had 
the mission to deal with its accommodation and cultural adoption.  
 
 Unique product of this process in Greece was the invention of the 
‘Great Idea’ (Megali Idea) as  a philosophy of Greek irredentism. First time 
in the second half of nineteenth century, prospective targets of Greek 
irredentism were defined as Ioannina, Thessaly, Serres, Adrianople(Edirne), 
Constantinople(Istanbul), Trebizond(Trabzon) and Crete.29 These cities were 
proclaimed as the most important centers of Hellenism and Hellenic 
historiography. Byzantine traditions were integrated into Neohellenic culture 
with the thesis that Byzantium was a manifestation of Middle Age 
Hellenism.30 The University of Athens became the scientific center of the 
new propaganda and was fully engaged to justify the Greek expansion and 
its necessity. Through cooperation with educational institutions, Greek 
National Church was the most important exponent of the Great Idea. Greek 
irredentism was justified with the project to create Greek Empire in the east 
embracing Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire and bringing the 
necessary modernization in the region. Great powers and especially Great 
Britain supported the idea of Hellenic Empire in the East, despite the fear 
that it would fall under Russian influence. When the separation of the 
Bulgarian Exarchate took place and Bulgarian nationalism developed under 
Russian influence, support for the Greek bid was increased dramatically, as 
controversy between Bulgaria and Greece arose. It was clear that Greece 
would be isolated from the Russian influence through Bulgaria.31  
 
                                                 
 Megali Idea or the Great Idea is a project of Greek irredentism to gather all Greeks with Orthodox 
belief under the umbrella of Neohellenic state whose borders would expand into the Ottoman Empire 
and restore Constantinople (Istanbul) as its capital. 
29 Victor Roudometof, p. 105-106. 
30 Ibid., p. 109.  
31 Sofia Matthaiou, “Stephanos Koumanoudis’ Preception of the Bulgarians: Convergences with and 
Divergences from his Contemporaries”, in: Greek-Bulgarian Relations in the Age of National Identity 
Formation, ed. P.M. Kitromilides & Anna Tabaki, Athens, Institute for Neohellenic Research, 2010, 
p. 155.  
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 The center of all these ideas and conflicts was still Ottoman Empire. 
After embracing Byzantine past, Greek scholarship was in search of other 
connections related to territorial claims. According to Greek elite, 
Constantinople was the pearl of Hellenic world. Its conquest by the Ottoman 
Turks and the rise of the Ottoman Empire at the expense of Byzantium, 
were consolidated with the decline of medieval Hellenism.32 Turks were 
identified as barbarians and blamed for the destruction of Greek culture and 
heritage through their backward Empire. Through education and different 
publications these ideas were spread among Orthodox subjects of the 
Ottoman State in order to increase the ethnic and religious segregation.  
 
 As it was previously indicated, no ethnic group was able to form a 
majority in certain area due to the Ottoman social system. Creation of Greek 
nation state made dramatic change in the lives of Muslims living in the newly 
proclaimed Greek territory. They were the first victims of the new structure 
called ‘nation state’. After a centuries long common existence, they were 
forced to leave new Greek territories because they were perceived as aliens 
representing Ottoman yoke and therefore were not qualified to be called as 
Greeks.33 This situation could explain how language was not used as an 
indicator of national identity during the time of Greek revival. Muslims living 
in the Greek territory were speaking Greek in their daily life, however, this 
was not enough to grant them Greek citizenship. Despite Greek revival 
relied on language and the invention of new vernacular, it was obvious that 
what Greek meant at that time was the composition of different elements 
defined by the elite, which in fact made Muslims/Turks ineligible for it. With 
feelings of revenge for the Ottoman rule, Greeks forced Muslims to follow 
Ottoman troops in their withdrawal.34 Eventually Muslims/Turks were 
excluded from the nation building process in Contemporary Greece. The 
number of Muslims who were allowed to stay was really very limited. Those 
                                                 
32 Paschalis Kitromilides (b), p. 15(XII).  
33 Konstantinos Tsitselikis (b), Old and New Islam in Greece: From Historical Minorities to 
Immigrant Newcomers, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, p. 27.  
34 Ibid., p. 30.  
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who left Greece were forced to liquidate their property. Muslims who stayed 
were obliged to share their property with Greek refugees regardless of their 
will. This was the beginning of the creation of a new system in Greece where 
in terms of rights, inequality between ethnically Greek and non-Greek 
subjects was structured on the equal distribution of obligations stemming 
from the Greek citizenship, while non-Greeks were denied the right to 
benefit equally from it.  
 
 During the time of Greek territorial expansion towards North, 
reassessment of Greek national identity and its unique distinction from the 
Ottoman Empire was questioned. Things which were reminding the Ottoman 
presence were ignored while Byzantine past was glorified together with the 
ancient Greek heritage.35 During the Balkan Wars, different components of 
Greek national identity were reinterpreted in order to embrace other 
Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire under the umbrella of modern 
Greece. This process witnessed strategic shifts in the definition of Greek. 
Macedonia and Thrace were really important for Greece, as they were on 
the way to Istanbul which was the main target of Greek irredentism. People 
living in these areas were not speaking Greek, but this did not stop Greek 
claims. People living in Macedonia and Thrace were considered ethnically 
Greek because of the traces of ancient Greece and the initial adoption of 
Macedonian traditions by Neohellenism. 36  
 
 Greek irredentism and efforts to realize the Great Idea reached their 
peak with Greece’s occupation of Izmir after the First World War. However, 
with the formation of Ataturk leadership, Greek forces had to withdraw and 
Greek population in Anatolia became subject of population exchange, as it 
was indicated in the previous chapter. This failure became known in Greece 
as Asia Minor catastrophe. Inevitable result of the Asia Minor catastrophe 
                                                 
35 Spyros A. Sofos & Umut Ozkirimli (b), ‘Colonising’ The Past: History and Memory in Greece and 
Turkey, in: Nations and Their Histories: Constructions and Representations, (Eds.) Susanna Carvalho 
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was a deepening of the segregation between Greek and Turkish nations. 
Destruction of the Greek project called Megali Idea confirmed the hostility of 
the Turks towards the Greek nation.37 Establishment of modern Turkey in 
1923 and reforms Mustafa Kemal Ataturk did, shaped modern Turkish 
nationalism. As a kin state of the Muslim/Turkish minority in Western Thrace, 
Turkey’s relations with the Muslims in Greece were interpreted differently in 
certain periods of history. Mostly these interpretations were conditional to 
the nature of bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey. However, the 
shadow of Greek nationalism prevailed every aspect of the treatment of 
Muslim/Turkish minority in Western Thrace. Turkish nationalism was made 
up as a natural enemy of the Greek one. Most common implications of this 
hostility found itself while minority in Western Thrace was often depicted as 
‘fifth column’ of Turkey.38 The fact that Turkey did not follow any irredentist 
actions against Greece, like the Greek occupation of Western Anatolia after 
the First World War, was distorted by interpreting this occupation as a 
tragedy of the Greek nation in Turkish lands. It is necessary to indicate that 
Greek scholarship regarding the Asia Minor catastrophe is very limited, 
compared to research done about ancient Greece and Byzantine past.39 The 
lack of self-criticism formed in a scientific way, leaves room for speculations. 
This situation became a tool of Greek nationalism to foster separation 
between Greeks and Turks. On the other side, showing an old map with 
Turkish names of places in Western Thrace, was accepted as an evidence 
of the resilience of Turkish irredentism toward Greece.40 
 
 It must be noted here that after spreading the ideas about one’s 
national belonging, violent conflicts became the next stage of drawing the 
                                                 
37 A. Triandafyllidou & A. Paraskevopoulou, p. 88. 
38 Dia Anagnostou (a), “Breaking the Cycle of Nationalism: The EU, Regional Policy and the 
Minority of Western thrace, Greece”, South European Society and Politics, Vol. 6, No. 1(2001), p. 
105. 
39 Alexander Kitroeff, “Continuity and Change in Contemporary Greek Historiography”, European 
History Quarterly, Vol. 19 (1989), p. 279-280.  
40 Paul Hidiroglu, “Thrace in the Light of the National Ideal of the Turks” 1985-1991, Athens, 
Hellenic University Press, 1991, p. 30.  
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borders in the Balkans. Same was the background of the Greek-Turkish 
relations. This aspect was once again challenged with the war in Cyprus. 
During the Greek revival, considerable amount of effort was made by 
Greece to stir independence of the island. Population of Cyprus was 
composed by Orthodox Greeks and Muslim Turks. Construction of Enosis-
the idea to incorporate Cyprus into Greece dates back to the nineteenth 
century. However, the fact that the island was under British control from 
1878 until 1960 made it impossible for Greece to realize Enosis. Archbishop 
of the Cypriot Orthodox Church Makarios was set to achieve Enosis and 
when his actions escalated into internal conflict in Cyprus, Turkey intervened 
in the island according to the regulations of the Treaty of Guarantee signed 
by Great Britain, Greece and Turkey. As a result of Turkish actions, Cyprus 
was divided in two, with Turks living in the North and Greeks living in the 
Southern part of the island.  
 
 Cyprus issue refreshed the bitter moments of the history between 
Greeks and Turks pertaining to nationalist divisions. Greeks accused Turks 
with irredentism while Turks kept Greek Cypriots responsible for the 
massacres conducted in the island to accomplish Enosis. Today, Cyprus is 
still dominating Greek-Turkish discourse. Often demands for further 
liberalization of minority rights in Western Thrace are denied by making an 
exclusive reference of  the division in Cyprus. Still, Greek Cypriots are not 
willing to accept that the reason for the eruption of conflict was the extreme 
form of Greek nationalism which has been named as Enosis.41 Apart from 
this, ongoing division in the island has negative impacts on the perception of 
both nations and creates negative images about the ‘other’ across the 
border, which inevitably affects the situation of Greek-Turkish relations in 
general.  
 
                                                 
41 Vassos Argyrou, “How Greeks Think: About Turks, for Example”, South European Society and 
Politics, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2006), p. 43-44. 
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 Considering the examples given above, it is possible to conclude that 
nationalism changed Greek and Turkish communities in a very significant 
way. One has to imagine that neither Greeks nor Turks were existent as a 
nation before nineteenth century. The emergence of nationalism created 
new challenges which deteriorated the ties between both nations. Therefore, 
historical Greek-Turkish enmity could be interpreted as a new product of 
nationalism.42 After centuries-long common existence, violent conflicts 
created a distance between both nations. Complexity of ‘nationalist social 
engineering’ in Greek and Turkish case can be explained better with the loss 
of contact and shared experience. Through the time passing, lack of 
experience evolves into further stages, such as suspicion and hostility that 
are reducing the possibility to cooperate. Creation of negative stereotypes at 
social level is exacerbating this division between groups. Thus, physical 
borders are supported with psychological and social narratives about the 
‘other’, in order to make projected alienation more sound. As a result of this 
process, it is possible to observe that, an inter-communal conflict turns to 
inter-state hostility.43  
 
 
2.2.1. The Role of the Greek Orthodox Church in Politics and Daily Life 
of Greece: Struggle for Power Through Competition 
 
 It is impossible to disregard religion while evaluating Greek national 
identity and its stance towards religious minorities in Greece. Religion was 
the center of every aspect in the development process of Neohellenism. 
From the very beginning of Greek national revival, the clergy became 
leading actor of it, since Orthodoxy was accepted as an integral part of the 
Greek national identity. Thus, by embracing Byzantine traditions, Eastern 
Orthodoxy was declared ipso facto as Greek through the synthesis of 
                                                 
42 Hercules Millas, Perceptions of Conflict: Greeks and Turks in Each Other’s Mirrors, in: In the Long 
Shadow of Europe: Greeks and Turks in the Era of Post Nationalism, (Eds). Othon Anastasakis, 
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‘Helleno-Christianity’.44 According to this analysis, the promotion of the 
Greek national identity among the Orthodox population in the Balkans was a 
steady process. With the adoption of Eastern Orthodoxy as de facto national 
religion45, Greek nationalism changed its way from liberalism into intolerant 
extremism in order to accomplish irredentist aims. The split of Greek 
National Church from the Patriarchate in Istanbul, was the first national 
challenge that Eastern Orthodoxy faced during the Ottoman times. There 
was significant division among the Greek elite, regarding the religious 
character of the Greek state. Adamantios Korais, defended the idea of an 
independent Greek Church and split from the Patriarchate in Istanbul.46 His 
view about modern Greece was dominated by the idea of secular Hellenism 
which had anti-Byzantine and anti-Patriarchal sentiments. Korais thought 
that the ideas of Western modernism, which could bring back the glory of 
ancient Greece, would not be reached under the leadership of Patriarchate 
controlled by the Ottoman Sultan.47 Therefore, the creation of a state 
controlled national Church was the best solution. However, with the second 
half of nineteenth century, when Byzantine past was adopted by Neohellenic 
Enlightenment, the vision for secular Greek state was abandoned, and an 
extreme form of nationalism was promoted by the Greek Church in areas 
such as Macedonia, Thrace, Cyprus and Western Anatolia. With an aim to 
lead Greek irredentism, Greek Orthodox Church took the control of political 
life in early stages of Greek national revival and continuously expanded its 
role in the formation of Greek national identity. Since then, whenever a 
sensitive discussion like the situation of minorities in Greece, implementation 
of democratic reforms or modernization/secularization of Greece is 
discussed, intervention of Greek Orthodox Church is taking place. This 
attitude of the Church is justified with its self-identification of being the only 
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loyal entity to the idea of Hellenism throughout the centuries-long struggle 
for nationhood.48   
 
 Another challenge for the Patriarchate in Istanbul was the 
establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870. This situation proved the 
ethnic division of religiously homogenous Christian population of the 
Ottoman Empire.49 Nevertheless, it made easier the rapprochement 
between Greek Orthodox Church in Athens and the Ecumenical Patriarchate 
in Istanbul. With the creation of Contemporary Turkey, situation of the 
Patriarchate in Istanbul was one of the main issues dominating Greek-
Turkish discourse. As a result of all events that took place before the First 
World War, Hellenic character of the Eastern Orthodoxy was approved 
through close co-operation between the Greek Church and the Patriarchate 
in Istanbul. Considering facts like the role Orthodox Church played during 
the Greek revival, and managed to consolidate its position as a national 
religion in Greece along its leading role in politics, it is possible to declare 
Orthodoxy as the champion of nationalism.50 This situation has been used 
up until now by clergy to justify their intervention into political issues.  
 
 Religious monopoly of the Greek Orthodox Church and its privileges 
are legalized in different forms. First in hierarchy is Greek Constitution. 
According to article 3 of the constitution of 1975, Greek Orthodox Church 
was declared as predominant with the following phrase: the prevailing 
religion in Greece is that of the Christian Eastern Orthodox Church.51 
Nevertheless, article 13 of the Greek Constitution protects freedom of 
worship under the condition that following requirements are met: religion 
must be known, in this case doctrines and rituals must be accessible to 
                                                 
48 Ibid., p. 210-211.  
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anybody. Therefore, Islam and Judaism are the other two religions officially 
recognized in Greece along with the Greek Orthodox Church. According to 
the Greek Law, officially recognized religious institutions possess the power 
of public entity in the country, which allows them to conduct marriages, 
granting tax exemptions and issuing public administration acts.52  
 
 During the years of Cold War, the idea of Ellinochristianismos 
(Helleno-Christianity) was upgraded in order to set defense against the 
ideas of atheist Communism. This move was justified with the thesis that, 
problems of the Greek society are to be solved only with the help of 
Christian faith. As a result of this movement, Ellinochistianismos has been 
accepted as a guiding principle that the Greek education system ought to 
promote in order to influence on the transformation process of Greek 
society.53  
 
 However, this dominant or ‘prevailing’ status of the Greek Orthodox 
Church, became an indicator of the fact that there is no official separation 
between state and the Church. This intertwined structure did not become a 
problem until 1990’s, when claims for the modernization of Greece were 
made. Every attempt to modernize the country was harshly criticized by the 
clergy. Archbishop Christodoulos was one of the enthusiastic supporters for 
the leading role of the Church in Greece. When separation of state and 
Church was first discussed in late 1990’s, he opposed the idea vehemently, 
blaming its supporters with the aim to destroy Greek national identity. 
According to him, survival of the Greek nation is possible only through the 
Greek Orthodox Church.54  
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 The Orthodox Church of Greece is also well known with its 
engagements in Western Thrace. Political engagement of clergy puts 
Muslim/Turkish minority in Western Thrace in a disadvantaged position. 
Church officials are showing the biggest opposition to every initiative that 
aims to improve the conditions of the Muslim/Turkish minority in Thrace.55 
After his election, Christodoulos initiated a project to change the population 
balance in Western Thrace in favor of Greeks. As part of ‘family planning 
policy’, Greek Orthodox Church decided allocation of additional allowance 
for the third child born in every Orthodox family in Thrace.56 This project has 
been implemented with the decision of Holy Synod, which shows the 
importance of the topic. Population of the Muslim/Turkish minority in 
Western Thrace is estimated between 100.000 and 120.000 people, which 
makes only 1,2% of the total population in Greece. However, the issue is 
perceived as politically sensitive exceeding the percentage of the population 
compared to the Greek one. Greek National Statistical Service does not 
offer certain numbers about minority’s population in Western Thrace. 
Estimation is used since 1951 when question about religion affiliation was 
removed from the national census data.57  
 
 
2.2.1.1. Controversies on ID Cards and Planned Mosque in Athens 
 
 Modernization of Greece and secularism became one of the most 
discussed issues in 1990’s. Secularization of the country has been 
discussed since decades without no progress. Growing number of the 
immigrants from different religious backgrounds, changed the structure of 
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Greek society, which until 1990’s had been mostly homogenous. Growing 
number of Muslim immigrants, along with Greece’s autochthonous 
Muslim/Turkish minority in Western Thrace, boosted steps for 
modernization. Political decisions taken by the Greek Parliament were often 
contested by the Greek Orthodox with the fear of losing its dominant position 
in Greek society.  
 
 The issue of religion and society fueled discussion between Greek 
Government and the Greek Orthodox Church in 2000, when government 
issued a plan for the removal of religious affiliation on the ID cards. This step 
has been taken to ease the integration of people from different religious 
backgrounds into Greek society and to prevent religious discrimination. 
However, Archbishop Christodoulos opposed it, by  stating that ‘an ID card 
is not just administrative document, but also proof of one’s personality’.58 
Situation escalated in short time and led to different discussions and 
focusing on the vital role of the Greek Orthodox Church to protect Greek 
nation.  
 
 In fact it has been long time since Church became worried of 
globalization and its possible effects on the Greek society, and the issue 
with ID cards presented the necessary opportunity to increase its 
conservative role in Greek politics, where political life is dominated by the 
European Integration. Ongoing diversity in Greek society, and its possible 
implications on the Greek national identity are interpreted as a threat to the 
Greek nationhood. According to Christodoulos, church is the only institution 
that is capable to protect Greek nation from harmful effects of the 
globalization process.59 To demonstrate the support of people for the 
declaration of religion on ID cards, Church collected signatures from three 
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million people.60 This action had a symbolic meaning beyond mere 
declaration of supporters, in which Church openly confronted the 
government with the support of citizens. Moreover, through the use of past, 
and connecting current challenges with it, Christodoulos tried to increase the 
presence of religious institutions, by declaring the Greek Government as 
incapable of protecting Hellenism and its ideals.61   
 
 Another controversy arose when a project for building central Mosque 
in Athens has been revealed. In order to meet the need of growing number 
of Muslim immigrants in Greece, Greek Government decided to build a 
Mosque outside of the city center of Athens. Situation of religious freedom in 
Greece has been often criticized by various non-governmental organizations 
and the European Union, as Athens is the only capital without an official 
mosque, despite the presence of a large Muslim immigrant community, 
whose numbers are estimated around one million.62 Again, with the 
intervention of the Greek Orthodox Church, the whole discourse of building a 
mosque in Athens has been made thorugh a direct reference to the 
Muslim/Turkish minority in Western Thrace, Turkey and the Ottoman past.  
 
 Establishment of a place of worship requires special permit in Greece 
whıch is asked from any religion except the Greek Orthodox Church. Non-
separation of church and the state showed itself in a different way during the 
discourse of building a mosque in Athens. According to the Greek legislation 
from 1930s, opinion of the local Orthodox bishop is required in order to give 
permission for the establishment of venue of worship for another religion. 
Mandatory Act  1363/1938 and its amendment with Act 1672/1939, are the 
legal regulation in the background of this application.63 In other words, these 
legal acts are regulating superiority of the Orthodox Church on all other 
religions in Greece in terms of worship.  
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 Intervention of the Archbishop Christodoulos took very extreme form. 
He connected building of a mosque in Athens with the return of the Turkish 
rule in Greece. Symbolic meaning of a mosque, became motive for objection 
of the Greek Orthodox Church, which symbolized to them ‘Turkish yoke’.64 
Consequently, Christodoulos reiterated his demands towards Turkey 
regarding reopening of Hagia Sophia in Istanbul for Orthodox Christian 
worship. Hence, the issue of building mosque in Athens, escalated from 
internal religious freedom in Greece into reciprocity of minority rights 
between Greece and Turkey.65 Despite the project has been approved by 
the Holy Synod of the Greek Orthodox Church, it is not implemented up until 
now.   
 
 Connecting building of a mosque with the minority rights reciprocity 
between Greece and Turkey, could be interpreted as a provocative 
discourse of the Greek Orthodox Church. Apart from being an alleged act to 
protect its privileged position in Greek society, Greek Orthodox Church tried 
to sustain its influence on the design and implementation of political issues, 
which were challenged by the Europeanization of the Greek political life.66 
Religious hierarchy in Greece, where Orthodox Church is at the top level, 
causes lack of interreligious dialogue in Greece and church is using this 
tension in order to strengthen its position in Greek social and political life.67 
This is why impossible conditions are put by the Greek Church in order to 
make ongoing tensions permanent. 
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 When Christodoulos in the name of the Greek Orthodox Church 
demanded these impossible changes from Turkey, reactions of the Turkish 
side usually focused on the requested opinion of the Orthodox Church to 
establish non-orthodox places of worship. Very interesting drawing was 
published on Zaman daily newspaper in Turkish, illustrating the situation in 
Greece, which is shown in figure 1.  
 
  
Figure1: Drawing from Zaman daily newspaper (source) in Turkish from March 11, 2003, 
where cross and crescent are put together on the building to illustrate complexity of 
building the mosque in Athens. Inside the structure its written in Turkish “Atina 
Camii’nin Yolu Kiliseden Geçiyor” which means “the path to the mosque in Athens 
passes through the church”.  
 
 This process once  again, revealed that the debate about religious 
freedom in Greece is strictly connected with nationalism and mainly driven 
by the Orthodox Church, which aims to keep its privileged position and tries 
to develop resistance against the challenges of globalization which are likely 
to change the structure of Greek society. Aforementioned both cases, are 
the major events in the last decade, which showed the changing nature of 
state church relations in Greece.  
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2.2.2. “Religious Minority” Recognition Versus “Ethnic Identity” Claims  
 
 The issue of ‘ethnic self-identification’ in Western Thrace, became to 
be the most problematic and resistant one following the signing of Lausanne 
Peace Treaty in 1923. Lausanne Peace Treaty, Protection of Minorities 
section deals with the rights granted to the non-Muslims in Turkey and 
Muslim community in Greece. The lack of direct reference to the ethnic 
Turkish identity turned to be problematic in 1930s. Formation of 
contemporary Turkey as a modern nation state and her will to keep close 
contact with kin minorities left beyond the border of new country, changed the 
discourse of minority protection into ethnic competition. Soon after having its 
political borders confirmed with Lausanne Treaty, Greece started the process 
of Hellenization of new lands namely Western Thrace which was acquired 
after the First World War. First step was to change the names of places from 
Turkish into Greek and to destroy last remnants of the Ottoman rule.68   
 
 During these first years under the Greek rule, mobilization of minority 
did not take place only through religion but also through Turkish language. 
The effect of modernization in Turkey showed itself also in Western Thrace 
where ethnic identification became an important element to face the ‘other’,  
in this case Greeks. It can be discussed though how vital the language is in 
this process, since some scholars base their ideas mainly on the Turkish 
language as a catalyzer for the Turkish self-identification.69 Nevertheless, it is 
obvious that education played an important role in the process of Greek 
nation building in nineteenth century and further after the population 
exchange that took place. Mostly those Greeks who came from Anatolia were 
settled in Western Thrace at the beginning, and they were speaking Turkish. 
In order to foster their integration into contemporary Greek society education 
was sought as the only vehicle to promote the use of Greek, which may help 
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for the formation of homogenous nation.70 Meanwhile, application of this 
methodology in the ‘homogenization process’ of Greek nation created certain 
sensitivity regarding the issue of ethnic belonging, which has been perceived 
as the corner stone of nationhood. Distinction between Greeks and non-
Greeks, including religious minorities has been interpreted as a threat to the 
unity of Greece.71 Therefore religious affiliation became dominant in a way 
being less demanding, while ethnic identification of non-Greek groups has 
always been perceived as a potential for irredentist movement.  
 
 Meanwhile, given the nature of Greek-Turkish relations in 1950s, 
revision of minority policy in Greece took place. Educated elite of the 
Muslim/Turkish minority in Greece, started to demand the ethnic recognition 
of the minority in Western Thrace.72  In line with these demands, Greek 
Government started to use terms ‘Turk-Turkish’ instead of ‘Muslim’. Following 
the process of demand made by the government, local public administration 
offices were ordered to use the term ‘Turkish’ when addressing minority in 
Western Thrace.73 Although there is no official document revealed from the 
archives of the Greek Government, by looking at the documents issued at 
local level, it is possible to understand that the order came from the central 
government in Athens.  
 
 With the eruption of conflict in Cyprus in 1970s, ethnic recognition of 
Turks became again a problematic issue. Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus 
augmented fears among the Greeks, who thought that Western Thrace might 
face the same problem. Sharp shift of Greek policy took place towards 
minority in Western Thrace. Since then, more restrictive policies started to be 
implemented not only in terms of ethnic self-identification but also regarding 
the use of word ‘Turkish’ by any association in Western Thrace. Existing 
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associations which used designation ‘Turkish’ in their names, were classified 
as dangerous for territorial integrity of Greece.74 Following this process, the 
use of terms such as Greek Muslims, Hellenic Muslims or Muslim Minority75 
is encouraged, in order to underestimate the ethnic character of minority in 
Western Thrace. Moreover, Greek Supreme Court prohibited the use of word 
Turkish in the names of organizations and associations created by the 
Muslim/Turkish minority in Western Thrace.76 
 
 After framing political and legal aspects of anti-Turkish regulations, 
Greek Orthodox Church got engaged with the issue again. Church members 
started to make special warnings through media regarding the demographic 
balance between Greek and Turks in Western Thrace. Exactly at this time, 
Greek Church started to offer financial incentives to Greek families in 
Western Thrace for the third child.77 It can be interpreted as a real dilemma 
to deny ethnic character of minority while following campaign against it by 
using ethnic Turkish designation. Greek institutions, tried to control 
population of minority in Western Thrace and change the demographic 
balance in favor of Greeks by using the issue of ethnic self-identification.78  
 
 The case of Ahmet Sadik is important to evaluate legal and political 
consequences of the ethnic self-identification issue in Greece. Dr. Ahmet 
Sadik put his independent candidacy for the Greek Parliamentary elections in 
1989. Sadik was elected for the Parliament at the election that took place in 
June 1989. Since no government was formed, second election took place in 
November 1989. Despite Sadik put his candidacy again, he was not elected. 
His candidacy was declared to be invalid ‘due to some technical problems’.79 
Moreover being charged with the use of term Turkish, he was arrested. He 
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was accused of distributing printed materials, where he described the ethnic 
identity of minority in Western Thrace as Turkish. Dr. Sadik spent 64 days in 
prison. Meanwhile this issue created conflict between Greek and Turkish 
communities in Western Thrace, where shops belonging to Turkish people 
were either destroyed or burned by extremists who were protesting against 
the ethnic self-identification of minority in Thrace.80 In such an environment 
Sadik was kept as the only responsible for disturbing public order, since 
Greek police did not arrest anyone from the Greek demonstrators who 
damaged properties and shops belonging to the Muslim/Turkish minority in 
Western Thrace. When Sadik applied to the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) his application was rejected based on the criteria that 
domestic remedies are not exhausted. Nevertheless, based on the findings of 
the Court, it becomes clear that legal provisions of Greek Government 
denying the existence of ethnic minority are found groundless.81 Hence, it 
may be accepted as wider interpretation of the criteria “existence of 
minorities is not a matter of law, it is a fact”.  
  
 Ethnic identity of the minority in Western Thrace still continues to be a 
problem for the Turkish/Muslim minority as well as for Greek-Turkish bilateral 
relations. In her speech at the meeting of European Christian Democrats-
European Democrats Group held in Istanbul, in 2005, Greek Minister of 
Education and Religious Affairs Marietta Yanakku, explicitly said that “there is 
no Turkish minority in Western Thrace, according to Lausanne Peace Treaty 
Greece has only Muslim minority”.82 This phrase is the official policy of the 
Greek Government towards Muslim/Turkish minority in Western Thrace for 
more than three decades now. Most of the time ethnic issues are being used 
by political parties and Greek Orthodox Church in order to boost Greek 
nationalism and to put real borders between minority and majority in Thrace.  
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2.3. BULGARIA: NATIONALISM AND GRADUAL DECREASE OF 
MINORITY PROTECTION UNTIL 1944 
 
 Independence of Greece and its implications in the Balkan peninsula 
were really important. Greek national revival process had also effects on the 
Bulgarian one. Paisii’s book Istoria Slaviano-Balgarska described in detail 
features of Bulgarian culture along the necessity to use Bulgarian language 
in everyday life and to put a distance between Greeks and Bulgarians since 
they are two different nations.83 Apart from language and culture, Paisii gave 
also additional information on the history of Bulgarians by emphasizing on 
the achievements made in the past. In his words, Bulgaria’s status under 
Ottoman Empire was identical with slavery. In different parts of his book, he 
mentions that Bulgarians were enslaved by Turks after the conquest of the 
country and were put under Greek dominance, which is explained as the 
reason of erosion of Bulgarian language and culture.84 Following massive 
printing and distribution of his book, several other printed materials occurred 
in order to strengthen Bulgarian identity and struggle for nationhood. 
However, as a result of this process, Bulgarian nationalism turned to be a 
product of exclusive ideas which were built to put distance between Greeks 
and Bulgarians and to justify Bulgarian bid for nation state against the 
Ottomans. Once again, education had been accepted as a tool to spread the 
idea of ethnic difference. Creation of secular Bulgarian schools was 
encouraged instead of existing Greco-Bulgarian schools85, which were 
perceived as a reason of Greek dominance among the Bulgarians.   
 
 Since language and authentic culture were perceived as the most 
important elements of ethnic belonging, Bulgarian elite showed great effort 
to produce and integrate everyday life stories into this conjuncture. 
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Chronicles were written to show the sufferings of Bulgarians under the 
Ottoman rule and how forced conversion to Islam took place in Seventeenth 
century Bulgarian lands. In order to make it more effective, stories were 
revised where Greek monks were depicted as supporters of the Ottoman 
oppressions towards Bulgarians. 86 In fact this type of material had been 
prepared just to intensify the division between Greeks and Bulgarians and to 
boost separation process of Bulgarian Exarchate from the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate in Istanbul, which for long had been perceived as a Greek 
religious institution. After the creation of Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870, 
Bulgarian elite started to make progress towards independence of the 
Bulgaria from the Ottoman Empire. Three different elements language, 
culture and religion were defined as crucial for the bid of independence.  
 
 Following the Russo-Turkish war in 1877-1878, defining the borders 
of new Bulgarian state became the most important issue in the Balkans. 
Bulgarian nationalists were in favor of Great Bulgaria, considering the 
largest territorial expansion of medieval Bulgarian Kingdom. San Stefano 
Treaty imposed by Russia, was designed to realize Bulgarian aims without 
taking into account ethnic composition of the areas that were supposed to 
become part of Great Bulgaria.87 But imposition of the Berlin Peace Treaty, 
was interpreted as injustice by the Bulgarian nationalists. Intervention of 
Western Powers and requests for minority rights in newly established 
Bulgarian Principality, reduced the chances to create homogenous state free 
of national minorities, since recognition of Bulgarian Principality was 
conditional upon respect towards minority rights. In line with these demands 
from the west, Bulgarian elite, strongly defended the idea that Bulgaria will 
be the ‘new home’ not only for the Bulgarian nation, but also for other people 
from different ethnic/religious backgrounds.  
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 Under the effect of pressures from the European powers, Bulgaria 
could not sign comprehensive population exchange with the Ottoman 
Empire. Therefore, emigration of Turks from Bulgaria to Turkey was rather 
unorganized process which took individual character as a result of local 
disputes connected with the attacks of Bulgarian irregular troops. This made 
unique difference compared to Greece and Greek-Turkish population 
exchange. In spite of large number of Turks who left Bulgaria for Turkey, still 
Bulgaria had sizeable Turkish minority. Post World War I period became 
important not only for minorities in Bulgaria, but also for Bulgarian 
nationalism. Territorial expansion of Bulgaria stopped and nationalist 
sentiments had been directed towards citizens with non-Bulgarian 
consciousness.  
 
 Sensitive balance between the ethnic and religious groups was 
sought through liberal Tarnovo Constitution adopted in 1879. In fact, this 
document was designed in a way to comply with the obligations Bulgaria 
was bound to because of international treaties signed in the past. However, 
with being one of the most progressive constitutions in Europe88, Tarnovo 
Constitution started to be accepted as an obstacle for those who wanted to 
stop the cultural and educational progress of the Turkish minority in 
Bulgaria. These efforts which lead to the suspension of the Tarnovo 
Constitution in 1934 will be explained below.  
 
 On the other side, after the creation of contemporary Turkey, bilateral 
relations between Bulgaria and Turkey continued to improve which resulted 
with signing the Treaty of Friendship Between Bulgaria and Turkey in 1925. 
This document, being the first one signed between Turkey and Bulgaria 
referred to Muslims in Bulgaria as minority, an aspect  which was criticized 
by some Bulgarian scholars, who denied the existence of the Turkish 
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minority in Bulgaria.89 With a special protocol signed at the same date in 
Ankara, both countries agreed not to put any hindrance to the voluntary 
migration of the Turkish (Muslim) minority from Bulgaria to Turkey, and the 
migration of Bulgarians (Christians whose mother tongue is Bulgarian) from 
Turkey to Bulgaria. The lack of direct reference to the Turkish minority in 
Bulgaria was interpreted in a way that contemporary Turkish Republic had 
nothing to do with the Muslims in Bulgaria since they were all Bulgarian 
citizens (an opinion which continued to dominate Bulgarian political 
discourse over a century).  
 
 With the evolution of Turkish nationalism, Turks in Bulgaria started to 
develop ethnic consciousness. Turkish minority had close contacts with 
Turkey, which showed itself in the daily life of Bulgaria after the World War I. 
Education became again the most important tool for constructing ethnic 
belongingness and for sustaining this identity, as it was the case with Greek 
and Bulgarian nationalism. The Turkish Alphabet reform90 created different 
reactions not only in Turkey but also in Bulgaria. At the time of its adoption 
by Turkey, Turks in Bulgaria were following education still with Arabic script. 
Since the independence of Bulgaria, Turks formed organizations to increase 
their role in the society and Bulgarian political life. Discussions on the 
adoption of new Turkish letters by the Turks in Bulgaria, caused division 
between two different organizations. The Chief Mufti (responsible for the 
organization of religious issues for Muslims in Bulgaria) in Sofia, was strictly 
against the idea of Alphabet reform for the Turks in Bulgaria. He was 
supported by the Bulgarian Government, as they wanted to distance Turks 
in Bulgaria from Turkey. Change of the script was perceived as an 
opportunity to divide culturally Turks in Bulgaria from the Turks in Turkey.91      
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 However, Turkish Teachers’ Association , established in 1906, with its 
modernist views was in favor of the adoption of new Turkish letters by the 
Turks in Bulgaria. Considering the fact that conservative Chief Mufti in Sofia 
was backed by the Bulgarian Government and reformist Turkish Teachers’ 
Association was supported by the Turkish Embassy in Sofia, the issue with 
new Turkish letters turned to be a rough competition for influence on the 
Turkish minority in Bulgaria. At the end of the process, modernists with the 
Turkish Teachers’ Association won the battle, and new Turkish letters were 
introduced simultaneously with Turkey.92 Conservative front, with the 
leadership of the Bulgarian Ministry of National Education, answered by 
prohibiting the use of the new Alphabet. Escalation of the debate resulted 
with the intervention of the Turkish Government. In the meantime, ‘Turkish 
Teachers’ Association formed a special commission which was sent to Sofia 
to discuss the problem with Bulgarian officials.93 Finally the issue was solved 
with the acceptance of the new Turkish letters by the Turks in Bulgaria.  
 
 Following this reform, Turkish press in Bulgaria with newspapers 
called İntibah and Turan ahead started to use the new script. However, it 
took some time till the reform was spread all around the country, since 
newspapers controlled by the conservatives, still used the old Turkish 
alphabet. With the initial support of the Bulgarian Ministry of National 
Education, new Turkish scripts started to be used widely in Bulgaria from 
September 1930.94 This situation made it easier to follow intellectual 
developments and modernization steps in Turkey. Therefore, Turkish 
minority in Bulgaria experienced the changes of the reforms which Ataturk 
did in Turkey.  
 
 Meanwhile, all these positive steps continued only until 1934, the year 
when military junta started to rule Bulgaria. Military and political organization 
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formed in 1927 by army officers called as ‘Zveno’ created an authoritarian 
fascist regime in Bulgaria. Consequences of this regime change were more 
severe for the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. Schools belonging to Turkish 
minority were closed, Vakıf properties were confiscated, publication of 
newspapers in Turkish was prohibited along with the total ban of the use of 
new Turkish letters.95 Within six months after coming to the rule, 
authoritarian regime changed the names of 1900 villages from Turkish into 
Bulgarian. This process aimed to stop the modernization efforts of Turkish 
minority in Bulgaria and to make them more conservative since newspapers 
published in old script were not closed. Another aspect of these actions was 
to force the Turks to remain only as Muslims and not to develop an ethnic 
identity.  
 
 With the time passing, educational and cultural life of the Turkish 
minority became really limited. Following the negotiations between Turkish 
and Bulgarian Governments, in 1938, Bulgarian King Boris III, agreed to 
resume education with the new Turkish letters for the Turkish minority in 
Bulgaria.96 This event marked the end of the conflict about the new and old 
letters. However, by looking at the period between 1920s and 1940s, it is 
possible to come to the conclusion that, educational infrastructure of the 
Turkish minority had suffered severe damages. The number of schools 
belonging to the Turkish minority in Bulgaria were approximately 1700 in 
1920s, and were reduced to almost 400 in 1940s as a result of the 
measures taken by the Bulgarian Government.97 This situation resulted in 
the increasing difference of intellectual abilities between Bulgarians and 
Turks, in which the latter were simply disadvantaged due to different 
circumstances of Bulgarian social and political life. Nevertheless, these 
changes were important to notice that, obligations undertaken with the 
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treaties signed in the past, might be always conditional to political changes 
and reinterpretations.  
 
 
2.4. COMMUNIST RULE AND THE RISE OF BULGARIAN NATIONALISM: 
INTEGRATION WHICH TURNED TO ASSIMILATION, 1945-1989 
 
 In 1944 Bulgaria was liberated by the Soviet Red Army. Fatherland 
Front created with the leadership of Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) was 
engaged with establishing communist rule in Bulgaria. However, on the 
other side Bulgarian Agrarian National Union was supporting the creation of 
western style democracy in Bulgaria. This contest continued with the 
persuasive policies towards Bulgarian population in order to attract their 
support and interest. In this process Turkish minority became really key 
factor in Bulgaria, since its support was of vital importance for both sides. 
Some liberal policies were accepted in order to have the support of the 
Turkish minority who was mainly living in rural areas. This included granting 
land to 45.000 peasants for agricultural production.98  
 
Nevertheless, many of these steps were taken just to spur some more 
positivity towards Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP). Bulgaria’s first 
Communist leader Georgi Dimitrov, had an interesting speech during  the 
meeting of the central committee of Bulgarian Labor Party, which was held 
in Moscow on February 6, 1945. The words of Dimitrov revealed the future 
scope of Bulgaria’s minority policy towards Turks:  
 
 National minorities have to be offered with full rights, but we have to 
be careful with the Turks. They must be treated equally, they have to 
have the same political and citizenship rights as Bulgarians, 
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possibility to study in their own language, and to have their own 
schools and mosques. However, they should not constitute particular 
national movement, which might create Turkish sentiments in 
Bulgaria. We want to separate Turkey from Europe. Therefore, Turks 
should not be allowed to form any national union and get elected to 
the national parliament as Turkish national community, but it should 
be under the common ground as Bulgarian citizens from Turkish 
origin.99 
 
 The statement of Dimitrov, gives an idea about the plans of the new 
Bulgarian Government regarding the situation of Turkish minority in Bulgaria 
and its anti-Turkish orientation which in the following two decades 
culminated into an extreme form of nationalism. Three days after Dimitrov’s 
speech, Central Committee of BCP in Sofia, organized a conference with the 
aim to discuss the problems of the Turkish minority. Turks who were 
Fatherland Front members also participated at the event. However there 
was a huge difference between the demands of both sides. Turks were 
asking for an equal access regarding the jobs in public administration, while 
BCP members were looking for the support of the Turkish minority 
representatives in the elections that were scheduled to take place in October 
1946.100 Organization of these events was important for the BCP in 
attracting the support of different angles of the society if their bid for ruling 
Bulgaria.  
 
 Following the elections in October 1946, communist regime had been 
established in Bulgaria and new Bulgarian Constitution was accepted in 
1947, which changed Bulgarian system into Peoples Republic. With the 
article 79 of the new Constitution of Bulgaria, existence of the national 
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minorities and their rights were officially recognized.101 But despite these 
guarantees, different interpretations took place in order to disable 
independent cultural and educational development. Private Turkish minority 
schools were nationalized in 1947/1948 to enable Government’s intervention 
on a more systematic way. The issue with providing books for the Turkish 
minority schools was revised, and Bulgarian authorities decided to print new 
educational materials in Bulgaria, instead of bringing them from Turkey. Two  
ideological motives stood behind this decision of Bulgarian Government. 
First, the use of the books printed in Turkey, would allow the Turkish 
minority in Bulgaria to follow the same curriculum as Turkish students in 
Turkey, which was perceived as a threat for the exclusion of the minority 
from Bulgarian social and cultural life. Second, after the establishment of 
communism in Bulgaria, ideological division with Turkey became more clear, 
since Turkey decided to form alliance with the West, designing and printing 
of new educational materials in Bulgaria, would allow the Government to 
imbue communist principles among the new generations.102       
 
 The spread of Bulgarian communist ideology in Turkish language was 
not restricted only to school, it covered almost every aspect of the social and 
political life. Several newspapers such as Eylülcü Çocuk and  Dostluk were 
published with the support of Soviet and Bulgarian officials in order to 
include the Turks in the process of communist nation building which was 
planned in Bulgaria. The methodology of the communist rule was to educate 
Turks in Turkish language, and to encourage their participation in the daily 
life of the country. 
 
 Reactions among the Turkish minority toward these developments 
was different. Starting with the establishment of communism, developments 
followed by the nationalization of minority schools, many Turks started to 
                                                 
101 See Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria: http://www.parliament.bg/bg/18 available 
only in Bulgarian.  
102 Ibrahim Yalimov, p. 295.  
101 
 
hand in petitions to the Turkish consulates for emigration from Bulgaria.103 
Still this issue did not took massive character until the collectivization 
process was launched. When this campaign of forcible collectivization of 
agricultural lands reached areas where Turks were living, situation 
deteriorated significantly.104 BCP wanted to attract more Turkish members 
into the structures of the organization by forming the so called Turkish 
intelligentsia, which would serve for a larger support of communist and 
nationalist ideas among the Turkish minority.  
 
 The situation of the Turkish minority was discussed several times in 
different meetings. Religious orientation of the Turkish minority had been 
perceived as a threat to its modernization along the lines of communism. 
Therefore, communists decided to fight against religion in order to 
encourage secular Turkish identity in Bulgaria.105 Low level of literacy 
among the Turkish minority, made it necessary to develop an approach to 
spread the ideas of communism via Turkish language which apparently had 
different impact on Turks. For the sake to sustain support to the regime, 
there were critics among the BCP members that Turkish ethnic identity is 
spread among the Turks very fast through the educational campaigns and 
additional courses organized. However, this situation was tolerated until 
some degree to enable the construction of communist regime at reasonable 
level.106 The presence of Turkish became more evident in daily life of 
Bulgaria and several Turkish schools opened to educate Turkish children. 
Opening of the Department of Turkish Philology at Sofia University had been 
accepted as a step forward in the integration of minority. But due to lack of 
educated personnel in Turkish language, experts from Azerbaijan were 
invited in Bulgaria in order to teach the members of Turkish minority 
according to communist ideals. Also some members of minority were sent to 
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the Soviet Union for higher education for the purposes of having Turkish 
intelligentsia with communist feelings107 who would be later responsible for 
its promotion among the members of minority.  
 
 Again in the mid-1950s, policy towards Turkish minority took different 
course. For some members of the BCP, cultural autonomy of the Turkish 
minority was found dangerous for the aims of Bulgarian communism. 
Ongoing resistance among the members of Turkish minority against the 
collectivization of agricultural lands was interpreted as hostility towards 
communist regime. Inasmuch ten years passed after the establishment of 
communism in Bulgaria, reluctance of the Turkish minority to be part of the 
regime and resistance to collectivization or land expropriation process, were 
accepted further as an extreme form of Turkish nationalism and 
conservatism. The process of collectivization was not welcomed by the 
Turkish minority since they had interpreted it as land expropriation, that 
communists conducted in order to make them deprived from their main 
agricultural activities. Collectivization process had different results in 
Bulgaria: by 1956, 75% of the agricultural land in Ruse was expropriated, 
while in regions like Tolbuhin and Targovishte this was 80% and 90% 
respectively.108 Considering the fact that collectivization process of the land 
in Haskovo region was only around 50%, and more than 80% of its 
population was of Turkish origin, fears raised among the members of BCP 
regarding the progress of communist regime in Bulgaria and its acceptance 
by the members of the minority.  
 
 Heavy atmosphere of nationalism started to show itself first in the 
form of communist social construction. Those Turks who actively 
participated in the establishment of communism in Bulgaria, started to 
complain first about the presence of Bulgarian nationalism and its rise in 
every sphere of the society. Majority of the complaints were related with the 
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privileged status of Bulgarians who were working together with Turks in 
public administration and agricultural production. By giving example of cases 
such as shorter office hours and less working load for Bulgarians, Turks 
expressed their criticism for the heavy presence of Bulgarian nationalism 
and discrimination based on ethnic grounds at work.109 However, this 
situation has been interpreted by Bulgarian officials as “perception of ethnic 
segregation from the side of Turkish minority”. Because of this reason, they 
decided to speed up the process of ethnic homogenization in order to 
prevent these complaints based on “nationalist grounds”.    
 
 In line with these developments, several measures were taken by the 
BCP to end up the cultural autonomy of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. 
Once again, education became a tool to intervene in the affairs of Turkish 
minority. Following the nationalization process of minority schools in 1947, 
this time in 1959, Turkish schools were merged with Bulgarian schools.110 
This process has been followed by the gradual increase of Bulgarian 
curriculum at the expense of the Turkish one taught in the schools of the 
Turkish minority. 
 
  Merger of Turkish minority schools was a product of a meeting of the 
Central Committee of BCP (known as Априлският пленум на ЦК на БКП) 
which took place between 2-6 April 1956. For the first time after coming to 
the rule, communist leader Zhivkov, defines the lines of the policy called 
‘further integration of national minorities into Bulgarian society’.111 Main 
target of this policy was to create homogenous Bulgarian society by 
eliminating divisions along ethnic and religious lines, and to continue the 
process of building communism in Bulgaria.  
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 Following the consolidation of Turkish schools with Bulgarian schools, 
curricula taught in Turkish have been reduced dramatically. This started to 
rise fears of assimilation among the minority. The issue with reducing 
Turkish curriculum was not welcomed also by the Turkish members of the 
BCP. Therefore, instead of cutting education in Turkish directly, its gradual 
decrease was preferred in order to keep limited negative reactions of 
Turkish minority.112 First, Turkish started to be taught at the schools as a 
facultative language and then by 1970 it totally disappeared from the 
curriculum of all schools in Bulgaria.  
 
 Meanwhile, BCP started also an intellectual propaganda by publishing 
books which included arguments that Turks in Bulgaria  are from Bulgarian 
origin. In cooperation with the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, BCP wanted 
to spread the idea that “Turks in Bulgaria are actually of Bulgarian origin”. In 
order to defend this idea the following method was used: publication of 
various books on the history of Ottoman Empire and its presence in Bulgaria 
had been encouraged. By referring to the book of Paisii Hilendarski, 
Ottoman period has been described as slavery for Bulgarians. Nevertheless, 
the striking arguments were formed exactly based on this idea. BCP 
members with Zhivkov ahead, started to argue that Turks in Bulgaria were in 
fact assimilated Bulgarians during the five century long Ottoman rule.113 
Therefore, it was assigned as a task to restore Bulgarian identity of the 
Turkish minority in Bulgaria, and to integrate them fully back into Bulgarian 
society.  
 
 These extreme ideas of communist rule started to find more and more 
proponents among the leadership of BCP and Bulgarian intelligentsia. 
Decisions accepted by the Central Committee of BCP started to show their 
consequences in daily life of Bulgaria. Population registers became the first 
evidence of the assimilationist policies. Up until 1980s section about the 
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ethnic origin was indicated in population registers. However, after an order 
from the central Government, this part of the registers has been left empty.  
 
 Every single change made by the BCP, made inevitable for the last 
stage to happen. After serious policies targeting social economic and 
political life, ethnic diversity in Bulgaria was systematically destroyed. 
Following steps were more directed to fix the missing link between people 
and state policies.114 Meetings of the Central Committee were dominated by 
the debate that “Turkish minority has to be part of Bulgarian nation after this 
process which might be called either as integration or assimilation”.115 This 
was important to show the decisive character of Bulgarian approach towards 
Turkish minority and to show its limits.  
 
 
2.4.1. Contractual Migration as a tool for Ethnic Cleansing during the 
Cold War 
 
  Since the very first days of Bulgarian independence, existence of non-
Bulgarian communities - mainly Muslims - and mixed structure of the 
population has been perceived as a threat for the project called “nation 
state”. As the issue of forced migration has already been denied by the 
Western powers with the Berlin Treaty, Bulgaria started to seek other ways 
to create a unitary state. Despite that Russo-Turkish war ended in 1878, 
collective migration from Bulgaria was still continuing in 1880s. According to 
the numbers given by the French consul in Edirne, in the first three months 
of 1883, approximately 200.000 people crossed the border from Bulgaria to 
Turkey.116 These migration flows continued throughout the Balkan wars and 
First World War. Often, Turkish/Muslim minorities felt threatened by the 
policies of Bulgarian Government and the attacks of Bulgarian irregular 
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troops, which were intensely focused on the areas where Turks live, in order 
to force them to emigrate from the new Bulgarian lands.  
 
 Singing of the Treaty of Friendship between Bulgaria and Turkey 
became another opportunity for Bulgaria to settle the issue of migration. 
Unlike Greece, Bulgarian authorities could not manage to make extensive 
migration agreement with Turkey and get rid of Turkish minority which was 
seen as an obstacle for the homogenous Bulgarian population. Considering 
the fact that the real growth of Turkish population was bigger than the 
Bulgarian one, Bulgarian authorities started to consider migration as the only 
solution to sustain demographic balance in favor of Bulgarians. After the 
military coup d'état in 1934, situation of the Turkish minority started to get 
worse due to restrictions imposed by the authoritarian government. 
Moreover, the fact that minority members were economically more deprived 
than the Bulgarian majority, increased the motives for emigration. According 
to the documents of BCP, in 1940, many Turks illegally crossed the border 
at night and emigrated from Bulgaria to Turkey.117    
 
 However, with the end of the Second World War, emigration from 
Bulgaria started to become part of the daily life. Part of this emigration was 
voluntary and part of it forced. Besides, migration in Bulgaria had two 
different types; internal and external. Its external dimension was mainly 
directed towards Turkey, composed of Turks who wanted to leave Bulgaria 
because of extreme poverty and limited resources. Nevertheless, in the 
south of Bulgaria, near the borders with Turkey and Greece a big part of the 
population was of Turkish/Muslim background including Pomaks who were 
later called as ‘Bulgarian Muslims. During the time of communist state 
building, cultural and linguistic homogeneity of the Turkish minority had been 
perceived as threat. Including the fact that compact Turkish minority was 
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living in border areas where they comprised almost 90% percent of the total 
local population, was considered as vulnerability for Bulgarian frontiers, and 
their protection from enemies of the western world such as Turkey and 
Greece.  
 
 Aiming to eliminate this threat stemming from the demographic 
concentration of the Turkish minority, BCP decided to relocate part of the 
Turkish minority from Southern Bulgaria into Central and Northern part of the 
country where mainly Bulgarian population lived.118 This relocation would 
also serve for the ‘voluntary assimilation’ of the Turkish population among 
Bulgarians. Because according to the Communists, compact settlements of 
the Turks in Bulgaria, where no single Bulgarian among them lived, enabled 
them to preserve their culture and traditions. Therefore, in order to speed up 
the process of voluntary assimilation, BCP decided to move ‘pure 
Bulgarians’ from the North and Central parts of the country to the South in 
order to increase cultural interaction in daily life and to speed up the process 
of integration of the Turkish minority into Bulgarian population. Since Turks 
were mostly living in villages and working in agricultural field or as tobacco 
producers, Bulgarian Government decided to take some measures to 
prevent the economic losses such kind of massive internal relocation might 
cause. Hereby migration of skilled Bulgarian farmers was encouraged to the 
Southern Bulgaria in order to reduce the losses in agricultural production.119  
This could solve the economic problem for the government and also ease 
the process of assimilation in Southern Bulgaria, which was planned to take 
place in later stage.  
 
 After its discussion at the Plenum of Central Committee of BCP, 
decision regarding the internal relocation started to be implemented. 
According to Şimşir, in July 1948, five trains full of Turks, were moved from 
Rhodope mountains in the South of the country to the Northeastern region 
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called Dobruja. In October 1949, twenty eight trains full of Turks were moved 
from Momchilgrad(Mestanli) and Zlatograd towards Northern part of the 
country. Also in 1950, many families from the Southern regions were moved 
to cities like Razgrad and Shumen120 in order to change the situation in 
Southern border areas which were densely populated by Turks. Despite the 
denial of Bulgarian officials for such kind of internal relocations in Bulgaria, 
during the fieldwork stage of this project, some interviews were conducted 
with the displaced people from South who are members of the Turkish 
minority. They have been settled all the way in the Northeastern part of the 
country, in regions such as Ruse, Silistra, Razgrad, Varna, Burgas and 
Shumen. But the interesting aspect of their relocation was the settlement 
style chosen by Turks in their new lands. Mostly, Turks who were forced to 
leave Southern regions and settled in the Northern parts of Bulgaria, 
preferred to create new villages with the same neighbors from South (with 
whom they travelled all the way), instead of going to the villages where local 
Turks were already living. Nevertheless, it becomes clear that cultural 
adherence played an important role while choosing their neighbors.121 
 
 When internal relocation did not assist policies of BCP, then external 
migration became a solution. Somehow, after the establishment of the 
communist regime in Bulgaria, Turks started to feel the restrictions of 
freedom first. Nationalization of Turkish schools, had already had bad impact 
on the Turks of Bulgaria and poor conditions in rural areas did not make the 
life easier for them. On the other side, newly established communist regime, 
continued to restrict the rights of minority with the motive that resurgence of 
the Turkish nationalism among Turks was taking place due to increasing 
mobility for migration to Turkey. With the census conducted in 1946, 
population of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria was officially announced as 
675.500 people. This number was equal to 9,61% of the total Bulgarian 
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population122, and the real growth of the Turkish population was much higher 
than the Bulgarian. In line with these developments, on August 10, 1950, 
Bulgarian Government gave a note to Turkey, through which it expressed its 
request for the acceptance of 250.000 Turks as immigrants within three 
months.123 The timing of this note was very meaningful, as the war in Korea 
broke up and Turkey supported United States by sending its troops to 
Korea. It is clear that, such extensive request for migration made by 
Bulgarian authorities was directed by the Soviet Union, in order to punish 
Turkey for her actions backing American side in Korea.  
 
 In its answer, Turkey expressed readiness to accept 250,000 Turks, 
however, in order to control the immigration process, put the requirement of 
obtaining an entry visa to Turkey. Despite the fact that 212,150 entry visas 
were granted to Turks, not all of them were able to immigrate in Turkey. The 
border was closed by the Turkish authorities in November 1951, as 
Bulgarian Government placed Gypsies without visas or fake entry visas 
among Turks, which was against the regulations of the Migration Protocol 
signed in 1925. Eventually, between 1950-1951, 154,393 Turks emigrated 
from Bulgaria to Turkey.124 This migration wave gave an opportunity to 
Bulgarian Government to boost the collectivization process of agricultural 
land and get rid of those Turks, who were not eager to integrate into the 
communist system.  
 
 Meanwhile, soon after this process, in 1956, there was another 
census conducted in order to see the growth of Bulgarian population. 
Despite the migration in 1951, the number of the Turkish minority recorded 
an increase bigger than the percentage of the Bulgarian.125 This situation 
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was regarded carefully by the Bulgarian authorities. Five years after the 
migration in 1951, Turks started to reorganize themselves for another 
emigration from Bulgaria. Given the effect of polices such as merging 
Turkish schools with Bulgarian schools, and gradual decrease of education 
in Turkish from 1962, tendency for emigration among the members of 
Turkish minority started to dominate the daily life.  
 
 In the meantime Central Committee of BCP was engaged with socio-
demographic analysis of Bulgarian population. The growth rate of ethnic 
Bulgarian population compared to the Turkish one, was accepted with 
apprehension by BCP. Even comparative analysis about the general health 
conditions of both ethnic groups was designed in a way to show the real 
growth of the Turkish population in Bulgaria.126  
 
 In the beginning of 1960s, after the restrictive measures in the cultural 
and educational life of the Turkish minority, tendency for emigration started 
to be spread among the Turks in Bulgaria. By the year 1964, almost 400,000 
Turks applied to the Turkish representative offices in Bulgaria to emigrate to 
Turkey.127 Harsh measures were taken by Bulgarian authorities to prevent 
Turks from reaching Turkish consulates.  
 
 Bulgarian Government interpreted this massive movement for 
emigration among the Turks, as a presence of ‘extreme Turkish nationalism’, 
rather than being a reaction to deteriorating standards of minority protection. 
Todor Zhivkov, started to develop the idea that, those Turks whose family 
members or relatives have already emigrated to Turkey, are more inclined 
for ethnic segregation due to the separation from their family members 
across the border. Consequently, in 1964, Bulgarian Government sent 
official request to the Turkish Government to reach another emigration 
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agreement. As a result of the diplomatic negotiations held between both 
countries, conclusion of an agreement was declared to the public on 
February 28, 1968, which aimed to unify broken families as a result of the 
emigration in 1950-1951.128 People who were eligible to emigrate within the 
scope of this agreement for family unification, were give the right to do so by 
1978. Approximately 130,000 people emigrated from Bulgaria to Turkey 
between 1969-1978 as a part of the Family Unification agreement.   
 
 With the last emigration of Turks, Todor Zhivkov managed to find 
more appropriate environment for the application of the so called policy of 
‘integration of the Turkish minority into Bulgarian nation’, and to realize his 
goal of bringing the real communism in Bulgaria. Besides, emigration of 
Turks, was deliberately restricted with close family members and spread to 
ten years in order to limit the economic and demographic effects of the  
migration for both countries.       
 
 
2.4.2. Revival Process and the Name Changing Campaign: The Last 
Exodus from Bulgaria 
 
 Bulgarian nationalism continued its rise during 1970s in the name of 
building the real communism in the country. Todor Zhivkov as the leader of 
BCP and Bulgaria, has planned every single detail of the process. According 
to him, inclusion of the Turkish minority in the process of communist state 
building in Bulgaria, would only be possible through its fully integration into 
Bulgarian nation, which in other words means assimilation. Apart from heavy 
nationalist propaganda directed to Turks, Bulgarian Government conducted 
also massive campaigns for the ideological aspects of Bulgarian 
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communism.129 Therefore, assimilation of the Turkish minority was 
spreading under the excuses of building real communism in Bulgaria.  
 
 BCP as the ruling power of Bulgaria for almost half a century, started 
to prepare the basis of the assimilation policy by claiming that Bulgaria is a 
unitary country. After the change of Bulgarian Constitution in 1971, the term 
‘national minorities’ had been replaced with the term ‘citizens of non-
Bulgarian origin’. In line with this shift, in most of Politburo meetings 
conducted by the BCP in 1980s, the term ‘citizens of non-Bulgarian origin’ 
has been used instead of the Turkish minority. Again the use of Bulgarian 
language has been accepted as an indicator of the integration of Turkish 
minority into Bulgaria nation.130 Therefore, speaking Bulgarian and 
conducting all the correspondence in Bulgarian became obligatory in order 
to show the level of integrity and homogenous character of Bulgarian 
population. 
 
 In 1982, after their Turkish names have been changed with Bulgarian 
ones, children born in Turkish-Pomak mixed marriages, started to face 
‘Bulgarization’ campaign first. Document sealed as top-secret, contained 
information about the achievements of name changing campaigns among 
the people who formed mixed marriages, and the Committee for State 
Security considered further extension of the name changing process 
towards Turks.131 Changing the names of people with mixed marriages, 
started to rise concerns among the Turkish minority as well. Turks handed in 
petitions to the regional police offices to express their will for leaving the 
country. Nevertheless, Bulgarian Government, took some measures to cover 
up these cases. In return those people who wanted to leave the country, 
were accused with Turkish espionage by Bulgarian authorities.  
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 On the other side, Bulgarian academic institutions such as Bulgarian 
Academy of Sciences were busy to prove Bulgarian origins of the Turkish 
minority in Bulgaria. Leading theory for the Bulgarian origin of the Turks has 
been connected with the Ottoman past. According to the Bulgarian theses, 
during the five hundred years long Ottoman rule, while Pomaks (so called 
Bulgarian Muslims) were only converted to Islam and assimilated through 
the religion, those who were called as Turks in Bulgaria, were assimilated 
both through religious and ethnic means. Regarding the discourse about 
ethnic origin of the Turks in Bulgaria, soon, academic research material 
started to appear supporting the opinion of the Government. Kardzhali 
region was chosen for anthropological fieldwork, where some arranged 
excavations were conducted in order to prove Bulgarian origin of the Turks 
in the area. For example in 1982, a book called ‘Ahrida’ has been published 
under the authorship of Boris Deribeev, where comprehensive analysis 
about the Bulgarian origins of Turks exists.132 In 1986, when second edition 
of the book was published, the author indicated that, first edition of Ahrida 
has been accepted with very high interests mainly in the region of Kardzhali 
where Turks were living. He interpreted this issue as a demand of the 
Turkish minority to learn the truth about its real origins. 
 
 With the support of the press and academia, BCP slowly started to 
launch the massive name changing campaign among the Turks in Bulgaria. 
However, even at Politburo meetings, where only key members of Bulgarian 
Communist Party were accepted, conversations were distorted mainly due 
to the potential for use of the recorded archival documents against them in 
the future. Therefore, instead of the term ‘assimilation of the Turkish 
minority’, terms such as ‘its inclusion into Bulgarian society’ and ‘to the 
struggle of building real communism in Bulgaria’ were preferred.133 
Eventually this process of Bulgarization of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria 
                                                 
132 Boris Deribeev, Ahrida: Nepoznata Zemia, Sofia, Otechestven Front, 1982, p. 235-237.  
133 TsDA, F. 1B, o. 67, a. e. 3090, l. 58-139, 1984.  
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has been officially called as ‘Revival Process’ (Vazroditelniyat Protses) of 
Bulgarian nation.   
 
 In a secret meeting conducted on July 4, 1984, at Boyana facilities, 
key members of BCP came together to discuss about the timing of the name 
changing campaign, and whether it will include all Turks in Bulgaria or only 
part of them. The meeting finishes without an agreement.134 Nevertheless, it 
was helpful to prepare the background of Politburo meetings in October 
1984, when the decision for launching massive name changing campaign 
has been taken.  Moreover, during the meeting of the Central Committee of 
BCP on October 24, 1984, creation of ‘Bulgarian Names Catalogue’ has 
been arranged in order to make the whole name changing process more 
systematic and smooth.  
 
 With an order by Dimitar Stoianov, Minister of Internal Affairs of 
Bulgaria, the name changing campaign started on December 10, 1984. He 
further urged for the increase of security officers in the regions where Turks 
lived, to prevent any events from happening. The so called Revival Process 
and name changing campaign, took its start from Kardzhali region, where 
Turks comprised almost 90% of the population. Generals of Bulgarian army 
forwarded their recommendations to the 6th unit of State Security Agency 
which was also in charge of the process. For example, general Musakov 
recommended to cut all phone lines in villages where name changing is 
planned to take place.135 Cutting all means of connection were important not 
to allow information to be spread around and reach to Turkish authorities.  
 
 During the name changing process, villages were occupied early in 
the morning and starting with 6am in the morning police forces were 
knocking the doors of every family to change their names. People were 
                                                 
134 Orlin Zagorov, Vazroditelniyat Protses: Teza i Antiteza, Otritsanie na Otritsanieto, Sofia, Pandora 
Ltd., 1993,  p. 25.  
135 AMVR, F. 22, o. 1, a. e. 257, l. 1-8, 1985.  
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forced to sign formal petitions which had fixed format, where they declared 
that name changing action was conducted by their own will. Police 
authorities collected old documents with Turkish names and issued new 
documents with Bulgarian names.136   
 
 In an interview with people from the villages near Kardzhali they said 
the following:  
 
 During the name changing campaign every village was first 
surrounded by the army early in the morning, in order to block all 
exits. However, we tried to avoid the name changing for as long as 
we could. Therefore, among our neighbors in the village, we have 
organized shifts in key areas of the village to see whether military 
officers are coming or not. When someone had seen an army or 
police patrol approaching the village, all adults in the village, we were 
running in to the forest or to the mountains to hide from the military 
officers who were there to change our names. In this way we 
managed to postpone our name changing for couple of weeks, 
unfortunately in the end we were also forced to change our names.137 
 
In this case the attitude of government officials was decisive as they 
needed permission of parents to change the names of children who were 
aged under eighteen. When they came to the villages, they have found 
houses empty with children accompanied by their grandparents, who were 
not entitled to sign the necessary documents for name changing. Thus 
finding family members was crucial for the progress of name changing 
campaign.  
 
                                                 
136 Mila Mileva Maeva, Balgarskite Turtsi: Preselnitsi v Republika Turtsia, Kultura i Identichnost, 
Sofia, IMIR, 2006, p. 30-31.  
137 Interview conducted on July 20, 2010, with a group of people from Benkovski, village in the 
Kardzhali district, near the Greek border.   
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 In those areas of Southern Bulgaria, where name changing campaign 
was launched first, people started to organize protests. Various protests took 
place in Kardzhali, Cebel, Krumovgrad and Benkovski. During the protest in 
Benkovski, a seventeen months old baby was killed as a result of a gunfire 
launched by the Bulgarian army towards protesters. Many people were killed 
or imprisoned in protests which were spread all around Bulgaria. Those 
Turks who were kept responsible for organizing such uprisings against the 
government, were sent to the prison in Belene island situated on Danube 
river.  
 
 From December 1984 until March 1985, the names of 850.000 Turks 
were changed with Bulgarian ones. Central Committee of BCP, planned new 
policies in order to deepen the Bulgarization process of Turks. The use of 
Turkish language was prohibited in all public areas and those people who 
spoke Turkish were fined with five Bulgarian Leva.138 Doctors were  ordered 
not to treat patients who did not speak Bulgarian. Mosques were either 
closed or destroyed, since they were seen as a symbol of conservatism 
among the Turks.139 Even crescents on top of the minarets were removed by 
officials who considered it as a symbol of the Turkish flag.   
 
 External reactions to the revival process in Bulgaria were different. Of 
course Eastern Block and Soviet Union supported Bulgaria. However, 
Turkey started a diplomatic campaign against Bulgaria, which led to the 
isolation of Bulgaria in the international organizations such as United 
Nations and Council of Europe. Turkish proposals for arranging another 
migration were refused by Bulgaria. Nevertheless, the Central Committee of 
BCP, was secretly considering the emigration of few hundred thousand 
Turks. Because according to them total number of the Muslims in Bulgaria 
                                                 
138 Milena Mahon, “The Turkish Minority Under Communist Bulgaria – Politics of Ethnicity and 
Power”, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 157.  
139 Ibid.  
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was approximately 1,600,000140 people by the year of 1988 including Turks, 
Roma and Pomaks. BCP members who were responsible for the revival 
process, considered these people in one way or another as natural allies of 
Turkey in Bulgaria.  
 
 With the time passing, protests and hunger strikes started to be 
spread in all Bulgarian cities. Zhivkov and BCP had difficulties explaining to 
the world the reasons of these protests. There were many critics that 
Bulgarian citizens did not have freedom to travel internationally. Thus BCP 
decided to issue passports for international travel of Bulgarian citizens who 
wanted to do so. However, people who have been kept responsible for 
provocations or organizing protests against the government, were expelled 
first from Bulgaria.  
 
 In May 1989, the border with Turkey was opened for migration and 
Turks started to emigrate from Bulgaria again. Bulgarian authorities had 
difficulty in issuing documents for all the Turks, since the number of 
applicants was growing every day. From May 25, 1989 opening of the 
border until its closure on August 21, 1989, 362,000 Turks emigrated from 
Bulgaria to Turkey.141  
 
 The effects of the last emigration of Turks in 1989 was really 
catastrophic for the Bulgarian economy. Most of the people who left the 
country were working population, either as teachers, doctors, or agricultural 
workers. This type of comprehensive economic and social change in 
Bulgaria, prepared the end of the communist rule, since people who were 
unsatisfied with their situation started to organize uprisings against the 
government.  
 
                                                 
140 Meeting of the Group Responsible for the Revival Process, TsDA, F. 1B, o. 99, a. e. 2, l. 1-82.   
141 Ibrahim Yalimov, p. 473.  
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 On December 29, 1989, the Central Committee of BCP denounces 
the name changing campaign and revival process whose engineer was 
Todor Zhivkov. Following this decision, normalization of the atmosphere in 
the country becomes the most important issue for all structures of the BCP.  
 
 
2.5. UNCERTAINTY OF POMAKS IN GREECE AND BULGARIA: AN 
EXAMPLE OF CROSS-BORDER MINORITY GROUP 
 
 Pomaks, also called Bulgarian Muslims in Bulgaria or Bulgarian 
speaking Muslims in Greece, are another autochthonous minority group, 
mainly settled in the Rhodope mountains area on the border between 
Greece and Bulgaria. Complex historical events shaped their lives along 
with their legal status. Their historical origin is one of the most contested 
issues in the region up until now. However, today they are called as Pomaks 
or Bulgarian Muslims.  
 
 It is supposed that Pomaks were converted during the Ottoman 
expansion in the Balkans in fourteenth century, as a result of which they 
became part of the Muslim millet.142 Since the millet system was based on 
religious grounds, Pomaks were also forming the same millet as Turks and 
the rest of Muslim population in the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, border 
changes in nineteenth century affected them as well. After the Balkan Wars 
in 1912 and 1913, territories where Pomaks had been living for centuries 
became part of the Bulgarian and Greek nation states.  
 
 Both Bulgaria and Greece concluded agreements with Turkey 
regarding the protection of minorities, as it was indicated previously in detail. 
                                                 
 Different terms such as Bulgarian Muslims, Bulgarian Mohammedans and Pomaks are in use to 
address this group. For the purposes of this work I will use Pomaks, since it has more reliable origins 
compared to two other terms.  
142 Madeleine Danova, Transformation of Ethnic Identity: the Case of the Bulgarian Pomaks, in: 
Parallel Cultures, Majority/Minority Relations in the Countries of the Former Eastern Bloc, (Eds.) 
Christopher Lord & Olga Strietska-Ilina, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001, p. 151. 
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Pomaks were part of this legal system as a Muslim minority. But during the 
expansion of the new nation states in the Balkans, they became the first 
victims of assimilation policies. The fact that the language spoken among 
Pomaks is a dialect of Bulgarian, created some ideas among Bulgarian 
officials and especially Bulgarian Orthodox Church, to make this population 
part of Bulgarian nation in the early days of Bulgarian independence.  
 
 After the creation of the Bulgarian Principality, three censuses were 
conducted until the end of the nineteenth century - in 1880, 1885 and 1888-  
where Pomaks were counted and registered as Turks. However, starting 
with 1905, separate group as ‘Pomaks’ started to appear in Bulgarian 
census data.143 In line with the philosophy of Bulgarian revival, there was a 
massive campaign for their separation from the Turkish ethnic group.  
 
 Meanwhile in the Greek case, since religion was the main criteria to 
identify non-Greek minorities, Pomaks were mainly considered in the same 
group as Turks and therefore not treated separately. This tendency 
continued after Lausanne Treaty was signed in 1923. Greek Orthodox 
Church was engaged with the assimilation of Christian Macedonians, 
Bulgarians, Vlachs and Albanians living in Greek territories and Pomaks 
have been considered automatically as non-Greek due to their religious 
affiliation.  
 
 The Tarnovo Constitution, declared Bulgarian Orthodox Church as 
the official religion of Bulgaria. Similar to the Greek case, Bulgarian 
Orthodox Church started to compete with the State and extend its power.144 
This usually happened through the involvement of church members in 
political and social issues. The first signs of this involvement came after the 
                                                 
143 Maria Todorova (b), p. 138-139.  
144 Spas T. Raikin, The Bulgarian Orthodox Church, in: Eastern Christianity and Politics in the 
Twentieth Century, (Ed.) Pedro Ramet, Durham, Duke University Press, 1988, p. 161.  
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Balkan Wars, when members of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church started to 
convert to Christianity Pomaks who lived in Rhodope Mountains. 
 
 Already in 1912, Bulgarian authorities had begun to speak about 
Bulgarian Muslims, a term which had been developed to strip off Pomaks 
from the protection of Turkey and to stress their Bulgarian origin. When the 
campaign of conversion initiated in Southern Bulgaria, group of Pomaks 
went to complain to the Mufti in Plovdiv, declaring that they had been forced 
to accept Bulgarian Orthodoxy.145 Pomaks from many other villages and 
cities started to complain about the ongoing imposition of Bulgarian 
Orthodoxy, and reiterated their complaints to the Turkish representatives in 
Bulgaria. However, Bulgarian authorities described the events as individual 
actions conducted by the Church members. In these place where conversion 
has already finished, new priests were appointed with the orders of 
Bulgarian Holy Synod.  
 
   
                                                 
145 Velichko Georgiev & Staiko Trifonov, Pokrastvaneto na Balgarite Mohamedani, 1912-1913 
Dokumenti, Sofia, Akademichno Izdatelstvo Prof. Marin Drinov, 1995, p. 21.  
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Picture about the conversion of Pomaks in Banite village in 1912. Source: State 
Archives Plovdiv, F. 959K, o. 1, a. e. 902, l. 2.  
  
 Conversion of Pomaks continued until late 1913. During this time 
people started to express their will to become Muslims again.146 People who 
were converted before were not using their Bulgarian names and did not 
attend worship ceremonies in churches. Moreover, this situation created 
tensions between the Bulgarian Church and State officials and therefore the 
conversion campaign stopped in late 1913.  
 
 The conversion of Pomaks in 1912-1913 showed how important for 
Bulgarian authorities was to ensure the homogeneity of the Bulgarian 
population in order to secure the borders of the newly created state. Support 
of State officials in the actions of the Church was based only on limited 
cooperation or unilateral ignorance about things being done by the members 
of Holy Synod. Although Pomaks were allowed to become Muslims again, 
the attitude of Bulgarian officials and Church members did not change this 
much. The only effective result of this ineffective conversion campaign was 
the fact that, after 1913 Pomaks started to be called “Bulgarian Muslims” 
officially.    
 
 After a turbulent transition process during the First World War, 
changes in Bulgarian political life affected Pomaks as well. The military coup 
which took place in 1934, affected not only the Turks, but Pomaks as well. A 
second conversion of Pomaks took place, this time carried out by state 
officials. In 1937, an organization called Rodina (motherland) was formed in 
Bulgaria. Rodina’s aim was to boost Bulgarian identity among all ethnic 
minorities in Bulgaria and Pomaks were the special target of this radical 
policy.147 Worship in Bulgarian language was  introduced in the mosques 
and Qur’an was translated into Bulgarian. It was important to state that 
“Bulgarians might have different religious affiliation but this does not change 
                                                 
146 Ibid., p. 456.  
147 Maria Todorova (b), p. 139. 
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their ethnic belonging”. Soon in 1942, these policies of Rodina culminated 
into a name changing campaign mainly initiated in Western Rhodopes. 
However, with the end of Second World War, Rodina was dissolved and the 
names of converted Pomaks were restored.148  
 
 The first process of Pomak conversions was initiated by the Bulgarian 
Orthodox Church and the second one by the nationalist movement called 
Rodina. The role of religion in both processes was really important to 
support the shift of identity although it had different methodologies. 
However, the establishment of the communist rule in Bulgaria changed 
everything in a very radical way. Communists were engaged with the 
national question and had different proposals regarding its solution. Their 
efforts focused on the idea to separate Pomaks from Turks, in order to make 
it clear that they did not belong to the Turkish minority in Bulgaria.149 Mixed 
marriages between Pomaks and Turks were discouraged with the idea that 
they created incentives for the assimilation of Pomaks into Turkish ethnic 
identity. Special measures were taken by BCP to prevent registration of 
Pomaks as Turks in areas where they live mixed.150 BCP members agreed 
in Politburo meetings to prevent children of Pomak minority from studying 
Turkish at schools, which was considered as a tool for their assimilation. 
Finally as a result of all these restrictive measures, some municipalities in 
Southern Bulgaria in 1960s embarked on an assimilation campaign by 
changing the names of Pomaks. By the beginning of 1970s the names of all 
Pomaks were changed with the exception of those who formed mixed 
marriages with Turks. In order to eliminate this obstacle, in 1982, BCP 
decided to conduct another name changing campaign among the people 
who formed mixed marriages, in most cases Turks and Pomaks. 
 
                                                 
148 Ibid.  
149 TsDA, F. 1B, o. 6, a.e. 653, l. 4-5, 1949.  
150 TsDA, F. 1B, o. 15, a. e. 765, l. 1-13, 1961.  
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 After changing the names of the Turkish minority, the so called revival 
process in Bulgaria finished. The successful assimilation of Pomaks, gave 
an idea that the same methodology might work with Turks as well. However, 
all these events prepared the end of the communist rule in Bulgaria. Soon 
after the collapse of communism in Bulgaria, all members of minorities 
started to submit petitions for the restoration of their names.  
 
 Pomak identity is still being perceived very different and subject to 
many discussions as a result of contradictory government policies in 
Bulgaria and Greece. Greece did not embark into an assimilation process 
toward Pomaks, as they constituted for the whole period an integral part of 
the Muslim minority in Western Thrace. Today, in some parts of Western 
Thrace as it is in Bulgaria, the use of the word ‘Pomak’ is perceived as a 
derogatory expression. Pomaks in Western Thrace consider themselves as 
Turks and they want to be identified as Turks. For example in villages near 
Xanthi, in Greece most people identify themselves as ethnically Turk despite 
the fact that their knowledge of Turkish is very limited.  
 
 When it comes to Bulgaria, the structure of Pomaks is even more 
complex. As a result of all assimilation and conversion campaigns launched 
against Pomaks, today part of them prefer to identify themselves as 
Bulgarian, while a second group prefers self-identification as Turkish or 
Pomak. Regarding the issue of their religious affiliation, Pomaks in Bulgaria 
are mostly Muslims. However, those who did not restore their names and 
identify themselves as Bulgarians are mostly not practicing any religion or 
declare themselves as agnostic. In the case of Greece, with the exception of 
few villages on the Rhodope mountains, all Pomaks are Muslim.  
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
EUROPEANIZATION/EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS AND THE 
PERSISTENCE OF MINORITY RIGHTS ISSUES IN GREECE AND 
BULGARIA 
 
 
3.1. EUROPEANIZATION OF MINORITY RIGHTS IN GREECE AND 
BULGARIA 
 
 Compared to Bulgaria, Greece has started her European journey 
relatively earlier. However, membership to the European Economic 
Community did not have significant effect on the rights of minorities in 
Greece, since oppressive policies of the Greek Governments took different 
form. Revision of the Greek policy towards minorities starts from the 
beginning of 1990s, under the effect of the new regulations for minority rights 
that were shaping in Europe, and as a result of the exacerbating ethnic 
tensions in Western Thrace between Greeks and Turks.  
 
 With the end of the communist rule, integration into Western world 
became a major goal for Bulgaria. The path towards European integration 
has been already linked to many reforms. Especially after the revival process 
and brutal assimilation campaign directed to minorities, European integration 
has been perceived as a major opportunity to provide necessary atmosphere 
for the peaceful co-existence of different ethnic groups. Already in the first 
part of 1990s some reforms were made by the Bulgarian politicians, just to 
enable members of the Turkish minority to restore their names. However, first 
real steps came after 1997, when Bulgaria’s EU candidacy has been 
approved.  
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 This chapter aims to evaluate minority rights issues in Greece and 
Bulgaria, and the persistence of oppressive measures despite the  
Europeanization process. Within the framework of this work, Europeanization 
of minority rights implies legal and political reforms to adjust national minority 
policies in line with the European regulations occurred in 1990s.  It will be 
further argued that, despite her longer experience as EU member, 
liberalization of minority rights in Greece does not take place until late 1990s 
due to the presence of strong nationalist discourse. Meanwhile, both Greece 
and Bulgaria, will be evaluated based on their achievements during the so 
called European integration process. Problems which have ongoing effects 
will be tackled to show the incompatibility of the current Greek and Bulgarian 
minority rights regulations with European  legal framework.  
 
 Turbulent years in Greece with the interruption of democracy by 
military junta did not become an exception for the unequal treatment of the 
Muslim/Turkish minority in Western Thrace. Stripping of Greek citizenship of 
60.000 people who were mainly members of the minority in Western Thrace, 
has been regarded as a consequence of this unequal treatment.1 Such kind 
of discriminatory measures were taken in spite of equality principles indicated 
in the Greek Constitution and Lausanne Peace Treaty. However, these 
problems were not discussed until late 1990s and European integration in 
Greece was mainly perceived as an economic process rather than a political 
one. Up until 1990s, minority rights in Greece have been considered as an 
issue of reciprocity with Turkey. Therefore, Greek authorities failed to 
improve the minority protection system in Greece and insisted on modest 
principles indicated in Lausanne Treaty, which had already been curtailed in 
favor of Greek nationalists who sought the Muslim/Turkish minority in 
Western Thrace as fifth column of Turkey.  
 
                                                 
1 Dia Anagnostou (b), Deepening Democracy or Defending the Nation? The Europeanisation of 
Minority Rights and Greek Citizenship, West European Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2, p. 339.  
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 When it comes to Bulgaria, similarity of the Greek political discourse 
towards minority rights shows itself again. The first part of 1990s was usually 
spent with restoring the names of the Turkish minority and accepting some 
legal regulations to ensure their equality as Bulgarian citizens. Nevertheless, 
this process did not lead to positive minority rights regulations until the 
second part of 1990s due to the ethnic tensions in Bulgaria. After the fall of 
communism, the unitary structure of Bulgarian society was underlined 
continuously denying special regulations for minorities,2 in this case mostly 
for the Turkish minority, with the accusations that minority rights regulations 
might be followed with the demand for territorial autonomy. In this 
environment, adopting more liberal minority rights regime was kept equal as 
treason. Moreover international pressure on Bulgaria was mainly demanding 
the stop the assimilation campaign itself, and there were no interventions 
during the post-communist law making process.  
 
 Meanwhile, during the transition process in 1990s, both Greece and 
Bulgaria continued to emphasize the potential of Turkish irredentism rather 
than adopting new minority rights standards. Ethnic self-identification as 
Turkish, is perceived as an influence of Turkification and an effect of 
Ataturk’s reforms in Turkey.3 Scholars fail to explain the issue of ethnic self-
identification as a social process which is shaping throughout the history. 
Considering the issue in a wider spectrum, Turkish minorities in Bulgaria and 
Greece have managed to protect their identity and created identical cultural 
traditions. Although their official recognition as minority in both countries is 
different, it seems that European minority regulations are neglected 
intentionally due to highly contested nationalist discourses. It is possible to 
defend the idea that European integration of Bulgaria and Greece, helps 
Turkish/Muslim minorities in both sides of the border to restore their kinship 
ties which were disrupted with the half century long Cold War. 
                                                 
2 Декларация на Бюрото на Централния Съвет на Българското Историческо Дружество 
(Declaration of the Bureau of Central Board of Bulgarian Historical Association), 10/01/1990.  
3 Konstantinos Tsitselikis (b), p. 51.  
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Europeanization continues to affect both countries with its restricted influence 
on minority rights. Reasons of this limitation will be analyzed further below 
tackling the problems in both countries separately.   
 
 
3.2. GREEK EU MEMBERSHIP PROCESS AND SYSTEMATIC 
VIOLATIONS OF MINORITY RIGHTS 
 
 Greece entered 1990s amid protests for ethnic self-identification of 
Turks in Western Thrace. In one side members of the Muslim/Turkish 
minority in Western Thrace were claiming their ‘Turkish origin’ while 
nationalist Greeks were organizing contra protests which led to violations and 
vandalism in Western Thrace. Events started with the decision of the Minority 
High Council in Western Thrace to organize a ‘Turkishness walk’ in the 
center of Komotini on January 29, 1988. However, the gendarmerie of the 
Rhodopi region issued a statement indicating ‘Turkishness walk’ is prohibited 
due to the rumors about an opponent Greek group plans to organize protest 
against the walk, which may lead to inter-ethnic clashes.4 Entrances to 
Komotini were blocked by the police in order to prevent influx of people from 
neighboring cities and villages. Extensive security measures taken by the 
police prevented escalation of the issue. Nevertheless, in the end of the day 
many people from the minority were either arrested or injured.  
 
 In 1990, during the second anniversary of the events in Komotini, 
representatives of the Turkish minority decided to organize mevlid. Even this 
was not accepted by Greek authorities and local radio stations announced 
the same day an event; a Greek man died after he was attacked by a Muslim 
who was staying at the same hospital with him. This situation caused 
massive reaction among the Greek nationalists, who organized their own 
                                                 
4 Yankı, 29 January 1988, Yıl 1, Sayı 11.  
 Mevlid/Mawlid is a religious celebration in Islamic tradition which has two different stages, first 
stage is composed of ritual and followed by different meals served to people.  
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protest in Komotini, which led to damage of minority properties and 
vandalism. While Muslim/Turkish minority was becoming allegedly target of 
aggression, Greek police was heavily criticized for not reacting towards 
demonstrators.5 However, it became clear that the news were not reflecting 
the truth since the Greek man died in February, a month later. Eventually this 
was used by the Greek media to extend ethnic confrontation in Western 
Thrace. News of provoking character became part of the daily life in Greece 
in 1990s. Watching Turkish television was interpreted by the Greek media as 
a demonstration of extreme Turkish nationalism.6  
 
 Strained relations between minority and majority in Western Thrace 
and the pressure of the Turkish Government resulted in the international 
isolation of Greece. Unfair trials in national courts directed to minority 
members were criticized due to the pressure on freedom of expression. 
Cases which have been forwarded by minority members to the ECtHR, were 
mostly rejected with the reason of not having exhausted domestic remedies. 
Nevertheless, situation was totally different in the Greek case. Greece had 
been condemned for not providing certain people - in this case minorities- 
direct access to judicial institutions.7 Simply for most of the cases related to 
the maltreatment of the minority in Western Thrace, either they were not 
documented or state institutions refused to process complaints made by the 
members of minority, which eventually made it impossible to exhaust 
domestic remedies and proceed with the application to the ECtHR. Issues 
involving ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities have long been interpreted 
as sensitive to the state security and ethnic peace, and therefore, avoided 
with deliberate ignorance. Long judicial proceedings involving excessive 
formal requirements, and intertwined relationship between the state and the  
Greek Orthodox Church8, made it almost impossible to break the chain of 
                                                 
5 Ortam Gazetesi, January 19, 1993, Yıl 1, Sayı 11.  
6 Ortam Gazetesi, February 23, 1993, Yıl 1, Sayı 16.  
7 Stephanos Stavros (a), “Human Rights in Greece: Twelwe Years of Supervision from Strasbourg”, 
Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol, 17, No. 1 (1999), p. 5.  
8 Ibid., p. 14.  
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institutional formality, which turned to systematic violation of minority rights in 
Greece. In fact, complexity of the legal structure served to the political goals 
of the politicians and Church members who openly rejected equality of the 
Greek citizens and accepted alleged discriminatory regulations which were 
not congruent with the ‘equality’ principle adopted in the Greek Constitution. 
With restrictions to exercise freedoms granted by the constitution and strong 
pressure on ethnic self-identification9, Greek democracy shows the 
characteristics of an ‘ethnic democracy’ when the treatment of  
Muslim/Turkish minority in Western Thrace is questioned.  
 
 The case of Sadik Ahmet in Western Thrace, could be an example for 
the problematic relationship between minority members and judicial organs. 
As it was previously indicated he had been sentenced by the Greek court for 
using Turk as ethnic identification for the minority in Western Thrace. He 
applied to the European Commission of Human Rights, where the 
Commission decided that Greece violated freedom of expression under the 
article 10 of the ECHR, and forwarded the case to the ECtHR. In 1996, 
however, the court decided that Dr. Ahmet’s case was inadmissible, because 
domestic legal remedies were not exhausted.10 Meanwhile, in their dissenting 
opinion, judges Martens and Foighel, criticized Greek policies as non-
appropriate in a democratic society, since ethnic self-identification of ethnic 
minorities was prevented with extreme measures that led to imprisonment.11 
Their criticism focused on the issue of ethnic denial, which was imposed by 
the Greek political discourse and reference to minority clauses in Lausanne 
Treaty, which had been accepted as the only legal document regarding 
minority groups in Greece. With their dissenting opinion they have stressed 
the point that “existence of minorities is not a matter of law, it is a fact”.  
    
                                                 
9 Sammy Smooha & Theodor Hanf, Conflict Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies, in: Ethnicity, 
(Eds.) John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 331.  
10 The Turks of Western Thrace, Human Rights Watch, January 1999, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 13.  
11 Patrick Thornberry and Maria Amor Matrin Estebanez, p. 42.  
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 The situation of the Turkish/Muslim minority in Western Thrace started 
to attract also the attention of Western scholars. However, Greek police took 
different measures to prevent direct contact between minority members and 
Western observers. Those people who assisted in activities of Western 
observers were labeled as potential traitors. For example, advocate Adem 
Bekiroglu, had been requested to come to the police office in order to explain 
his assistance to Professor Eric Siesby, who was president of the Danish 
Helsinki Committee and visited Western Thrace between 11-15 February 
1990, and published  a report about ‘Turkish minority in Northern Greece 
upon his return. Police authorities were interested in the nature of 
cooperation between Eric Siesby and Adem Bekiroglu by asking to the latter 
the motives and scope of his assistance during the visit.12    
 
 Considering the events in 1988 and 1990, strained ethnic segregation 
and its gradual exacerbation, prompted Greek officials to adopt some liberal 
policies in line with European regulations to end the ethnic tension in Thrace. 
For the first time in 1991, during his visit to Western Thrace, Greek prime 
minister Mitsotakis identified policies of past governments towards minority in 
Western Thrace as ‘mistakes’ and ‘injustices’. Moreover he declared that the  
new principles of the Greek minority policy will be based on ‘legal equality’ 
and ‘equal citizenship’.13 This step of recognition of unequal treatment of the 
Muslim/Turkish minority and considering it as a problem to be eliminated, 
could be seen as an important progress for the Greek minority rights regime.  
 
 It is necessary, however, to indicate that problems pertaining to the 
ethnic self-identification still exist. In late 1980s, Greek courts outlawed the 
word ‘Turkish’ and its use in Western Thrace with motive that it refers to the 
citizens of Turkey.14 In spite of some positive steps throughout the 
Europeanization process, there are certain  breaches of basic human rights. 
                                                 
12 Baskın Oran, Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Batı Trakya Sorunu, Ankara, Bilgi Yayınevi, 1991, p. 187; 
See “Destroying Ethnic Identity: the Turks of Greece”, New York, Helsinki Watch Report, 1990.  
13 Dia Anagnostou (b), p. 344.  
14 Destroying Ethnic Identity, Helsinki Watch Report, p. 16.  
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For instance in 2005, Greek Court of Cassation decided that using the word 
‘Turkish’ is harming public order in Western Thrace.15 The ‘Turkish Union of 
Xanthi’ established in 1927, continued its cultural activities, however, Greek 
officials decided to close it down, since the use of word Turkish was found as 
illegal and disturbing peaceful co-existence of ethnic and religious groups. 
Apart from political impositions directed by the court, this case showed the 
level of tolerance towards ethnic minorities in Greece, since extreme right 
wing organizations showed also their discontent for the use of word Turkish, 
by organizing some protests which led to violence in Xanthi as well. 
 
The prohibition of Xanthi Turkish Union followed similar pattern with 
the case of Sadik Ahmet. The creation of Xanthi Turkish Union dates back to 
1927.  However, in 1986, it was closed down by the Greek court due to the 
use of the word Turkish in its name. After exhausting all domestic remedies, 
the case has been forwarded to the ECtHR. In its decision regarding the case 
of ‘Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis and Others v. Greece’, ECtHR, condemned 
Greece for violating the articles 11 and 6 of the ECHR, which are respectively 
tackling freedom of association and the right to fair trial. However, the most 
striking developments occurred at this stage. As a result of the decision from 
Strasbourg, Xanthi Turkish Union applied to the Regional Court in Xanthi for 
the reestablishment of the Union according to the decision given by the 
ECtHR. Regional Court of Xanthi concluded that they were not obliged to 
apply the decisions taken by the ECtHR. The case has been forwarded to the 
Greek Court of Cassation, which on February 24, 2012 decided that “the 
decisions of ECtHR are not binding and therefore Xanthi Turkish Union is not 
allowed to continue its activities as a Turkish organization”.16 With the 
decision of Greek Court of Cassation on the issue of Xanthi Turkish Union, 
domestic legal remedies were exhausted for the second time with no positive 
impact on the lives of Turkish minority in Western Thrace. Article 46 of ECHR 
                                                 
15 Ioannis Grigoriadis (c), “On the Europeanization of Minority Rights Protection: Comparing the 
Cases of Greece and Turkey”, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1(2008), p. 27.  
16 Hürriyet Gazetesi, March 4, 2012. See http://www.iskeceturkbirligi.org/page.php?ref=hukuki_surec  
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states that judgments made by the Court are binding, however, even today, 
Greek authorities refuse to apply the decision of ECtHR. This confirms the 
complaints, Greek judges remain unaware or ignorant to the judgments of 
ECtHR and contemporary standards of minority protection.17 Not respecting 
EU decisions to a large extent by Greek authorities, reduced popularity of 
European justice system among the Muslim/Turkish minority in Western 
Thrace. Decisions involving minority members, have had the heavy influence 
of politicians and Church officials.  
 
 The shift to more fair treatment of minority in Western Thrace did not 
take place quickly. However, adoption of some European standards in 1990s, 
deteriorating inter-ethnic relations in conjunction with the pressure from 
Turkey, revision of the Greek minority rights regime became inevitable. The 
most important aspect of these changes was the fact that this movement of 
liberalization was marked with strong nationalist resistance, which prevented 
retrospective restoration of the rights of minority in Western Thrace. 
Eventually those people who were affected by previous restrictive measures, 
were not given the chance to seek justice.     
 
 Eventually, these controversial applications, showed that all efforts 
have been made to change oppressive regulations targeting minorities in 
Greece. Greek authorities initiated liberalization process just to get rid of 
international isolation and criticism towards minority rights in Western Thrace. 
Efforts were not directed to the elimination of unequal treatment of minority in 
Western Thrace, but they were rather adapted to the contemporary European 
legislation, in order to make them less detectable. The following stage of this 
work, analyzes other measures directed against minority members in 
Western Thrace along with problems pertaining to their daily life.  
 
 
                                                 
17 Evangelia Psychogiopoulou, p. 121.  
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3.2.1. Restricted Area and Military Surveillance Zone in Western Thrace 
 
 Designation of military surveillance zone(MSZ) in Northern Greece 
took place in 1953 with the motive to prevent the communist threat from the 
North. It encompassed a 15-45 km wide strip parallel to Greece’s northern 
borderlands along the borders with Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia (Figure: 
1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Military surveillance zone/restricted area and its historical evolution.  
Source: Lois Labrianidis, IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Summer 1999.  
 
 Formation of the MSZ was primarily related with the issue of 
communist threat. However, it took different shape throughout the history and 
an additional term restricted area  was invented to point it. During the Cold 
War period, the so-called threat from the northern neighbors who were 
looking for an outlet to the Aegean Sea, remained as a main concern of 
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Greek national security policies.18  Greece’s Slavic neighbors Bulgaria and 
Macedonia were the targets of this policy, because of different reasons which 
were unified with the single aim to occupy northern Greek territories. 
Bulgaria’s strategy and demands towards Thrace confirmed this situation, 
while Macedonia was blamed because of her name, which would invoke 
some territorial pretensions related to the region called Macedonia in 
northern Greece. 
 
 Apart from its external aspects, inside Greece, however, MSZ took 
different forms of measures directed mainly against minority members. Some 
of these measures were as follows:  
 
- Entry to the surveillance zone was based on a pass issued by the 
police. Those who were found dangerous - either Greek nationals 
or foreigners - were denied the entry into restricted area.  
- The inhabitants of the restricted area had to carry special identity 
cards with themselves. Special working permits were required to 
exercise all professions.  
- Between 24:00 and 08:00 nobody was allowed to move from one 
village to the other, enter or leave the restricted area.  
- Buying and selling property was prohibited. Moreover, those who 
were found dangerous for the security, could be expelled by the 
Committee for Military Security in each prefecture.19    
 
Although at the first instance, the idea of restricted area might look as 
conceivable, the scope of its application and existence of measures heavily 
targeting life conditions of minorities living in border regions is creating 
different impressions. Up until 1970’s restricted area had features of a 
military surveillance zone. However, after 1970’s it was abolished in most 
                                                 
18 Ioannis Stefanidis, p. 28.  
19 Lois Labrianidis, “The Impact of the Greek Military Surveillance Zone on the Greek Side of the 
Bulgarian-Greek Borderlands”, Boundary and Security Bulletin, Vol. 7 No. 2 (1999), p. 83-84.  
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areas except regions where minority population was living.20 But this did not 
change the status of relevant legislation of military surveillance zone, which 
later became a tool for restrictive measures against minorities. In 1990s, 
restricted area in Western Thrace covered 120 villages and 40.000 people 
mainly members of Muslim/Turkish minority.21 Considering the applications of 
restrictive measures, restricted area has been defined as an open air jail for 
the minority in Western Thrace.  
 
As it was previously indicated above, expulsion of people who were 
classified as suspicious for the security was possible under the legislation of 
restricted area. This rule has been largely adopted to change the composition 
of population in border areas. In fact some members of Muslim/Turkish 
minority in Western Thrace were forced to emigrate not only from the 
restricted area but also from Greece, as a result of threats made by secret 
service members who were responsible for the management of the security 
in this territory. In 1980s, many families, especially those people who owned 
land in Western Thrace, were forced to leave Greece in a very short time like 
24 hours after signing the documents of land and property expropriation 
brought to them by the members of secret police.22  
 
With its restrictive measures in force, MSZ created limitations on the 
freedom of movement of minority in northern Greece. MSZ served also for 
the goal of transforming minority into “the other who threats Greek 
statehood”. Presence of a sizeable Muslim/Turkish minority along the border 
with Bulgaria and Turkey, was conceived as threat for irredentist activities 
which might be directed from northern and eastern neighbors. Therefore, 
there was an immense effort to justify the reasons of applications which were 
                                                 
20 Ibid., p. 85.  
21 Ortam Gazetesi, December 22, 1992, Yıl 1, Sayı 7.  
22 Interview made in Bursa, Turkey on 30 April 2012, with a family who had to leave Greece in 1980s 
as a result of these measures. All members of the family were deemed to have lost their Greek 
citizenship and had no more right to return to Greece.   
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not in line with the legal obligations of Greek Government and with norms 
related to human rights in general.   
 
After the fall of communism and elimination of communist threat from 
the north, it became clear that the existence of the military surveillance zone 
had been directed against minority groups living in this area. However, in the 
second half of 1990s, with the Europeanization process of Greece, MSZ 
stopped to exist in Western Thrace. Today there is no official policy of MSZ 
anymore, however, sometimes researchers or foreigners who attempt to 
travel in some mountainous villages along the border with Bulgaria are often 
followed by the secret police or even stopped to give information about the 
purpose of their visit in the region. Despite the time passed, there is very little 
known about activities carried out in the restricted area. Perhaps opening of 
Greek archives will help to know more about the developments in MSZ.  
 
 
3.2.2. Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Code and Its Effect on the 
Muslim/Turkish Minority 
 
 Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Code (GCC), so far constituted one 
of the most excessive tools for ethnic cleansing of Turkish minority in 
Western Thrace. According to article 19: 
 
A person of non-Greek ethnic origin leaving Greece without the 
intention of returning may be declared as having lost Greek 
citizenship.23  
 
 Article 19 was in force between 1955 and 1998, and during this time 
60.000 people of non-Greek origin were deprived of Greek citizenship.24 
Application of article 19 created many discussions regarding the legal status 
                                                 
23 The Turks of Western Thrace, Human Rights Watch, January 1999, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 15.  
24 Ibid. 
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of minorities in Greece and constitutional equality of Greek citizens. Turkish 
minority in Western Thrace became the main target of article 19. Members of 
Albanian and Macedonian minorities who refused to assimilate in Greek 
ethnicity were found as dangerous and simply lost their citizenship. 
Meanwhile, in the case of Western Thrace it had different objectives. Article 
19 was used as a tool to control the demography of the minority population in 
Western Thrace. The process of deprivation of citizenship was quite 
unofficial, it began when police authorities informed the Directorate of 
Citizenship about an individual and/or his family having left Greece for a long 
time without the intent to return.25 However, the process took an arbitrary 
procedure, since people who left Greece for a very short time or even those 
who never left the country, were stripped of from Greek citizenship. There 
were cases when an individual or family members travelled outside of 
Greece for a short holiday and learned that they had lost Greek citizenship 
on the border when they were trying to enter Greece and were denied the 
entry.  
 
 Another complexity occurred when Greece joined European Economic 
Community. As part of free movement, many Greek citizens from Turkish 
origin went to Germany for work. Majority of those people learned that their 
citizenship was revoked, during their visit to Greek consulates or 
embassies.26 Those who resided in Greece and were stripped of from Greek 
citizenship learned about it when they had to visit state offices for 
administrative issues. Since there was no official correspondence sent to the 
individuals whose citizenship was revoked, they were only informed about it 
when they had to go to local public institutions. Some students who went 
abroad for education were also stripped of Greek citizenship.  
 
 Application of article 19 of GCC continued uninterrupted from 1955 
until 1998 despite the fact that it was an alleged violation of national and 
                                                 
25 Ibid.  
26 Ortam Gazetesi, April 13, 1993, Yıl 1 Sayı 23.  
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international regulations. According to article 4.1 of the Greek Constitution, 
“all Greeks are equal before the law”.27 However, article 19 is making 
distinction between Greek citizens from Greek and non-Greek origin. In 
addition to this article 4.3 is indicating that “withdrawal of Greek citizenship 
shall be permitted only in case of voluntary acquisition of another citizenship 
or of undertaking service contrary to national interests in a foreign country”. 
Revoking the citizenship of Turkish minority in Western Thrace became an 
arbitrary process, since Greek authorities revoked the citizenship without 
having sufficient data about the acquisition of another nationality. Eventually, 
people were facing consequences of a process about which they were not 
informed at all. Although officially there was a process allowing the appeal 
within two months after the decision had been issued, in many cases people 
failed to meet the two months deadline since no official correspondence was 
sent.28  
 
 Application of article 19 had far more different motives than only 
targeting the existence of minority in Western Thrace. Normally, Greek 
constitution does not create distinction between citizens of Greek and non-
Greek ethnic origin.29 However, these discriminatory concepts were existent 
in contemporary Greek national identity, which served as a basis for the 
creation of Greek nation state.  From the very first days of Greek 
independence there has been a distinction between Greek citizens of non-
Greek origin (allogeneis) and those of Greek origin who are not Greek 
citizens (omogeneis).30 This classification created a hierarchy between two 
groups on the basis of their Greekness as such that first group allogeneis are 
not considered as Greeks even if they are Greek citizens, while second 
group omogeneis are considered as Greeks even if they do not possess 
                                                 
27 Greek Constitution: http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-
f24dce6a27c8/001-156%20aggliko.pdf  
28 The Turks of Western Thrace, Human Rights Watch, 1999.  
29 Stephanos Stavros (b), Citizenship and the Protection of Minorities, in: Greece in a Changing 
Europe: Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration, (Eds.) Kevin Featherstone & 
Kostas Ifantis, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996, p. 118.  
30 Ibid. 
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Greek citizenship.31 Therefore this situation automatically excluded from 
Greekness those citizens who lacked main features of Greek identity such as 
religion, language and culture.  
 
 Application of article 19 left many people in stateless position due to 
the fact that their citizenship was revoked in a very short time. Those who 
were deprived of citizenship abroad were denied entry to Greece and could 
not appeal against the process. Those who were deprived of Greek 
citizenship while living in Greece, were given the chance to reapply for it 
through naturalization process. However, most of them had to follow a really 
long process of naturalization which was embedded in bureaucracy that 
formed only an official made up process to confirm their exclusion not only 
from ethnic Greekness but also from Greek citizenship. The majority of 
applications made by the members of Turkish/Muslim minority for the 
restitution of Greek citizenship through naturalization, were denied with the 
motive that they failed to acquire ‘Greek consciousness’.32    
 
 Between 1955 and 1998, article 19 and other measures such as 
restricted area helped to control the demographic growth of Turkish minority 
in Western Thrace. According to the Greek census from 1928, the number of 
people who speak Turkish is recorded as 191,254.33 However, there is some 
reservation next to this figure that, the number of Turkish speakers contains 
also Greeks who arrived from Turkey as part of population exchange and 
indicated Turkish as their mother tongue.34 It looks quite suspicious that 
authorities agreed to register those Greeks who claimed Turkish as their 
mother tongue, since nationalist sentiments at the time of migration were 
really extreme and language was perceived as one of the main features of 
Greekness. Population census from 1951 shows that there were 179,895 
                                                 
31 Konstantinos Tsitselikis (b), p. 198.  
32 Gündem Gazetesi, February 12, 2010, Yıl 13 Sayı 672.  See:  Konstantinos Tsitselikis (b), Ibid., p. 
203.  
33 Angelopoulos, Ath., “Population Distribution of Greece Today According to Language National 
Consciousness and Religion”, Balkan Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1979), p. 126.  
34 Ibid.  
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people whose mother tongue was Turkish.35 Again inside parenthesis it is 
indicated that part of them are migrants from Anatolia. However, according to 
religious affiliation there were 112,665 Muslims in Greece which might 
confirm the argument that partially people from Greek origin indicated Turkish 
as their mother tongue. Population census from 1951 was the last census 
conducted in Greece which asked questions about religious affiliation and 
mother language. Eventually, today the number of minority in Western 
Thrace is estimated to be between 120,000-140,000 people as there is no 
official data provided by Greek authorities. The strategy of Greek 
Governments was based on balancing population demography of Turks in 
Western Thrace with the Greeks in Istanbul. However, the growth rate of the 
Turkish minority in Western Thrace was much higher than the one of the  
Greek minority in Istanbul. Due to continuous migration of Greeks from 
Istanbul, population of Greek minority has been reduced dramatically. 
Therefore, Greek authorities came to the conclusion that: “if it is not possible 
for the minority in Istanbul to increase, then the minority in Thrace has to 
decrease”.36 
 
 For almost half century, article 19 was in use to punish minority 
members through the citizenship. Democratization of minority rights in the 
beginning of 1990s and the so-called equal citizenship principle promoted by 
the Greek government did not include abolition of article 19 of GCC. 
Meanwhile, there was a continuous pressure on Greece via international 
organizations regarding the cases of stateless people. These people either in 
Greece or abroad, continued to have difficulties as they were not registered 
anywhere and did not have any documentation to prove their existence in 
general. With the initiative of PASOK and leadership of Costas Simitis, in the 
second half of 1990s, the abolition of article 19 started to be discussed 
widely. When the issue came to the Greek Parliament, several members of 
                                                 
35 Ibid., p. 127.  
36 Konstantinos Tsitselikis (c), Reciprocity as a Regulatory Pattern for the Treatment of the 
Turkish/Muslim Minority of Greece, in: Reciprocity: Greek and Turkish Minorities, Law Religion, 
Politics, (Ed.) Samim Akgönül, Istanbul, Bilgi University Press, 2008, p. 80. 
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parliament expressed their opposition to abolish article 19.37 Reasons for 
opposing the article focused on the issue of reciprocity with Turkey and 
depriving the Government from a very powerful tool to control demographic 
balance in Western Thrace. In the meantime local community in Thrace 
along with the Greek Orthodox Church also vehemently opposed abrogation 
of article 19.38 Their concern was based on the potential return of people who 
reinstate their citizenship and decide to reestablish themselves in Greece. 
This could change population demography in the region totally. Therefore, 
Government officials decided to find a different solution to the problem. 
Article 19 was abolished in June 1998 with the Law 2623/1998, but not 
retrospectively. More than 60,000 people whose citizenship was revoked with 
the article 19, were not given the chance to reinstate their Greek nationality.  
 
 Once again, this case showed that Government policies were 
changing with certain reservations and references to history and national 
elements. Greek nationalists from Western Thrace opposed to the abrogation 
of article 19 because of the possibility for restoring property rights. Those 
people who had lost their citizenship while visiting or working in another 
country never had the chance to come back to Greece and deal with their 
properties. After some time, their property was seized by Greek Government 
and transferred to other people, possibly citizens who were ethnically Greek. 
According to the report of Helsinki Watch, Minister of the Interior George 
Doganis signed an order on February 1, 1988, where it is indicated that if one 
person in a family loses Greek nationality, no one else in the family can 
obtain legal papers or documents concerning their citizenship. Thus no one 
can apply to inherit property.39 In conjunction with other restrictive measures, 
article 19 was used to deprive people from their citizenship and other rights 
such as property which have been considered as main indicators for the 
existence of minority in Western Thrace.  
                                                 
37 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis (b), p. 183.   
38 Dia Anagnostou (b), p. 349.  
39 Greece: Improvements for Turkish Minority; Problems Remain, Helsinki Watch, Vol. 4, No. 
6(1992), p. 10.  
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 Application of article 19 is contradictory with the official Greek policy of 
not recognizing the ethnic character of the minority in Western Thrace. 
Deprivation of citizenship for those people who are not ethnically Greek is in 
contrast with official Greek policy of not recognizing existence of ethnic 
minorities in Greece. Claiming that the minority in Western Thrace is only 
Muslim and not Turkish, and then revoking their Greek citizenship based on 
the difference of their ethnic identity, creates a dilemma about the Greek 
policy towards Turkish/Muslim minority in Western Thrace. It is difficult to 
understand not recognizing ethnic character of minority and at the same time 
discriminating its members based on the difference of their ethnic origin.  
 
 
3.2.3. Land Confiscation and Restrictions on Property Transfers 
 
 Since the beginning of Greek Revolution, land confiscation became 
one of the most powerful tools of Greek State to change the ethnic structure 
of areas inhabited by Muslims/Turks. Greek authorities expropriated lands 
owned by the Sultan, vakıf and individuals with the aim to redistribute them 
among ethnic Greeks. During the exchange of populations after 1923, 
houses, schools and mosques were seized in order to host incoming Greek 
migrants from Anatolia.  
 
 Vakıf properties had a very special place in Ottoman Empire. They 
were mainly established to serve for the common needs of community.40 
Therefore, major part of vakıf properties were composed of schools, 
dormitories and mosques. Eventually, these places were mainly areas where 
community members came together and organized some events. A 
committee composed by several people was responsible for the 
management of vakıf properties. Aside from competition between members 
of minority to be part of the management committee of vakıf properties, 
                                                 
40 Konstantinos Tsitselikis (b), p. 342.  
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Greek authorities wanted to influence the selection process of committee 
members in order to have indirect influence on the minority group.41  
 
 However, with the time passed, Greek State started massive 
expropriation of vakıf properties in 1930s. For example, Muslim cemeteries in 
Komotini were turned into gardens as a result of expropriation.42 A big part of 
vakıf properties in Xanthi and Komotini disappeared because of excessive 
expropriation policy followed by the Greek State with the aim to diminish 
minority existence in Western Thrace. Moreover, all these properties were 
expropriated for a very low price and in some cases, compensations were not 
given to the owners.  
 
 Meanwhile, expropriation of individually owned properties took a more 
aggressive and systematic character. Legal regulations which had been 
adopted in the past, were updated according to present political conditions to 
serve the goal of reducing minority population through different means. 
Ownership rights of the Muslim/Turkish minority in Western Thrace were 
guaranteed with the Lausanne Treaty. However, additional legal regulations 
in Greece, took different shape to change this situation. After the settlement 
of 120,000 Greek refugees in the region, local authorities in Western Thrace 
confiscated houses and plots of the Muslim minority in order to offer incoming 
Greeks a place to live and land to work.43 This situation raised the tension 
between two communities. Nevertheless, confiscation of Muslim properties in 
1920s, marked only the beginning of a very comprehensive policy of land 
expropriation to the detriment of the Muslim/Turkish minority in Western 
Thrace.    
 
 Special regulation in 1950s was prepared to ease expropriation of 
property of those people who left Greece illegally with the aim to settle in 
                                                 
41 Ibid., p. 345.  
42 Ibid., p. 342.  
43 Ibid., p. 315.  
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another country-mainly Turkey.44 At the same time, in 1964, when crisis in 
Cyprus started to deteriorate, Greek authorities made a secret regulation to 
prevent the acquisition of real estate by the members of Turkish/Muslim 
minority in Western Thrace.45 Meanwhile, Greeks were encouraged to buy 
property from Muslims. The Agrarian Bank became the provider of loans to 
Greek Christians who intended to buy Turkish/Muslim properties in Western 
Thrace.46 This policy was in force up until 1990s. Christian Greeks were 
declared as loyal citizens and encouraged to buy properties from Muslim 
Turks in order to create the balance in Western Thrace, which has always 
been perceived as a strategically important area. In this part of Greece, 
property acquisition had to be approved by a committee of five people 
including a member of the Greek Orthodox Church. When there was a 
transfer of property from Muslim to Christian Greek, this was approved in a 
very short time. However, transfers of property from Greeks to Muslims has 
never been approved by the committee. Simply an issue of public act was 
turned into a matter of national security through demographic and territorial 
balance.  
 
 Land expropriation in Western Thrace took a massive way after the 
conflict in Cyprus began. Large areas were confiscated through the 
introduction of different projects such as university, industrial zone etc. For 
instance, excessive land expropriation took place during the creation of 
Democritus University of Thrace and Industrial Zone in Komotini. In 1978, 
Greek Government confiscated 4,000 acres of land in order to build a  
campus for the Democritus University of Thrace.47 85% of the seized land 
belonged to the Turks in Thrace. Members of minority complained about the 
issue claiming that confiscated areas were mostly composed of fertile fields. 
This policy of land expropriation followed a pattern consistent with the policy 
of revoking citizenship of ethnic Turks in order to reduce their share in the 
                                                 
44 Article 13 of LD 3958/1959.  
45 Nora Fisher Onar & Meriç Özgüneş, p. 118.  
46 Konstantinos Tsitselikis (b), p. 319.  
47 Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks of Greece, Helsinki watch Report, p. 35.  
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population of Western Thrace. The slogan adopted regarding the government 
policies towards Muslim/Turkish minority was “the Turks will leave we will buy 
their land by any means”.48 This makes clear how in harmony are article 19 
and other restrictive measures of Greek authorities.  
 
 Since Turks were not allowed to work in public administration or other 
state agencies, agricultural production constituted their main income. 
Therefore, the majority of restrictive measures has focused on land 
expropriation, with the motive to deprive them economically and encourage 
for emigration. In addition to this, another policy targeting agricultural areas 
was in force. A different type of land expropriation has been conducted 
through the unification of land (Anadazmos). According to this method, lands 
separated into small parts and that had lost their economic function were 
redistributed as a result of petitions sent by those people who owned land in 
the same area. Nevertheless, after 1974, redistribution of land became an 
obligatory act with the order of regional governor. Members of 
Muslim/Turkish minority were discriminated in this case as well; their lands 
were included in the land unification process, however they were not offered 
new land during the redistribution stage.49 There were cases, where fertile 
lands belong to members of the minority were expropriated  and during the 
redistribution process they were given back an infertile land.     
 
Restrictions in the area of properties were not only limited to transfer 
and sales. Members of minority had to obtain special permission to repair 
their own houses. In most cases, their applications were denied by Greek 
authorities, and repairing a house without permission was subject to a huge 
fine.50 Normally, Christian Greeks never had a trouble to obtain such 
permission, however, for Turks it was a lengthy process which resulted in 
most cases in a negative answer. This policy created huge disparity between 
                                                 
48 Konstantinos Tsitselikis (b), p. 320.  
49 Baskın Oran,  p. 244-245.  
50 Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks of Greece, Helsinki watch Report, p. 32.  
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Christian Greeks and members of Muslim minority in Western Thrace, as 
areas settled by Turks and Greeks became really detectable from their 
appearance, an issue that is even valid for today. Usually Greeks own big 
apartments or modern houses, while areas settled by the Turkish minority are 
characterized by small old houses and some areas are lacking even the 
basic infrastructure.  
 
 Inequality between the members of minority and majority became also 
evident with the issue of new immigrants in 1990s. After the fall of 
communism, immigration of Pontic Greeks in Western Thrace had negative 
consequences for the minority. Government expropriated 1,500 acres in 
order to accommodate Pontic Greeks51 who were settled in Western Thrace 
in order to change the population balance in the region. They were offered 
some subsidies to establish themselves. However, few years later, due to 
hard economic problems and in search of a better life, part of them left 
Western Thrace and settled in other big cities such as Athens and 
Thessaloniki. For instance those who settled in villages near Soufli which is 
across the border with Turkey, abandoned their newly built houses and 
settled in Athens.  
 
  Currently land expropriation does not continue with the same speed 
as it was in the past. Minority members say that they do not have much left to 
give the government. One thing becomes clear that, land expropriation had a 
very strong effect on the land ownership of Muslims who live in restricted 
area.52 Most of them have lost their land ownership rights and given only the 
opportunity to work temporary on the lands where they reside. Land 
confiscation together with the implementation of MSZ, helped for the policy of 
Hellenization of border areas, which are perceived as important for the 
national security of Greece.   
 
                                                 
51 Ibid., p. 35. 
52 Konstantinos Tsitselikis (b), p. 322.  
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3.2.4. Restrictions on the Political and Social Participation of the 
Minority in Western Thrace 
 
 Similar to the previously mentioned policies, minority in Western 
Thrace faced also restrictions on political and social participation. Muslims 
were represented in the Greek parliament since the creation of Greece as 
independent state. However, this situation started to change with the 
enlargement of Greek territory towards north and gradually deteriorated after 
1920s. Muslims/Turks were perceived not just as a different ethnic religious 
group, but also as a political opponent. Muslims were elected also to local 
governments which showed certain integration into Greek political life.53 
 
 The political life of the minority in Thrace was dominated by the rivalry 
between Kemalists ( modernists) and Islamists (conservative group). After 
the Second World War period, parallel to Greek-Turkish friendship, the role 
of modernists in Greek political life started to increase. The period between 
1967 and 1974, marked inactivity for the Muslim/Turkish candidates 
because of the military junta in Greece. Developments in Cyprus, affected 
also the political life of the minority in Thrace. They had to rise their 
candidacy through main Greek political parties rather than forming their own 
party. Two leading political parties, PASOK (socialist party) and Nea 
Demokratia (right wing) put the members of Muslim/Turkish minority in their 
lists. Obviously, this representation was more in the form of symbolic action 
than initiating constructive policy towards the rights of minorities. 
Considering discriminatory measures directed toward minority members in 
Western Thrace, it is possible to conclude that, Turkish/Muslim MPs were 
not given the opportunity to bring solution for long standing problems of the 
minority in Thrace.  
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 Starting with the elections in 1985, minority members participated in 
elections as independent candidates. The first attempt to get elected as 
independent candidates was unsuccessful. This shift of strategy started to 
raise some doubts among the Greek political parties, due to discourse of 
political separation from the side of minority members. Eventually, the issue 
of independent candidacy culminated into expression of ethnic identity, 
which was not welcomed by Greek authorities. During the elections in 1989 
two members of minority were elected as independent candidates to the 
Greek parliament. However, when the issue of ethnic self-identification 
erupted with the case of Sadik Ahmet, the Greek State decided to take some 
preventive measures to block such expressions by the members of 
parliament in the future. The case of Sadik Ahmet (independent candidate 
elected for the parliament in 1989) created big tensions in the region, since it 
was the only situation of non-Greek nationalistic discourse throughout the 
modern Greek history.54 Escalation of the issue into an inter-ethnic conflict in 
Western Thrace was a direct consequence of intolerance from the side of 
majority, who already labeled the people as Turks, but did not want to 
recognize it officially.  
 
 During the elections in 1989, massive complaints were forwarded by 
the members of minority regarding the attitude of Greek authorities. Greek 
citizens from Turkish origin who were in Turkey and wanted to cross the 
border for voting, were denied entry to Greece, as border was closed due to 
strike.55 There were massive attempts also internally to prevent Turks from 
voting. Bus services to Western Thrace from other Greek cities were 
cancelled the day before elections. Following this, with the aim to outweigh 
the votes of Turkish minority, Greek authorities brought thousands of 
soldiers to vote in Western Thrace.56 Additionally some people complained 
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that there were attempts to prevent Turks from voting by closing polling 
places in Turkish districts earlier.  
 
 The application of such methods was heavily criticized by the 
members of minority and would not be sustainable for long time due to the 
potential for attracting critics from international organizations. Therefore, in 
an attempt to find a permanent solution to the problem, Greek Government 
decided to change the electoral law in order to prevent the entry of Turks in 
the parliament, either as independent or as members of their own party. 
New electoral law accepted on October 24, 1990 put a threshold of three 
percent for an independent candidate or political party in order to enter 
Greek Parliament.57 This change in the electoral law was solely targeting 
independent candidacy of Turkish/Muslim people from Western Thrace, and 
designed in a way to control their activities via Greek oriented political 
parties.  
 
 Following revisions in the electoral law, the Greek State started to 
focus on restricting the political role of Turks at local level as well. The 
democratization process in the beginning of 1990s prevented the application  
of extreme measures, which forced the government to seek different 
methodology in imposing restrictions for the political participation of Turks at 
local level. Demographic situation became an incentive to force the change 
since nationalists warned for the possibility of election of a Muslim/Turkish 
prefect in areas such as Xanthi and Komotini.58 In order to prevent election 
of a Muslim/Turkish prefect, Kapodistrias project has been accepted in 1994, 
which provided enlargement of two prefectures Xanthi and Komotini, 
dominantly settled by Muslims/Turks with the other three predominantly 
Christian Greek prefectures Drama, Evros and Kavala.59 Eventually, election 
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of Muslim/Turkish prefect in Xanthi and Komotini became almost impossible 
after consolidation of predominantly Christian areas.  
 
 Political restrictions imposed on minority in Western Thrace were 
enforced with different measures which affect their social participation as 
well. Access to public employment is the biggest problem for the 
professional life of minority members in Western Thrace. Moreover, they 
were not allowed to practice every profession and especially the ones which 
include property ownership such as pharmacy etc. During 1990s, they were 
able to work in stores or rent a property, but they were not allowed to buy a 
property and open their own business.60 Usually they were not able to get 
permission from Greek authorities to launch new business. Even hospitals 
were reluctant to employ Muslims/Turks. This type of discrimination was 
valid only for Western Thrace. Minority members who wanted to work in 
other Greek cities outside of Thrace faced relatively less discrimination.  
 
Today, restrictions on private business are relatively lifted, however 
disparity in public employment still prevails. Despite the fact that the 
Muslim/Turkish minority forms a significant part of the population in Western 
Thrace, they are discriminated for accession to work in public administration. 
They do apply for vacant positions announced by the municipalities, but they 
never get hired. This practice which is totally against the equality principle of 
Greek constitution, has been repeated for decades. Some Greek officials 
explained this situation due to the lack of knowledge of Greek language, by 
the members of minority.61 However, the situation in Western Thrace shows 
totally different things. Officials might be partially right for the command of 
Greek, but it becomes relatively less convincing when a member of minority 
graduated from a Greek university has his application denied on the ground 
of poor Greek language knowledge.  
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There are obviously other reasons for this policy of systematic 
discrimination. Aside from obliging Turks of Western Thrace to leave for 
other EU countries, Turkey or big cities such as Athens and Thessaloniki in 
search of a job, the Greek State encouraged migration of Christian Greeks 
from other areas into Western Thrace by giving them priority in public 
employment and constantly creating new positions reserved only for 
ethnically Greek citizens. A chain of policies, granted privileged status for 
people of ethnically Greek origin in the name of a common ‘Turkish threat’,62 
and this has created a system that took its sources from ethnic hatred.   
 
Encouraging minority members to leave Thrace with economic 
reasons, aimed their assimilation among the Greeks in other cities such as 
Athens and Thessaloniki. This is because of the fact that minority rights are 
not available outside the territory of Western Thrace. Provisions of Lausanne 
Treaty are not applied by the Greek State in other areas except Thrace. This 
situation is not also compatible with current legal standards since it restricts 
the movement of minority members in Greece.63 Today geographical 
restriction of minority rights provisions shows itself in a very different way in 
Athens and Thessaloniki. The main issue is to find a place of worship for 
Muslims. As it was previously indicated, Athens does not have a mosque, 
and same is true also for Thessaloniki. Old mosques from Ottoman era are 
either destroyed or turned into museums or churches. Discussions to build 
new places of worship for Muslims are dominated by the nationalist 
comments related to the Turkish rule. However, Turks from Western Thrace 
who live in Athens and Thessaloniki, gather to pray in prayer rooms which 
are created in small apartments.  
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3.2.5. Educational Policies Towards Minority Members in Western 
Thrace 
 
 Education plays an important role for everyone in order to facilitate 
the process of social inclusion while developing a certain identity. As it was 
previously mentioned, during the process of Greek nation building, every 
single detail of national education was planned to impose linguistic and 
ethnic differentiation of Greek nation from other ethnic groups in the 
Ottoman State. Congruent to this comprehension, after the formation of 
contemporary Greece, Greek authorities put every effort to limit the 
establishment of an autonomous minority education system. Therefore, 
Turks of Western Thrace, were affected by the shifts of Greek educational 
policy, despite the guarantees provided by the Lausanne Peace Treaty. 
 
 Problems experienced by minority members in 1920s were mostly 
related with the material deprivation, as most of the schools belonging to 
minority were seized to host incoming Greek refugees from Anatolia. Soon 
after signing the Lausanne Treaty, a bilingual education system was  
adopted by minority schools. Aside from teaching Greek, Turkish became 
the main language of instruction in minority schools of Western Thrace. 
Although some authors argue that adoption of Turkish was due to its 
dominance among the minority in Thrace64, there was no claim for another 
language to be taught at that moment.  
 
 The first years of bilingual education faced some problems related 
with the lack of knowledge in Greek and on discussions whether education 
in Turkish should be done with old Turkish letters or the Latin script. 
Atatürk’s alphabet reform in Turkey was perceived as an opportunity to 
reduce the cooperation between Turkey and minority in Thrace. Thus, Greek 
officials denied to allow education with new Turkish letters. However, soon 
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the issue was solved and books with new Turkish letters were in use at 
minority schools in Thrace.  
 
 It is necessary to indicate that this did not put an end to the problems 
of the minority, and marked only the beginning of a more complex chain of 
events. There was a problem with providing adequate teaching in Greek, 
and due to the lack of proficient teachers, members of the minority with non-
adequate education level were hired to teach Greek at minority schools. 
Eventually, this situation did not make a positive impact on the education of 
minority in Thrace.   
 
 Bilingual education in Greek and Turkish with a mixed curriculum 
taught in both languages, was offered only at primary schools until 1950s. 
Greek authorities stressed the point that Lausanne Peace Treaty did not 
oblige to the creation of bilingual educational facilities in other levels.65 
Therefore, the organization of subsequent high school education took long 
time like 30 years. Articles 40 and 41 of Lausanne Treaty deal with the 
regulation of educational life of the minority in Thrace. Although the provision 
of primary schools is explicitly indicated in article 41, the right to create other 
social and educational institutions at the expense of minority is provided with 
article 40. This creates doubts that Greek authorities might have ignored the 
article 40 for a long period.      
 
 Besides the lack of certain educational facilities for the minority, 
another issue of major importance is the control imposed by the Greek 
State. Usually Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs imposes its control 
in every stage of educational activities, and this constituted violation of the 
independent status of minority schools in Greece.66 Textbooks for minority 
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schools and appointment of teachers became major problems that 
dominated educational life of minority in Thrace.  
 
 Bilingual education in Greek and Turkish was only guaranteed for the 
primary schools which were offering education over six years. Until 1952, 
there was no high school education offered for minority members. Medrese 
(which can be translated as Muslim Seminaries) were mostly offering 
religious education, and were selected by those who would become imams 
or continue their education later in the area of religious studies, at 
Universities abroad, mainly in Turkey or other Muslim countries.67 Teaching 
of the Qur’an was part of educational curriculum also in primary schools. 
Courses such as History, Geography and Greek Language were taught by 
Greek teachers, while courses like Turkish Language, Mathematics, Physics 
and Religion were taught by Turkish teachers. Providing education in Greek 
was hampered by several reasons such as geographical location of areas 
settled by minority and financial problems, since until 1960s, minority 
members had to pay for the salaries of Greek teachers as well.68 But on the 
other side, Greek State aimed for the massive introduction of Greek 
Language, especially in Thrace in order to promote Greek consciousness 
among the members of minority. Beginning with late 1960s salaries of 
Christian teachers who teach at minority schools, started to be paid by the 
Greek Government. Nevertheless, when state funding was extended in a 
way to cover minority schools, it automatically affected their private status as 
well. Minority schools became private by creation and public as institution. 
Moreover, minority education became available only in Thrace and those 
who move into another city outside of Thrace, did not have the right to ask 
for minority education. This situation is valid even for today.  
 
 Among all these complexities, a low level of the educational profile 
among minority children became really a chronic issue. This problem, 
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however, constituted only the result of various mistakes done in the past, 
and which were repeating themselves. Minority education in Turkish was 
offered by Turkish teachers, but their educational level was always 
questioned. There was exchange of teachers between Greece and Turkey, 
a program which allowed Turkish teachers from Turkey to teach at minority 
schools in Thrace. Their salaries were paid by the Turkish Government. 
Meanwhile, Greek authorities embarked on a project to open their own 
academy for educating teachers for minority schools in Western Thrace. 
Thessaloniki Pedagogical Academy (EPATH) established in 1968 became a 
direct product of this thought.69 Minority students were allowed to become 
teachers after attending two years long training at EPATH.  
 
 Creation of EPATH did not bring an end to the problems but rather 
became a new topic of contention between minority and Greek State which 
will be tackled below in detail. Due to the lack of secondary schools, after 
finishing bilingual minority schools, children of Muslim/Turkish minority were 
either forced to follow Greek secondary schools or attending Turkish high 
schools in Turkey.  Problems pertaining to secondary education were solved 
with the creation of two high schools in Komotini and Xanthi. But still their 
capacity was not enough to answer the needs of the minority. Both high 
schools provided places for approximately 400 students all together, while 
there were 8,500 pupils attending minority primary schools.70 Obviously, this 
limited availability of places became an additional incentive for minority 
students to follow their education in Turkey.  
 
 Outdated textbooks also turned into diplomatic problem between 
Turkey and Greece in the past. Usually, books which will be used for the 
Turkish curriculum at minority schools were printed in Turkey. After the 
control and approval of Greek authorities they were forwarded to minority 
schools. This process was regulated through the Cultural Agreement signed 
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between Turkey and Greece in 1968. Question of old books started to raise 
in the beginning of 1990s when minority students were forced to use books 
printed in 1960s.71 For decades Greek authorities did not approve the books 
sent from Turkey and therefore education had been conducted with old 
books. Eventually, the Greek Government decided to take the initiative to 
print Turkish books in Greece contrary to the cultural agreement signed in 
1968. Turkish books printed in Greece were forwarded to minority in 
Western Thrace for the 1992-1993 school year. Amid protests, minority 
organizations, teachers and parents denied to use the books sent by Athens 
and even burned them publicly, blaming the Ministry of Education for 
spreading the nationalist propaganda.72 Problem with the textbooks 
continued until 1997, when Turkey sent books that were accepted as 
adequate by Greek authorities.73    
 
 EPATH became the symbol for bad quality of minority education. 
After two years of education, EPATH graduates were allowed to become 
teachers at minority schools. This issue was first criticized by the members 
of minority, as Greek teachers who teach at minority schools are graduated 
from four years long programs.74 EPATH graduates faced the problem of 
bad reputation, since they were labeled as incompetent. Members of 
minority made series of requests to Greek authorities urging for change. 
Those students graduated from EPATH were employed as regular teachers 
or under renewable contracts as other Greek teachers. However, a person 
who has finished his education in Turkey was not appointed as teacher due 
to non-recognition of Turkish diplomas.  
 
 Changes occurred in Greece resulted with an impact on minority 
education as well. Finally decision was taken to abolish EPATH by 31st 
August 2013 by putting an end to a very controversial issue. According to 
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the new regulations, Pedagogical School of Elementary Education of the 
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki will be responsible for educating future 
teachers who are supposed to teach Turkish curriculum at minority 
schools.75   
 
 Positive changes in the area of higher education took place in the 
second half of 1990s. Turkish students who finished minority high schools in 
Thrace were mostly going to Turkey to study at Turkish universities. In fact, 
this situation became normal for many students, since their families opted 
for minority schools as well. Greek Ministry of Education decided to increase 
the number of minority students who study at Greek universities. Quota 
system provided 0,5% of the available seats at Greek Universities for the 
members of Muslim/Turkish minority who graduated from Muslim high 
schools in Thrace.   
 
 It might be relatively early to comment about the impact of recent 
changes in Greek educational policy. In spite of some positive developments 
occurred in the beginning of 2000, still there are additional steps to be taken 
in order to reduce the cases of discrimination. Perhaps considering 
education as a preparatory step for professional life is not enough, as it is 
obvious that it constitutes the basis of segregation and discrimination in 
Thrace.    
 
 
3.2.6. Problems with the Election of Muslim Religious Representatives 
 
 The ‘Mufti’ is the most important religious personality under Islamic law 
who has the authority to interpret and explain sharia rules. Through bilateral 
agreements between Greece and Turkey, Mufti position has been created as 
the highest representative of Muslim minority in Western Thrace. Moreover, 
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Muftis are authorized to act as judges in cases among the Muslims in 
Western Thrace. Marriage between Muslims of Thrace must be authorized by 
the local Mufti. There are three regional Muftis in Thrace: in Komotini, Xanthi 
and Evros. Apart from duties indicated above, they are acting also as 
religious heads of local community in the areas where they are responsible.  
 
 According to article 11 of Treaty of Athens from 1913, Muslims have 
the right to elect their own Mufti.76 Later, this regulation became part of Greek 
internal legislation through the Law 2345/1920.77 However, contrary to this 
situation Greek authorities preferred to appoint Muftis instead of allowing 
Muslims to elect their own religious head. Duties attributed to the Muftis 
cover a wide range of issues pertaining to every aspect of life. Muftis are 
entitled to act as judges in many issues related to family law, marriage, 
divorce, adoption and inheritance.78 Greek authorities have the right to 
control legal conformity of the decisions given by Muftis, however they do not 
have the right to check their content. Due to this power of influence in the 
daily life of the minority, Greek authorities tried to exercise their own control 
on the Muslim minority by interfering in the selection process of Muftis in 
Thrace.  
 
 In late 1980s after the death of the Mufti of Komotini, Greek authorities 
decided to appoint a new Mufti. But newly appointed Mufti resigned as a 
result of massive discontent among the members of Muslim minority. This 
process followed with the appointment of the second Mufti by the Greek 
State, and he did not resign despite the pressure imposed by the Muslim 
minority in Komotini. Amid discussions on the newly appointed Mufti of 
Komotini, members of Muslim/Turkish minority decided to elect their own 
religious head according to the provisions of Law 2345/1920. Eventually, 
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Muslims elected Mehmet Emin Aga as Mufti of Xanthi, while İbrahim Şerif 
was elected as Mufti of Komotini.79 Meanwhile, Greek authorities made a 
counter attack by passing new legislation from the Greek Parliament, which 
was intended to abrogate Law 2345/1920 on the election of Muftis. According 
to the new legislation approved by the Greek Parliament in 1991, there was 
no change in the functions and qualifications of Mufti. However, with the new 
regulation, a Mufti was to be appointed by presidential decree following a 
proposal by the Minister of Education.80 Before forwarding his proposal to the 
President, Minister of Education was obliged to consult a committee 
composed by the local Prefect and some other Muslim members chosen by 
Greek authorities. 
 
 The new regulation about the election of Muftis was welcomed by 
some Muslims, since Muftis were entitled to get the status of public servants 
and social benefits. Nevertheless, it was been rejected by others, due to 
allegations that it consisted in a direct intervention in the affairs of 
Muslim/Turkish minority in Thrace. With the goal to control religious and 
social life of the minority in Thrace, the Greek State started to create legal 
regulations which were in conflict with its international obligations and 
Treaties signed with Turkey.  
 
In the meantime Muftis elected directly by Muslims started to perform 
their duties normally. However, both İbrahim Şerif and Mehmet Emin Aga 
were arrested and taken to trial by Greek authorities. İbrahim Şerif was 
accused of having worn the uniform of public officer and usurped Mufti post. 
Greek criminal court of Thessaloniki sentenced İbrahim Şerif for six months 
imprisonment, which was converted to a fine. Following a negative result of 
the appeal to the Court of Cassation, Şerif forwarded the case to the ECtHR. 
In its decision, the Court found Greece guilty as a result of violation of article 
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9 of the convention which stands for religious freedom.81 The case of 
Mehmet Emin Aga followed the same pattern. After exhausting domestic 
remedies his case was forwarded to the ECtHR. In its decision on July 13, 
2006 the Court found Greece in violation of article 9 of the convention.  
 
 Decisions of the ECtHR in the case of Muftis, gave certain confidence 
to the Muslims in Thrace to continue the election of their own religious heads. 
However, Greek Government still continues to appoint its own Muftis as well. 
This situation certainly creates division in Muslim minority of Thrace. One 
might consider that the Greek State benefits from this disorganization and 
keeps blaming Turkish Consulate in Komotini with the spread of nationalist 
sentiments.  
 
 An additional change on imams approved by the Greek Parliament on 
January 16, 2013 seems to escalate discussions about the religious freedom 
of Muslim/Turkish minority in Thrace. According to the Law 4115/2013 which 
is also known as ‘240 imams act’, 240 religious officials of Turks in Western 
Thrace will be elected by a commission formed of five officials composed of 
an appointed Mufti, Muslim theologist assigned by the Greek Ministry of 
Education, another theologist assigned by the appointed Mufti, a member of 
the Ministry of Education and an academician whose area of expertise is 
Islam.  
 
This new regulation is harshly criticized by the members of minority 
who accuse Greek Government with alleged intervention into their religious 
issues contrary to the provisions of Lausanne Peace Treaty. There are no 
certain provisions about the post of Mufti in Lausanne Peace Treaty since it 
has already been solved with the Treaty of Athens. However, article 40 of 
Lausanne Peace Treaty provides full freedom to the Muslim minority in the 
creation and management of their own religious institutions.   
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3.3. THE END OF COMMUNISM IN BULGARIA AND AN ENDLESS 
TRANSITION PROCESS 
 
 Transition process has begun with very big ambiguities for Bulgaria. 
International isolation showed itself heavily amid protests in almost every 
city for the restoration of Turkish names. Although communists were 
responsible for the revival process, they were also among the first to 
underline territorial integrity of Bulgaria. The last plenums conducted by the 
BCP, turned into an open expression of the unitary character of Bulgarian 
nation and assimilation campaign was accepted as a national question. 
Despite the fact that revival process failed totally, the issue of national unity 
and ‘single ethnic’ character of Bulgarian nation, became to be the only 
basis for the discussion of any possible solution. Revival process was 
denounced and restoration of constitutional rights of the Turkish minority and 
their Turkish names was accepted by the members of BCP. 
 
 However, the decision to restitute Turkish names was not welcomed 
by the extreme nationalists who were mainly supporters of Bulgarian  
Communist Party. While Turks were organizing protests in Sofia to have 
their rights back, demonstrations of Bulgarian nationalists were against of 
such restitution.82 Intensified demonstrations in mixed areas brought the 
danger of interethnic conflict, which forced politicians to abstain from 
extreme nationalist expressions. First democratic elections after the post-
communist era were held in 1990, and Turks managed to participate with a 
separate party called Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF). Turkish 
party managed to become the 3rd power in the parliament and obtained 24 
seats out of 400. Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) was transformed into 
center-left party and took the name Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). BSP 
came out as the first party from the elections in 1990. BSP’s electorate was 
at large extent from a nationalist background. However, due to the danger of 
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escalation of ethnic clashes, BSP tried to distance itself from nationalist 
rhetoric and focused on the issue of gradual restoration of the rights of 
Turkish minority in Bulgaria. In March 1990, Bulgarian Parliament passed a 
law for the restitution of Turkish names.83 Demonstrations made by masses 
against the law allowing restitution of Turkish names did not receive much 
support from the political parties in the parliament, which prevented 
escalation of conflict in Bulgaria. However, distinctive ethnic identity of 
Turkish minority was not accepted by academic circles who supervised 
communists for decades throughout the revival process by emphasizing on 
the Bulgarian origins of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. Therefore, 
declaration made in the beginning of 1990  by  the Bureau of Central Board 
of Bulgarian Historical Association, became an indicator of the new policy 
towards Turkish minority in Bulgaria. Group of leading academics from 
Bulgaria signed the declaration where revival process was not even officially 
condemned and all the critics were directed to the totalitarian character of 
Bulgarian political life. They refrained themselves from calling Turks in 
Bulgaria as ethnic minority and underlined the expressions such as ‘Turkish 
speaking’ and ‘Muslim Bulgarians’ in order to stress the ethnic unity of 
Bulgarian nation.84  
 
 The second political power in Bulgarian Parliament, the Union of 
Democratic Forces (UDF) emerged as centre-right organization. From time 
to time UDF supported some nationalist revisions on the rights of minorities, 
however, this was not at the level as it had been performed by BSP. UDF 
turned into political power which strengthened Bulgaria’s European 
integration process by applying reforms of vital importance for the 
improvement of democracy in Bulgaria.  
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 During the census in 1992, there was a huge debate about whether to 
add the question of ethnic belonging. Nationalists vehemently opposed 
inclusion of questions regarding the ethnic belonging in census with the 
motive that there are no ethnic minorities recognized in Bulgaria.85 However, 
when the debate was transferred to the Bulgarian Parliament, there was 
certain consensus to include questions such as ethnic belonging, language 
and religious affiliation. According to the results of the census conducted in 
1992, the number of Turkish minority was slightly over 800,000 out of 
8,487,317 people, which constituted 9,7% of the total population.86 
Southeastern provinces Kardzhali and Haskovo, and Northeastern provinces 
Razgrad and Shumen were the major areas where Turkish minority mainly 
lived and even constituted majority of the population in some areas like 
Kardzhali (approximately 69%). Considering the fact that more than 300,000 
Turks emigrated from Bulgaria in 1989, it is obvious that the number of 
Turks in Bulgaria was more than one million before the end of communism. 
1992 census created many arguments as people from different regions 
complained that they were not registered in the ethnic groups as they 
declared themselves to belong. This mostly happened in the regions like 
Smolyan and Gotse Delchev, where Pomaks mostly identified themselves 
as Turks.  
 
 There has been a certain need to prevent escalation of discussions 
regarding the ethnic belonging of Bulgarian citizens and political parties in 
the parliament took the leading role to avert ethnic conflict especially in 
mixed areas. In the political scene, neither BCP nor BSP officially 
apologized for the revival process.87 Nationalists defended the idea that the 
revival process was necessary for the unification of the Bulgarian nation, 
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and Turks had had to change their names if they wanted to stay in Bulgaria. 
The only alternative to the name changing was the emigration to Turkey. 
Therefore, with the background of decades-long emigration followed by 
expulsion in 1989, post-communist era invented a new nationalist rhetoric: 
“either stay and accept the assimilation or leave for Turkey if you feel 
Turkish”. This phrase is still used by nationalist in Bulgaria who are mostly 
against any positive regulations pertaining to minority rights. 
 
 Negative comments regarding the revival process were balanced with 
critics directed to Turkey, as Turkey was accused with being the main 
responsible for the failure of the assimilation process of Turks in Bulgaria. 
Expulsion of more than 300,000 Turks who were mainly qualified workers 
caused a sharp decrease in Bulgarian GDP, and suddenly the so-called 
national problem revealed its economic aspect as well.88 Again Turkey was 
blamed for causing damages to the Bulgarian economy by opening borders 
to the incoming Turkish population.    
 
 After years of political struggle between nationalists and Turks, in 
1995 Bulgaria successfully lodged application for EU  membership. If we 
consider the end of communism as the beginning of the transition process, 
then application for the full membership to the EU meant intensification of 
the transition process and liberalization of minority rights in Bulgaria. Like all 
other Eastern European countries, Bulgaria was also subject to evaluation 
according to the Copenhagen criteria regarding the treatment of minorities. 
While the first part of 1990s was usually spent with the prevention of ethnic 
conflict and taking foremost legal measures for the democratization of 
Bulgarian political system, the second half of 1990s was the beginning of 
Bulgaria’s Europeanization process.  
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 Beginning of European integration process created new hope for the 
further liberalization of minority rights. However, due to peculiarities of the 
Bulgarian political system, these steps did not provide for radical change in 
the conditions on Turkish minority in Bulgaria as it will be indicated in detail 
below. Eventually, the transition process from communism to democracy 
had its own character stemming from the complexities of Bulgaria’s minority 
policy which limited the impact of European integration on the rights of 
minorities. Ethnic issues were widely used to redefine Bulgarian nationalism, 
rather than being perceived as problems to solve. Modest minority rights 
were offered with the motive to protect the majority by demonizing minorities 
and linking every ethnic issue to the national security. 
 
 
3.3.1. Bulgarian Constitution from 1991 and Restoring the Rights of 
Minorities 
 
In July 1991, Bulgarian Parliament adopted a new constitution that 
provided basic minority rights suitable to the strained atmosphere in the 
country. Majority of Bulgarian nationalists were not ready to face the reality 
to accept officially the existence of a Turkish minority in Bulgaria and to have 
constitutional guarantees for their rights.                                         
 
One could say that the Constitution from 1991 turned to be a really 
disappointing document due to its vague phrasing of the rights of minorities. 
Bulgarian constitutions from 1947 and 1971 had more explicit expressions 
regarding other ethnic groups in Bulgaria and their rights. The first 
Constitution adopted by communists in 1947 recognized national minorities 
in Bulgaria by indicating that “national minorities have the right to study in 
their mother tongue and to develop their own culture while learning 
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Bulgarian is obligatory”.89 The Constitution from 1971, which is also known 
as “Zhivkov Constitution”, made some changes coherent with the 
deteriorating treatment of minorities, and concluded that “citizens of non-
Bulgarian origin, apart from the compulsory learning of Bulgarian, have the 
right to learn their own language”.90 When it comes to the post-communist 
Constitution adopted in 1991, minorities were only mentioned in an implicit 
way by the article 36(2) which states “Citizens whose mother tongue is not 
Bulgarian shall have the right to study and use their own language alongside 
the compulsory study of the Bulgarian language”.91 This was the first result 
of the nationwide nationalist protests which were directed against every 
attempt to improve the rights and conditions of Turkish minority in Bulgaria. 
Eventually, Bulgarian constitution adopted in the post-communist era failed 
to offer solid minority recognition even compared to the totalitarian one.  
 
Another negative aspect of the Bulgarian constitution which created 
many critics was the article 11(4) regulating political parties. Article 11(4) 
provided that “there shall be no political parties on ethnic, racial or religious 
lines”. This article has been adopted mainly to prevent formation of an ethnic 
Turkish political party, thus to prevent political participation of Turks through 
their own organization and rather control them via mainstream Bulgarian 
parties. Although nationalist circles in Bulgarian Parliament, failed to provoke 
inter-ethnic conflict, their activities had an important influence on the 
legislation process.92 Prohibition of all organizations based on ethnic or 
religious motives was justified with the protection of ethnic unity of Bulgarian 
nation, an aspect which contradicted with the notion of plurality. However, 
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the situation of the Turkish minority was used to politicize  minority rights 
issue in Bulgaria, and every liberal step has been connected with the 
national betrayal. It was mainly the attitude of nationalists which limited the 
adoption of more liberal minority rights standards in Bulgaria in the 
beginning of 1990s.  
 
Article 37 of the new Constitution provided freedom of conscience, 
which allowed religious minorities-mainly Muslims to practice their religion 
freely in Bulgaria. In the meantime, equality of all Bulgarian citizens was 
guaranteed with the article 6 of Constitution from 1991. During the European 
integration process, events that occurred in Bulgaria created some 
discussions regarding the implementation of the Bulgarian Constitution. For 
instance, freedom of conscience was guaranteed for all Bulgarian citizens 
while it could be restricted under certain conditions when used to the 
detriment of national security, public order, public health and morals, or of 
the rights and freedoms of others. When it came to the stage of 
implementation, the rights of religious minorities were often restricted due to 
the problems stemming from the derogative interpretations of this article. 
More detailed evaluation of the issue will be made below under the heading 
‘religious issues’.  
 
Including the fact that there was no official tool created for the 
protection of minority rights in Bulgaria, democratic deficit shows itself even 
when it is tackled as a general human rights issue. The Supreme Court of 
Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, were defined as the 
highest judicial bodies responsible for the protection of human rights under 
the 1991 Constitution.93 Their authority was limited to the issues dealing with 
criminal law, civil law and administrative law. During the Europeanization 
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process in Bulgaria, both courts have referred to a certain degree to the 
decisions given by the ECtHR. But this did not make any significant effect in 
the area of human rights, as majority of cases were related with the fair trial 
issue.  
 
The lack of clearly articulated standards for the application of basic 
human rights, leaves quite large room for the interpretation of by judges.94 
The Constitutional Court in Bulgaria has been designed as an institution 
responsible for the interpretation of rules in line with European standards. 
However, it failed to accomplish its duty as a result of heavy political 
influence. Eventually, ordinary judges, preferred to give decisions according 
to domestic legal standards, without considering the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court or ECtHR. These practices in 1990s, reduced the 
impact of European standards on the Bulgarian jurisprudence. There has 
been a common mistrust towards Bulgarian courts, which initiated the 
litigation process to the Court in Strasbourg. With the support of Western 
governments, several human rights groups took the initiative to forward their 
cases to the ECtHR claiming that Bulgarian courts were not a reliable forum 
for human rights complaints.95  
 
Meanwhile, the issue to deliver justice in minority rights issues 
became even more complicated both for Bulgaria and the ECtHR. After the 
fall of communism, Bulgarian authorities condemned the revival process, but 
there was no legal pursuit against those who were responsible for the 
process. Bulgarian courts denied to proceed with the request to deepen the 
investigation against the perpetrators (Todor Zhivkov, Pencho Kubadinski 
etc) ‘due to lack of evidences’ for their participation in the assimilation 
campaign and for torturing thousands of imprisoned people.96 100 Turks, 
forwarded the case to the ECtHR, however, in 2005 the Court did not find 
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the request admissible because of the fact that Bulgaria was not part of the 
European Convention of Human Rights at the time of the revival process. 
The negative answer from the ECtHR, reduced the confidence toward the 
European human rights mechanisms among the members of the Turkish 
minority.  
 
 
3.3.2. Educational Rights of the Turkish Minority in Bulgaria 
 
 The right to have education in mother tongue had been revoked by 
the communist rule and for more than two decades Turkish minority in 
Bulgaria did not have the possibility to conduct education in Turkish or to 
learn the language. The lack of education in mother tongue showed its 
impact mainly on the new generations who were born during 1980s and 
became pupils in the last years of communist rule. Children of Turkish 
families attended kindergartens in Bulgarian and followed primary school 
education in Bulgarian, however, they used Turkish at home. But since 
circulation of books in Turkish was strictly forbidden during the last two 
decades of communism, there were no facilities for teaching Turkish to the 
new generations. In some cases letters sent to the relatives in Turkey were 
written in Turkish with Cyrillic script. Therefore, the main target of the post-
communist era was to reintroduce learning of Turkish in schools. 
 
 The Bulgarian Constitution from 1991 provided the right to learn 
Turkish along with the obligation to study Bulgarian. Therefore, MRF 
launched the initiative to introduce education in Turkish at schools. However, 
there was strong opposition from nationalist circles regarding this effort, and 
it became clear that other political parties in the Parliament did not have the 
intention to launch education in Turkish at all.97 Members of the Turkish 
minority started to protest when the 1990-1991 school year began without 
                                                 
97 Ali Eminov (b), p. 48.  
  
171
Turkish language classes. Once again, potential for inter-ethnic clashes 
arose when nationalists organized protests against the introduction of 
language courses in Turkish. The shift from oppressive to more liberal policy 
was not a fast process, BSP continued its discriminatory policies towards 
Turkish minority by blocking the process of introduction of Turkish language 
courses in public schools. Moreover, BSP and other nationalist members at 
the parliament, enacted a new law “granting minorities the right to study their 
mother tongue outside the state school in Bulgaria, under the protection and 
control of the state”.98 The timing of this law was very important as it was 
accepted just before the National Assembly dissolved itself for the elections 
on October 13, 1991. With this regulation, which was mainly prepared to 
attract the votes of nationalists,  organizing Turkish language courses in 
public schools was outlawed automatically. Reinterpretation of constitutional 
norms with the nationalist arguments became an obstacle to the principle of 
equality of Bulgarian citizens adopted with article 6 of Bulgarian constitution.  
 
  Following the shift of BSP’s policy regarding the educational rights of 
the Turkish minority, there were massive protests in mixed areas against the 
law enacted. It led to a school boycott in places where Turkish minority 
constituted majority of the population, and Turkish children did not attend 
Bulgarian schools for approximately two months between September and 
November 1991.99 When the elections held on 13 October 1991 resulted 
with the victory of UDF, the new government lifted the ban on Turkish 
language courses at Bulgarian public schools, and prepared a plan for the 
introduction of Turkish language classes in Bulgarian schools in areas where 
Turkish minority lived. The boycott of Turkish students ended in November 
1991, and Turkish language courses were introduced as of February 1992 in 
Bulgarian municipal schools. Ministry of Education offered Turkish language 
classes as required subject at schools in areas where Turkish minority 
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constituted majority of the population, and as elective subject in areas where 
Turks were a minority, covering the grades 3-8.100 Turkish language classes 
were offered for four hours per week to students of Turkish origin.   
 
 Meanwhile, apart from the legal troubles, organization of Turkish 
language classes became a problematic issue due to the lack of books and 
educated teachers. Ministry of Education took the initiative to organize a 
committee responsible for the preparation of new books in Turkish and to 
offer intensive training for candidate teachers for Turkish language. It can be 
predicted that, due to the lack of experienced personnel and shortage of 
resources, the first years of Turkish classes did not provide fruitful results, 
however, allowing Turkish language at schools after two decades was 
welcomed as a positive change both by the members of the Turkish minority 
and by the European countries.    
 
 In 1994 teaching of Turkish was extended in a way to cover grades 1-
8 and offered as elective subject in municipal schools. Meanwhile, it was not 
part of the school curriculum and grades in Turkish language were not 
counted towards completion of general education which left Turkish courses 
outside of general curriculum. For example, schools in Kardzhali region, 
offered language courses in Turkish and Russian. While Russian has been 
accepted ‘traditionally’ as part of the curriculum, the same status has been 
denied for the Turkish language. This became part of the policy to 
undermine the importance of Turkish language and indirectly to reduce the 
interest of learning Turkish at schools.  
 
 After the elections in December 1994 BSP came to the rule again. 
Newly appointed Minister of Education Ilcho Dimitrov, who had been 
supported Zhivkov’s assimilation policies, decided to change the style of 
Turkish language courses. It was in this period that staffing became very 
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important in post-communist transformation of Bulgaria. Every political party 
tried to fill public employment posts with its supporters. Ilcho Dimitrov as 
Minister of Education appointed loyal supporters of BSP as inspectors 
especially in the areas where Turkish minority was living.101 These 
inspectors had the mission to push for the organization of Turkish language 
classes outside of normal school hours. The aim of this action was to reduce 
the number of Turkish students who were participating in Turkish language 
courses. BSP, once again, confirmed its anti-minority rhetoric.  
 
 Meanwhile, these measures were revoked when UDF came to power 
again in 1997. In line with the Europeanization bid of Bulgaria, Turkish has 
been added as compulsory elective course to the educational curriculum, 
and this time it has been extended to high school level.102   
 
 Currently, learning of Turkish language in municipal schools is 
conducted according to the regulations accepted in 1990s. Many experts 
criticize the methods and quality of minority languages in Bulgaria. Many of 
the criticisms are based on the figures of students who continue to attend 
minority language classes in Bulgaria, so that in 1992-1993 school year 
approximately 100,000 students attended courses for mother tongue while 
this number reduced to the level of 7,000 in the 2010-2011 school year.103 
MRF urged for an educational reform that would allow improvement of 
textbooks and adding to the school curriculum teaching of some subjects in 
Turkish, however, all proposals have been rejected by the political parties in 
the parliament, and MRF has been accused with a policy of Turkification.  
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3.3.3. Religious Issues 
 
 The democratization process in Bulgaria tackled also religious 
freedom. 1992 census showed that there were 1,110,295 Muslims in 
Bulgaria constituting 13.1% of the whole population in the country. Sunni 
Islam was the dominant religion for the majority of Muslims (92,3%) while 
7,7% of the Muslims were Shi’ites. Part of the Pomaks and Roma minority 
members also declared themselves as Muslims.104 Mixed ethnic background 
of Muslim followers made it necessary to create a new environment for the 
peaceful co-existence of religious and ethnic diversity in Bulgaria.  
 
Article 37 of the constitution from 1991, provided freedom of 
conscience for all Bulgarian citizens. This brought certain freedom to all 
religious groups in Bulgaria. Muslims were granted the freedom to practice 
their religion and to establish new mosques or rebuild old ones.  
 
 Meanwhile, the status of Bulgarian Orthodox Church was regulated in 
the post-communist constitution, with an aim to restore its position which 
was heavily damaged during the half century long atheist regime. The new 
Bulgarian constitution redefined secularism in Bulgaria in a ‘religious way’. 
Article 13(2) explicitly indicated separation of church and the state. However, 
article 13(3) defined Bulgarian Orthodox Church as traditional religion in 
Bulgaria. Even this expression was not enough to reestablish the dominant 
position of Bulgarian Orthodox Church created by the Tarnovo Constitution 
in 1879.105 It provided certain freedom to church members which had been 
previously denied for Muslims and created a religious hierarchy in Bulgaria.   
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 With the spirit of reforms, after facing problems for decades, Muslims 
finally were granted the freedom to practice their religion freely. Apart from 
worship, religious education and training became the most important 
problem, since all educational institutions which used to provide religious 
training for Muslims were closed down by the communist rule. Following the 
adoption of the new constitution in 1991, the Islamic Institute of Sofia was 
re-opened as an independent institution, along with Islamic high schools in 
Shumen, Kardzhali and  Momchilgrad.106 Together with the newly 
established religious institutions, religious literature became easily available 
for Bulgarian citizens. For the first time Qur’an was translated into Bulgarian 
in 1993. Guides for prayers were translated or in most cases they were 
brought from Turkey, for those who read Turkish. Briefly, 1990s became the 
decade for the revival of Islamic education in Bulgaria. This process resulted 
with the growing interest of other countries in the Islamic revival of Bulgaria. 
International mobility of Bulgarian students-mostly from Turkish origin- was 
encouraged through the scholarships offered by countries such as Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt.  
 
 However, despite all these liberal steps, there was still a problem to 
bring religious education into public schools. Initiated as a pilot project in 
2000 and later extended to all primary schools, Islamic education became 
an elective course in Bulgaria in 2004.107 Discussions whether Islamic 
education should be funded by the Ministry of Education or by the office of 
Chief Mufti in Sofia ended, when Ministry of Education agreed to take the 
responsibility for funding.  
 
 Restitution of vakıf properties confiscated in 1940s and 1950s by the 
communist rule turned into a chronic issue, since most of them are not 
returned to the Muslims even today. The office of Chief Mufti in Sofia is 
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responsible for the management of vakıf properties in Bulgaria and their 
restitution is very important for the economic self-sufficiency of Muslim 
community.108 State authorities still did not approve the project of building 
Islamic Education Centre in Sofia on a land that is officially part of vakıf 
property.  
 
 Election of Muftis became also another problem after the fall of 
communism. During the totalitarian rule, Chief Mufti and other regional 
Muftis were usually appointed by the state among the people who were loyal 
to the communist rule.109 During the revival process Muftis were used by the 
state to support the religious dimension of the assimilation campaign. The 
last Chief Mufti appointed by the communists was Nedim Gendzhev. When 
a new Muslim Theological Council was elected in 1992, it has been decided 
that the Chief Mufti and the regional muftis will be elected by Muslims in 
Bulgaria. Therefore, previously appointed Chief Mufti and regional muftis 
were relieved from their posts.  
 
 However, when in 1995 BSP came to power, Gendzhev saw the 
possibility to become Chief Mufti through the support of the new 
government. On the other side Hasan was elected as the new Chief Mufti at 
the conference representing all Muslims in Bulgaria. When Bulgarian 
Government decided to recognize Gendzhev as Chief Mufti, Hasan 
appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Court dismissed his case. After 
exhausting domestic remedies Hasan forwarded the case to the ECtHR. In 
its decision, the Court ruled that Bulgaria violated article 9 of the Convention, 
which guarantees religious freedom.110 The case Hasan and Chaush v. 
Bulgaria, managed to bring significant autonomy to the religious affairs of 
Muslims in Bulgaria.     
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3.3.4. Social and Political Participation of the Turkish Minority 
 
 Social and political participation of the Turkish minority, became one 
of the most important issues during the transition process in Bulgaria. Being 
subject to excessive assimilationist campaign and oppressions caused a 
certain shock for a while. However, in the aftermath of name changing 
actions, massive protests were organized by Turks aiming to restore their 
names and rights. In the years following the fall of communism, Turks tried 
to improve their situation by taking an active role in the social and political 
life in Bulgaria.  
 
 The beginning of 1990s marked also the period when political life in 
Bulgaria was reshaped according to the standards of the transition period, 
which changed the country’s political system from communism into liberal 
democracy. Elites of the Turkish minority sought engagement in political 
activities in order to solve the ethnic problem in Bulgaria. However, creation 
of political organization which would promote minority rights in Bulgaria 
required some specific preparation. At that time Ahmed Dogan appeared in 
the Bulgarian political scene. Dogan was imprisoned in 1986 for his activities 
against the revival process in Bulgaria and the formation of Turkish National 
Liberation Movement in Bulgaria. After the reversal of the revival process, 
Dogan decided to take the initiative for the formation of a new organization: 
the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) was founded as political 
party on January 4, 1990 and Dogan became his leader.111 According to 
Dogan, the rights of the Turkish minority could be only guaranteed through 
active political participation, and he considered that Turks had the potential 
to form a strong political unity.  
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 Nevertheless, in order to prove that creation of MRF does not target 
territorial integrity and ethnic peace in Bulgaria, Dogan preferred to see the 
revival process merely as an assimilation campaign directed by the 
Bulgarian Communist Party and not supported by all Bulgarians. Moreover, 
MRF’s demanded modest minority rights and never requested Turkish to be 
the second official language in Bulgaria. Following clarifications regarding 
their positions, MRF was registered at the Sofia City Court on April 26, 1990. 
This allowed the MRF to participate in the upcoming elections in June 1990. 
MRF won 24 seats in the elections which was evaluated as a great success.  
 
 The formation of MRF as the Turkish political party was not welcomed 
by the BSP and UDF, who wanted to prevent Turks from forming their own 
political party which might be the symbol of the distinctive Turkish identity in 
Bulgaria. This attitude became more evident when the new post-communist 
Constitution of Bulgaria was enacted in July 1991. Article 11(4) of the new 
constitution prevented the creation of political parties based on ‘ethnic, racial 
and religious lines’. Since Turks were the only minority which could form a 
separate political organization, there was not much left for the interpretation 
of its consequences.  
 
 Following the enactment of the new constitution in July 1991, Sofia 
City Court decided to reject the application of MRF to be registered as 
political party on the grounds that this would violate article 11(4) of the 
constitution.112 The Supreme Court approved the decision of the regional 
court as well. These decisions attracted negative comments from Western 
countries and international organizations. Finding solution to the problem 
was really important in order to define whether MRF could participate in the 
elections on 13 October 1991. Under the heavy pressure of Western 
countries, Central Electoral Committee decided that MRF could participate in 
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the next elections since it was already represented in the parliament. 113 In 
fact, this decision was generated only as a temporary solution to the 
problem, since all legal remedies to exclude MRF from the political scene 
were not exhausted. 
 
 On October 1991, 93 deputies, mainly from BSP, submitted a petition 
to the Constitutional Court - which was newly created after the adoption of 
the new constitution in 1991 - to declare MRF as illegal due to the 
contradictions with the article 11(4). MRF was defined as a political party 
known for its mission to represent Bulgarian citizens who identified 
themselves as ethnic Turks.114 This petition showed the division in Bulgarian 
political life and to which extent political parties are open for the participation 
of Turks in Bulgaria. Finally on 21 April 1992, the Court decided to reject the 
petition and reaffirmed the constitutionality of the MRF.115 The decision of 
the court was focused on second part of the article 11(4) ‘involvement in 
violence’. MRF did not target ‘violent seizure of state power’ nor it was 
involved in the activities of such groups. According to the Court, MRF strived 
for the same goals like improving educational quality and life standards, 
social and political participation of Bulgarian citizens. Therefore, carrying 
these activities through political channels was not assessed as illegal.  
 
 After solving its legal status, the MRF focused on the formation of 
local representatives and on coordinating political demands of the minorities 
in Bulgaria. Turks formed the largest number of the MRF electorate followed 
by Pomaks (who are known as Bulgarian Muslims) and Roma minority. MRF 
managed successfully to improve its position as key party in Bulgarian 
Parliament by supporting directly or indirectly formation of coalitions. 
Creation of MRF as (non-official) Turkish political party has been accepted 
as a great success for the Bulgarian democratization process, since for the 
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first time after the creation of Bulgaria in 1878, Turks had a separate political 
party.116  
 
 During Bulgaria’s transition process, MRF continued to increase votes 
in parliamentary and local elections. Political mobilization of ethnic Turks at 
local level was coordinated by the MRF. Local elections in 2003 became the 
turning point for the political participation of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. 
Hasan Azis who put his candidacy through the MRF was elected as new 
mayor of the Kardzhali district, where Turks comprised 67% of the total 
population. Previously, municipalities had a Turkish mayor, but this was not 
case for the provinces and especially as a candidate of MRF, which has 
always been perceived as Turkish party in Bulgaria. This situation has been 
protested by some nationalist groups who organized protests in Sofia and 
Kardzhali with posters ‘Kardzhali is Bulgarian fortress’.  
 
 Population census in 2001 revealed that 746,664 people declared 
themselves as ethnically Turkish, while Bulgaria’s total population was 
7,928,901 people. This obviously affected the role of MRF in Bulgarian 
politics since most of its electorate was of Turkish origin. After the 
parliamentary elections in 2001 MRF managed to win 21 out of 240 seats in 
the Bulgarian Parliament, which turned MRF into a key political actor. For 
the first time Turkish was part of a government through the coalition made 
between BSP and National Movement of Simeon II.117 Turks were offered 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forests and one ministry without portfolio.  
 
 After its first experience in government, MRF continued to increase its 
votes at the parliamentary elections held in 2005. MRF achieved great 
success by increasing its seats in the parliament from 21 to 34, compared to 
the elections in 2001.These results made MRF the third political power in the 
parliament. New coalition formed in 2005 included also MRF, in which MRF 
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had three ministers.118 Being part of this government had also symbolic 
meaning for MRF, since Bulgaria’s EU accession took place during the 
same mandate.  
 
 In a short period of time. MRF managed to transform itself into key 
political actor in Bulgaria. Its electorate was diverse and focused in different 
regions, while Southeast and Northeast regions settled by Turks became the 
most important supporter of MRF.  
 
 
Figure 2: Geographical proportion of the MRF’s votes. (DPS stands for Dvijenie Za 
Prava i Svobodi which is the Bulgarian version of Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms).    
   
 Bulgarian nationalists, interpreted MRF’s continuous success as 
results of the Turkification campaign of Bulgarian Muslims. With the time 
passing, criticism directed towards the political participation of Turkish 
minority in Bulgaria resulted with the creation of a far right political party 
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called ATAKA. With its anti-Turkish rhetoric, ATAKA managed to attract the 
votes of many nationalists and this became evident when it won 21 seats in 
2005 elections, after having conducted an election campaign directed 
against minorities in Bulgaria.  
 
 On the other side, MRF managed to strengthen its representation in 
the European Parliament. It managed to obtain 3 out of 18 seats allocated to 
Bulgaria. This was not a surprise considering MRF’s activities during the 
European integration process. Dogan and MRF leadership concentrated on 
the education of youth and MRF organizations working in municipalities in 
order to increase the contribution of European funds in the regional 
development.119 This policy aimed to increase economic development of the 
regions and at the same time helped MRF to sustain its existence on power.  
 
 
3.3.5. Europeanization of Minority Rights in Bulgaria: Resilience of 
National Problems or Incompetence of European Institutions? 
 
 The transition process in Bulgaria ended officially when Bulgaria 
joined EU on 1 January 2007. However, problems of the Turkish minority 
remained unsolved during the negotiation process of EU membership. Both 
EU and Bulgaria did not raised officially the situation of the Turkish minority 
in Bulgaria due to high political sensitivity of the problem. Both Bulgaria and 
the European Commission have been criticized for their attitude during the 
negotiation process. While Bulgaria was accused with following nationalist 
approach towards minorities, European Commission was labeled as 
incompetent regarding its attitude toward minority rights.  
 
 Copenhagen criteria emerged as first conditionality for countries 
aspiring to the EU membership. Nevertheless, minority rights are tackled in 
                                                 
119 Ibid.  
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a very vague way, which allows large room for political interpretations. 
Situation is quite different with economic achievements as they can be easily 
linked with the acquis, which would make necessary their implementation. 
Same mechanism was not available for the rights of minorities. In most 
cases expertise of the European Commission was limited, and they often 
referred to local NGO’s and international organizations such as OSCE and 
CoE, and had to rely on their evaluation.120  
 
 The lack of expertise became more evident when the European 
Commission started to issue yearly progress reports regarding the 
achievements of Bulgaria. For consecutive three years from 2001 until 2004, 
there was the same sentence included regarding the situation of the Turkish 
minority in Bulgaria.121 This situation created different opinions regarding the 
EU’s commitment in the area of minority rights since one of the most 
important conditions of EU membership was tackled only in two-three 
paragraphs with very vague expressions.  
 
 Bulgaria signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities in 1997, and ratified it in 1999. However, in spite of time 
passed, there was no implementation taking place. Bulgarian authorities 
ratified the convention in order to speed up the negotiation process for EU 
membership. The fact that neither Bulgarian Constitution nor Bulgarian 
legislation did not recognize the existence of national minorities in Bulgaria, 
remained as an issue ignored throughout the negotiation process with 
Bulgaria. Moreover, many politicians declared that there are no national or 
ethnic minorities in Bulgaria.122  
                                                 
120 Kirsten Shoraka, p. 121.  
121 Following is the sentence included in progress reports without any change for three years: “The 
Turkish minority continues to be integrated into political life through elected representation at national 
and local levels. Further attention needs to be paid for the socio-economic integration of those ethnic 
Turks and other minority groups who live in economically less developed regions.” (Source: 2004 
Regular Report on Bulgaria’s Progress Towards Accession, European Commission, Brussels, 6 
October 2004.)  
122 Bernd Rechel (a), p. 246.  
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 FCNM provided minorities with the right to use their language in 
dealing with authorities and for topographic indicators. When the Advisory 
Committee on the Framework Convention recommended Bulgaria to apply 
these provisions123, Bulgarian authorities vehemently opposed the idea. 
Main reason for the opposition were again historical and social problems. 
Historically most of the places in Bulgaria had Turkish names. These names 
were changed with Bulgarian ones in 1930s in order to get rid of Turkish 
legacy. Allowing the use of old Turkish topographic names was not 
acceptable because of their symbolic potential. The same motives were 
used for the justification of language, and these problems are still persistent 
in Bulgaria. Therefore, the effects of FCNM were limited on the rights of 
minorities in Bulgaria, as it was in the case of the EU negotiation process.  
 
 Following the EU directive on anti-discrimination, Bulgaria agreed to 
take necessary measures to prevent discrimination. Creation of the 
Commission for Protection against Discrimination in 2005, was really praised 
by the European Union. Similar to other cases involving minorities, newly 
established Commission for Anti-Discrimination failed to answer the needs 
of national minorities.124 Because parallel to the adoption of non-
discrimination principles, hate speech targeting minorities, started to become  
the new problem in Bulgaria. Extreme nationalist party ATAKA and its 
supporters, organized protests against minorities in front of the Parliament 
and mosque in Sofia. In May 2011, supporters of ATAKA including its 
members from Parliament organized protests in front of the Bania Bashi 
Mosque in Sofia. The protest culminated into violence as extreme 
nationalists started to seize Muslims in the garden of the Mosque who 
gathered for the Friday prayer. As a result of the clashes in Sofia’s city 
center, several people were injured. The attitude of the police was highly 
                                                 
123 Bernd Rechel (b), Bulgaria: Minority Rights ‘light’, in: Minority Rights in Central and Eastern 
Europe, (Ed.) Bernd Rechel, London, Routledge, 2009, p. 81.  
124Ibid., p. 82.  
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criticized for not taking necessary measures before the clashes and allowing 
aggressors  to disappear.  
 
 The European integration process had a really important impact on 
the general development of minority rights and especially in adopting 
international and European legal standards concerning minorities. However, 
adoption of these legal documents, passed through the evaluation of 
politicians who tried to adapt them into Bulgarian realities, which inevitably 
limited their impact on the rights of Turkish minority in Bulgaria.  
 
 After the realization of EU membership, suddenly the speed of 
reforms slowed down. Economic problems dominated political discourse 
which caused distraction in legal reforms. Persistent inter-ethnic tensions 
became part of political life and reinvented to serve the needs of political 
parties during the election process. Bulgarian nationalist described 
themselves as tolerant and at the same time continued to oppose every 
initiative to bring more freedom for minorities. Eventually, the lack of active 
violent conflict has been interpreted as tolerance in the case of minority 
issues in Bulgaria.  
 
 
 CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
MAPPING BULGARIAN-GREEK CROSS-BORDER 
COOPERATION: THE ROLE OF EU AND OTHER ACTORS  
 
 
4.1. BORDERS AND THEIR CHANGING MEANING 
 
 Briefly, borders would be defined as physical geographic boundaries 
that separate states, regions and limit their legal jurisdiction. However, 
borders exist also in our lives, which characterize our own identity and help 
us to define our difference from other people. In this case it has more to do 
with imagined peculiarities such language, culture and race. Due to 
complexity of problems surrounding the daily life of people, perception of 
borders changed gradually parallel to the needs of society. Borders which in 
the past were seen as guarantees of nation state, now are considered as 
obstacles for economic development and intercultural interactions. This 
phenomena continues its evolution in different regions of Europe and is 
spreading itself towards the Balkans.  
 
 Up until the twentieth century borders were perceived as systems to 
separate nation states, national economies and even political regimes.1 This 
led to centralization of all state policies such as health, education and 
economy which were totally directed by the central government, and in 
return changed the relationship between state and society by creating 
mutual dependence. While people inside the borders were considered as 
belonging to the same nation and thus closer to the central government, the 
bordering (geographically closer but living in the other side of the border) 
populations were ignored and turned into total strangers regardless of 
                                                 
1 James Anderson, Liam O’Dowd and Thomas M. Wilson, “Why Study Borders Now?”, Regional and 
Federal Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2002), p. 2.  
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connections in the past. In cases where borders were created as a result of 
violence, its presence facilitated the creation of more solid boundaries 
between societies bordering each other. Consequently, parallel to these 
tendencies, border regions were considered as periphery and therefore,  
became less developed areas compared to central regions or places close 
to the center with relatively easy access. These features created the 
connotation that border regions are relatively backward and less populated. 
In highly centralized systems, development of border regions was usually 
regulated through regional policies that tackle certain policy area such as 
education, health or economy.  
 
 The Second World War became the last massive event which 
strengthened the meaning of borders. Violence and ongoing conflicts are 
catalyzers of deep divisions between societies, and borders have been 
perceived as the only way to protect state from the enemies. However, with 
the beginning of the European project, perceptions of borders have changed 
rapidly. Economic, environmental and migration problems began to force the 
necessary process of dialogue2, which eventually,  culminated into cross-
border cooperation. The successful example of cross-border cooperation in 
Rhine valley, became an incentive for other countries to initiate such 
cooperation. The initiation of cross-border cooperation, gave better 
economic perspective to border regions, while helping to solve the problems 
stemming from historical hostilities. The process dominated with the lack of 
contact, and turned into hostility though the time, was the first thing to 
change for the creation of the idea of a united Europe.  
 
 In the last half century, European integration process has changed 
the position of border regions significantly. Borders began to be considered 
in a different way due to opportunities they offered for cross-border 
cooperation, cross-border movement of capital and free movement of 
                                                 
2 Ibid., p. 8.   
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people.3 With the increasing popularity of the liberal democratic system in 
Europe, and the effect of the globalization process, borders were sought as 
key areas and networks for the development of further economic relations 
and co-operation. Moreover, starting with 1980s, economic integration of 
European Community brought the understanding that state borders are 
barriers preventing the realization of the European market.4 This indeed was 
the motive of the shift from considering borders as political barriers to 
considering borders as limiting the economic development. Thus states were 
offered with economic incentives to encourage cross-border cooperation and 
to reduce the risk of conflicts via closer dialogue between communities living 
in border regions.  
 
 However, this does not mean that the change in the process was a 
fast and sharp one. Still borders are being conceived as symbols of identity5, 
although this division is not that strong as it was in the past. But it is beyond 
discussion that this perception has the tendency to change from one area to 
the other. European countries that started the process of cross-border 
cooperation in 1950s and 1960s had already defeated this phenomena 
where borders are being perceived as means to strengthen bilateral ties. 
There are different challenges for countries which are latecomers in the 
process of cross-border cooperation.  
 
 Apart from the issue how did the borders have changed, one needs to 
know different aspects which facilitate and complicate innovation and cross-
border cooperation processes.6 The initial resurgence of cross-border 
cooperation became detriment to the rigid system of state centralization. The 
classical way of central planned governance proved to be incapable of 
managing the new border challenge. Cross-border cooperation and its 
                                                 
3 Ibid.  
4 Liam O’Dowd, “The Changing Significance of European Borders”, Regional and Federal Studies, 
Vol. 12, No. 4 (2002), p. 20. 
5 Ibid., p. 27.  
6 Ibid., p. 14.  
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increasing importance, forced for new reforms mainly in the area of regional 
policy planning, which eventually brought the issue of decentralization of 
public administration. The need to decentralize state power, gradually 
facilitated the creation of cross-border cooperation, and later its 
management. However, ‘decentralization of power’ was accepted by central 
governments only after sustainable peace process was guaranteed. In the 
case of the European continent, the process of peaceful coexistence 
initiated with the European Coal and Steel Community, and later on was 
followed by the European Union.7 
 
 The tendency to give more power to regional authorities, became 
crucial for the successful management of cross-border cooperation by 
reducing initial formalities to launch and manage projects. Furthermore, 
decentralization of power was supported within the objective to solve the 
issue of regional underdevelopment that became common for most border 
regions.8 Therefore, political transformation of borders was followed and 
directed with economic goals and opportunities to flourish less developed 
regions in the periphery. It can be possible to argue that there is a link 
between regional policies and cross-border cooperation, since both aim to 
focus on less developed areas. However, there is still a difference between 
two concepts since regional policy might be directed to every region, while 
cross-border cooperation covers only border regions.9 The crucial point in 
the process of cross-border cooperation is to deal with another community 
or society across the border to foster ties. 
 
It is normal to discuss the evolution of bilateral ties while revising the 
opportunities for common work. When it concerns borders, usually historical 
flow of the bilateral relations with neighboring state are often involving a 
problem related with the settlement of borders or some territorial claims. In 
                                                 
7 Anne van der Veen, Dirk-Jan Boot, Cross-border cooperation and European Regional Policy, NIG 
working papers, No. 95-8, Hengelo, Drukkerij Twente, 1995, p. 2-3.  
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid., p. 14.  
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this case priorities of both nations would give the shape to the cross-border 
cooperation. The two options are, either solving the ongoing discussion and 
continue working together for the development of border regions or continue 
the old strained relations. Here the most important fact is, what 
characterizes the priority of a given country. As it will be tackled below, 
complexity of ongoing problems between Greece and Turkey still prevents 
the development of cross-border cooperation due to some unsettled border 
issues. 
 
Another challenge for the cross-border cooperation is the presence of 
ethnic minorities in border regions.10 If a given minority is settled in a border 
region where the state across the frontier is kin state, then there might be 
some reservations from the state to which this minority is connected with 
citizenship ties. In this case the nation state may see cross-border 
cooperation as a threat to its territorial integrity and deny to share some 
administrative competencies with regional authorities. Thus, strong central 
power could be perceived as the only option to protect the borders. One 
case that the current literature fail to nalyze is when the border regions of 
two states are populated by minority group whose kin state is a third country. 
How does this may affect the cross-border cooperation process? Regarding 
this aspect Greek-Bulgarian border is unique since this border region is 
settled by the Turkish minority whose kin state is Turkey. Current 
developments in the region continue to provide additional perspective about 
the topic, which will be examined below in detail as part of Greek-Bulgarian 
cross-border cooperation section.  
 
For years European Union tried to change the vision of borders in 
order to foster integration. Western European countries managed to reduce 
the problem with borders to a minimum thanks to the European integration 
                                                 
10 Francesco Palermo, Trans-Border Cooperation and Ethnic Diversity, in: Minority Policy in Action: 
The Bonn-Copenhagen Declarations in a European Context 1955-2005, (Eds.) Jorgen Kuehl & Marc 
Weller, Aabenraa, Institut for Graenseregionsforskning og forfatterne, 2005, p. 161.  
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process. However, when Eastern European countries wanted to join 
European Union, borders began to be discussed again. With their own 
political and historical problems, Eastern European countries changed the 
dynamics of the cross-border cooperation throughout 1990s and somehow 
tried to copy the models applied in Western Europe in order to improve the 
situation of border regions.  
 
 
4.2. PECULIARITY OF BULGARIAN-GREEK BORDER AND THE INITIAL 
RELEVANCE OF TURKEY  
 
The Bulgarian-Greek frontier was first created in 1913 after the 
Second Balkan War. However realities of First World War changed the 
situation, and with the Neuilly Treaty signed in 1919 Bulgaria lost her access 
to the Aegean See.11 As it was explained in detail in chapter one, according 
to the Convention signed on 27 November 1919 and attached to the Neuilly 
Treaty, reciprocal emigration between Bulgaria and Greece took place.12 
Both countries wanted to clear the minorities from their territories in order to 
put an end to the irredentist claims.  Despite this intention there were 
additional steps taken to create minority protection mechanisms for those 
who desired to stay in their respective countries; however, the Greek side 
was unwilling to proceed with that. Such an action would have meant ipso 
facto the recognition of the Bulgarian minority in Greece and its existence in 
northwestern Greece exceeding beyond the area of Western Thrace. Aside 
from this, newly created independent Balkan states were eager to increase 
their populations; as a result of which new lines of division had to be set in 
order to create new borders. Therefore, reciprocal emigration was accepted 
as the best way to solve the minority issues between Greece and Bulgaria. 
Continuous efforts in search of homogeneity focused especially in border 
                                                 
11 A.R.H., “The New Boundaries of Bulgaria”, Wiley-Blackwell and The Royal Geographical Society, 
Vol.55 No.2 (Feb 1920), p. 133.   
12 For more information see: http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%201/v1.pdf 
(access: 17 October 2012) 
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regions which had the imagination of intangible and concrete fortresses of 
nation state in twentieth century. Consequently, all Bulgarians were expelled 
from Thrace, and all Greeks in Bulgaria were forced to emigrate to Greece. 
This action became the first mutually organized exodus in order to secure 
the borders of new nation states.  
 
 The creation of Bulgarian-Turkish border took place after the Second 
Balkan War in 1913 had resulted with the emigration of Bulgarian population 
living in Edirne and surrounding villages, while two border towns Kırklareli 
and Edirne remained Turkish. Bulgaria and Turkey did not sign a  
comprehensive exchange agreement involving minorities and therefore a 
sizeable Turkish minority was left in Bulgaria, settled adjacent to the frontier 
with Greece, Black Sea Region and Northeast Bulgaria near the border with 
Romania. Turks who were living next to the Turkish border in the Bulgarian 
part, were forced either to emigrate to Turkey or other regions in Bulgaria, 
while settlement of ethnic Bulgarians in the border region with Turkey was 
fostered for security reasons.  
 
 The Lausanne Peace Treaty signed in 1923 between Greece and 
Turkey, gave the last shape to the Greek-Turkish frontier including the 
compulsory population exchange. The Greek population in Turkey focused 
in Istanbul and Turkish/Muslim population in Greece was settled in Western 
Thrace (See Figure 1, the map of Western Thrace, Greece). There was very 
small detail in this population exchange in terms of location of minorities. 
While Turkey’s border region with Greece did not have Greek minority, 
Greece’s border areas with Turkey, along the Evros region, had a significant 
Muslim/Turkish population, mainly based in villages and part of them in 
Alexandroupolis. By the time passing, Greek policies aiming to change the 
demography in the region intensified. In 1974 when Turkey intervened in 
Cyprus, application of Military Surveillance Zone (MSZ) was extended to 
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Evros region, in a  way to cover the areas bordering with Turkey.13 The 
extension of MSZ to Evros, was formation of a buffer zone between Greece 
and Turkey.  
 
Figure 1: The map of Western Thrace, Greece. Source: http://www.maps-of-
greece.com/thrace-map.htm (access: 18/01/2013). 
 
 
 Meanwhile, another issue involving minorities, disrupted homogenous 
nation state project both for Greece and Bulgaria. Although they had faced 
controlled expulsion, Southern part of Bulgaria and regions bordering 
Greece, were predominantly settled with the Turkish minority. After the 
creation of Greece and Bulgaria, families remaining in the opposite sides of 
the border were split. Many Turks had to leave their relatives on the other 
part of the border. For instance Turkish people from Xanthi, Komotini and 
Iasmos who had their relatives in mountainous Bulgarian villages or cities 
like Smolyan, Zlatograd and Kardzhali suffered the most from the creation of 
Greek-Bulgarian border. They continued to see each other and kinship ties 
                                                 
13 Lois Labrianidis, p. 82.  
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were somehow kept until the Second World War. The establishment of bi-
polar system, and having Greece and Bulgaria allied with opposite powers, 
created a strained situation on the Greek-Bulgarian frontier. Restricting 
mobility of people, resulted with the disruption of family ties. Thus, people 
stopped seeing their relatives in the other side of the border and eventually 
became foreigners. With the adoption of two different political systems - 
liberal democracy in Greece and communism in Bulgaria -  the fate of 
Turkish minorities in both countries have changed dramatically. The only 
thing which left almost intact was the status of Turkey as the kin state of the 
Turkish minorities in Bulgaria and Greece.  
 
These facts, led to significant changes in regional developments and 
continued their influence throughout the European integration process of 
both countries. Minority issues and problems not solved in the past continue 
to dominate cross-border cooperation between Bulgaria, Greece and 
Turkey. Nevertheless, it is necessary to admit that, involvement of European 
Union in the process, helped the gradual increase of cross-border initiatives 
and reduced tensions through mutual interactions.       
 
 
4.3. THE INCITEMENTS AND PROBLEMS OF CROSS-BORDER 
COOPERATION IN BULGARIAN-GREEK-TURKISH TRIANGLE 
 
 Compared to Greece and Turkey, realization of cross-border 
cooperation in Bulgaria was relatively different. Communist style state 
planning had its effects both in economy and administrative issues because 
heavily centralized state system managed economic ties and trade in the 
same way. Moreover, since two of the most important neighbors Greece and 
Turkey were defined as enemies cooperating with the Western World, closer 
cooperation in any aspect was not well regarded. Therefore, there was no 
cross-border cooperation experience with Greece and Turkey.  
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 In the meantime, the way that regional policy was planned by the 
communist party, served mainly the interests of state centralization rather 
than the distribution of power. During the communism, less developed 
border regions were supported in a way to change the demography in favor 
of Bulgarians with the motive to prevent irredentist activities. However, 
massive emigration of Turks from Bulgarian border regions created huge 
disparities between the regions in the center and periphery. For a while this 
problem was solved by encouraging the migration of Bulgarians from the 
central regions. Nevertheless, it failed once again after the end of the 
communism in Bulgaria, when 360,000 Turks were forced to emigrate to 
Turkey. Eventually, between 1990 and 1994 Bulgarian GDP declined with 
30% and 25% respectively.14 Due to regional differences, this decrease was 
felt more in the border areas where emigration continued. Agriculture and 
tobacco production were the main economic activities in the Southern border 
regions. However, economic crisis hit also agricultural production and many 
people decided to leave border regions in search of a better life somewhere 
else in Bulgaria or abroad.  
 
  After the confirmation of Bulgaria’s EU candidacy, cross-border 
cooperation became main priority for Bulgarian authorities in order to 
prevent depopulation in border regions. A new administrative reform took 
place in 1999, which facilitated the process of cross-border cooperation by 
sharing certain aspects of central power with regional authorities.15 Nine 
large provinces (oblast) in Bulgaria were divided into 28, hoping to ease their 
administration. However, this constituted only an internal reform process in 
Bulgaria and cross-border cooperation had also its second part which had to 
deal with the bordering state. It is necessary to mention that most of the 
reforms in Bulgaria in 1990s were done with economic incentives and the 
prospect for European integration.  
                                                 
14 Vassilis Monastiriotis, The Emergence of Regional Policy in Bulgaria and the Role of the EU, in: 
Bulgaria and Europe: Shifting Identities, (Ed.) Stefanos Katsikas, London, Anthem Press, 2010, p. 
175.    
15 Ibid., p. 180.  
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 The issue of cross-border cooperation has totally different aspect in 
Greece. Despite being the first EU member state in the region, Greek cross-
border cooperation policy does not have long traditions. This is due to many 
facts that are related with the bilateral relations between Greece and 
neighboring countries. As it was previously explained in detail, all land 
borders of Greece were part of MSZ, which restricted every activity within 
the 15-45 km wide strip close to the border.16 This action was justified as a 
security measure since all northern neighbors of Greece were communist 
countries. Moreover, after the conflict in Cyprus in 1974, Northeastern part 
of the Greek border was also declared as MSZ. These restrictive measures 
were applied until the second half of 1990s. Immediately after the fall of 
communism, talks for bilateral cooperation were launched between Greece 
and her neighbors. However, the process was not smooth since 
decentralization in Greece did not take place until 2010. Kallikratis plan 
which came into force as of 1 January 2011, created 9 decentralized 
administrations and 13 regions in Greece. The change brought significant 
hope for the development of cross-border cooperation between Greece and 
her neighbors.  
 
 When it comes to Turkey, it is clear that Turkey’s cross-border 
cooperation experience is not also a very rich one. Turkey signed European 
Charter of Local Self-Government in 1988 and accepted decentralization of 
power. After becoming member of Customs Union in 1996, Turkey was 
confirmed also as EU candidate in 1999. With this confirmation Turkey 
became eligible for European funding within the framework of “Pre-
Accession Financial Assistance”.17 Meanwhile, Bulgaria’s EU membership 
increased European borders of Turkey. Further discussion of cross-border 
cooperation and its progress, showed different results while creating new 
discussions about bilateral relations between Turkey and her neighbors. The 
                                                 
16 Lois Labrianidis, p. 83.  
17 Füsun Özerdem, Turkey’s EU Cross-Border Cooperation Experiences: From Western Borders to 
Eastern Borders, European Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2011), p. 81.  
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contrast in objectives and priorities of all three countries created different 
perspectives for cross-border cooperation which will be analyzed below.  
 
 
4.3.1. Cross-Border Cooperation Between Bulgaria and Turkey  
 
 The border line between Bulgaria and Turkey is 288 km long, and 
comprises three border crossing points, namely Svilengrad-Kapıkule, Malko-
Tarnovo-Dereköy and Lesovo-Hamzabeyli (opened in 2005). During the 
Cold War period this border area witnessed mostly the expulsion of Turks 
from Bulgaria, an issue which dominated for a long time bilateral relations 
between Bulgaria and Turkey. However, after the end of the Cold War, both 
countries spent massive effort to improve bilateral relations despite some 
problems with the rights of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria.  
 
 For Turkey, Svilengrad-Kapıkule border crossing point bears the 
symbolic meaning of being the gate to Europe. Big part of the Turkish 
exports to Europe are transported through this border crossing point. 
Therefore, Turkey pays special attention not only to improve its bilateral ties 
with Bulgaria, but also to enhance the level of regional development by 
increasing cross-border cooperation with Bulgaria.  
 
 The Bulgarian side of the border with Turkey is one of the least 
populated areas of Bulgaria.18 Population density is low and agriculture is 
the main income source for most people. Two cities, Haskovo and Burgas 
have relatively developed industry and offer more opportunities for 
employment. In the Turkish side Edirne and Kırklareli are the two cities that 
border with Bulgaria. Agricultural activities and industry are main sources of 
income for the residents of both cities.  
 
                                                 
18 Petar Stoyanov, “Bulgarian Regions at EU External Border: The Case Study of Bulgaria-Turkey 
Border Area”, Geographica Timisiensis, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2010), p. 200. 
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 During 1990s, Bulgarian-Turkish cross-border cooperation process 
continued to develop as bilateral initiative. After 2003 cross-border activities 
between Bulgaria and Turkey began to attract financial support from the EU. 
The 2004-2006 cross-border cooperation program between Bulgaria and 
Turkey constituted a small step to encourage cooperation by supporting the 
building of new infrastructure. A new IPA Cross-Border Cooperation 
Programme has been approved for the period 2007-2013, which aims at the 
development of border regions (see figure 2, for the eligible geographic 
area).  
 
 
Figure 2: Bulgaria-Turkey IPA Cross-Border Programme, map of eligible areas. Source: 
http://www.ipacbc-bgtr.eu/en/page.php?c=35    
  
 The objectives of the 2007-2013 Cross-Border Cooperation 
Programme between Bulgaria and Turkey were set as follows: 
 
- Developing economic, social and environmental activities in 
border regions through cross-border cooperation. 
 200
- To deal with common challenges such as environment, public 
health and prevention of organized crime. 
- Promote legal and administrative cooperation between both 
countries and to secure borders.  
- Encouraging local “people to people” type actions.19 
 
With these objectives, cross-border cooperation programme covers 
the districts of Haskovo, Yambol and Burgas in Bulgaria and Turkish 
provinces Edirne and Kırklareli. Total population of the area is 1,561,984 
people, out of which 830,917 reside in Bulgarian side and 731,067 people  in 
the Turkish part. This project has been initiated to enhance cross-border 
cooperation between Bulgaria and Turkey, and to increase the intercultural 
interaction between people in both sides of the border. Total budget of the 
Programme for the period of 2007-2013 is approximately 32 million Euros. 
27 millions are provided by the EU contribution, while both countries agreed 
to finance the cooperation with 4.8 millions Euros.20 There are three calls 
issued so far under the framework of Bulgarian-Turkish cross-border 
cooperation. All the three calls are directed on activities that aim 
‘improvement the quality of life’ and ‘sustainable social and economic 
development’ in border regions.   
 
The current situation of the Bulgaria-Turkish cross-border cooperation 
is still under the process of development. Considering that Bulgarian border 
for long remained closed for any kind of cooperation during the communist 
rule, these achievements are really impressive. The perspective of 
European integration and economic incentives of both countries, boosted 
gradually cooperation between Bulgaria and Turkey, which opens the room 
for more positive expectations for the next period of the cross-border 
cooperation.  
                                                 
19 Bulgaria-Turkey IPA Cross-Border Programme (2007-2013). Source: http://www.ipacbc-
bgtr.eu/upload/docs/2012-10/IPA_CBC_BG_TR_Programme.pdf  (access: 20/02/2013).  
20 http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=45456&l=2 (access: 20/02/2013) 
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4.3.2. Cross-Border Cooperation Between Greece and Turkey  
 
 Cross-border cooperation (CBC) between Turkey and Greece shows 
very complicated progress. In spite of her long experience in EU affairs, 
Greece historically lacked the opportunity to develop cross-border 
cooperation with neighboring states. There are several reasons behind this 
fact. First, during the Cold War period, both countries became close US 
allies and this resulted with the NATO membership in 1952. Bilateral 
cooperation between Greece and Turkey continued mostly on ad hoc basis 
and most of the time interrupted with the problems in bilateral relations. 
Turkish/Muslim minority in Western Thrace and the Greek minority in 
Istanbul were used as diplomatic tool by both states to enhance their 
influence on each other.  
 
 There were no problems in land borders, however, defining the sea 
borders in the Aegean Sea, and additional issues such as continental shelf, 
territorial waters and the militarization of Aegean Islands, created tensions 
between Greece and Turkey. It would be beyond the limits of this work to 
underline problems in bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey, 
therefore, they will be shortly evaluated only in terms of their relevance and 
impact on the cross-border cooperation.   
 
 The main issue which dominates the discussion on the Aegean sea is 
the Greece’s claim to increase her territorial waters up to twelve miles. 
According to Lausanne Treaty, territorial waters of both states were limited 
at three miles. In 1936, when Greece extended her territorial waters to six 
miles, Turkey accepted the status-quo by doing the same in 1964.21 
Nevertheless, when Greece decided to expand her territorial waters 
according to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea which entered into 
force in 1994, Turkey objected the action. Moreover, Ankara warned Athens 
                                                 
21 Serdar Ş. Güner, “Aegean Territorial Waters Conflict: An Evolutionary Narrative”, Conflict 
Management and Peace Science, Vol. 21 (2004), p. 298.   
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that such an action will be accepted as casus belli.22 In fact Greece’s action 
was rejected on the grounds that it was significantly impairing the navigation 
of Turkish ships in the Aegean Sea. So far there is no solution found to the 
problem. Along with the arguments on the continental shelf and Flight 
Information Region, there are many issues to be solved in the Aegean sea.  
 
 The crisis between the two countries which erupted in December 
1995 over the disputed Kardak/Imia Rocks, showed how serious is the 
issue, since it had a great danger to turn into war.23 After the escalation of 
the crisis, both sides drew back their forces from the area, and several rocky 
islands in the region remained with disputed sovereignty.  
 
 In 1999, following the earthquake in Turkey, both states embarked on 
the process of rapprochement. The same year at the Helsinki Summit,  
Turkey’s status was confirmed as EU candidate, and this gave additional 
impetus for the development of bilateral relations via CBC. 
 
 Nevertheless, this process created its own challenges as well. The 
first Greek-Turkish CBC programme has been created under the Interreg 
III/A in 2004, covering the 2004-2006 period. Its main target was to reduce 
regional disparities and to increase economic and social cooperation in 
order to facilitate the European integration process.24 In addition to this, 
increasing the life standards of people and building new infrastructure were 
other priorities set to the cooperation. However, during this time, several 
problems occurred and the programme could not be implemented properly.25 
The lack of coordination and expertise on both sides led to the failure of the 
project. Following this negative experience there was no submission of 
                                                 
22 Ibid.  
23 See more about the topic: Jon M. Van Dyke, “An Analysis of the Aegean Disputes Under 
International Law”, Ocean Development & International Law, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2005), 63-117.   
24 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_projet/document/TR%200405.05%20CBC%20with%20Gree 
ce.pdf (access: 20/02/2013).  
25 Füsun Özerdem, p. 86.  
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another IPA CBC project for the period 2007-2013 with the joint initiative of 
Greece and Turkey.  
 
 Meanwhile, during this period, problems related to the land borders 
between Greece and Turkey began to be discussed more often due to illegal 
migrants crossing the Turkish border and asking asylum in Greece. Most of 
the illegal migrants crossed the border by passing through a thin line on the 
Meriç/Evros river.  Greek authorities blamed thr Turkish side for not 
controlling the border.   
 
 
Figure 3: The map of the area covered under the Greek-Turkish Cross-Border Cooperation 
Programme INTERREG III/A.  
Source: http://archive.interacteu.net/604900/604902/603765/605062 (access: 20/02/2013).   
 
 Greece as Schengen exclave became the target of illegal immigrants 
since it was the easiest way to reach Europe. Aside from the land border, 
                                                 
 This river passes through Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, and therefore, has three different names. 
Bulgarians call it Maritsa, Greeks call it Evros, and Turks call it Meriç. 
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close distance between Greek islands and the Turkish coast, made it easy 
the use of sea for migration to Greece. Therefore, migration continued both 
through the land borders and the sea. However, it seems that the Greek 
allegations towards Turkish authorities regarding the border control are not 
totally justifiable. According to the reports of the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex), 
in August 2012, the number of migrants who attempted to cross the Greek-
Turkish land border dropped from 2000 a week to almost 200 after an 
increase of the surveillance and patrolling activities of Greek authorities.26   
 
 In order to stop illegal migration, Greek authorities expressed their 
intention to build a wall on the border with Turkey.27 The Turkish side 
reacted negatively to this decision, due to potential consequences of a fence 
between Greece and Turkey.28 The criticisms were usually focused on the 
psychology of the presence of such a wall, which might increase the division 
between Greek and Turkish people. However, despite these negative 
stance, in December 2012, Greek authorities declared that the fence on 
Evros has been completed.29 Four meters high fence was built on the 10,5 
km long shore, where due to its geographical features it was more easy to 
cross the border.   
 
 There are very different issues that affect CBC between Greece and 
Turkey. Priorities of both states are reflecting also the development of 
cooperation. It is obvious that the progress in the process of CBC is still 
depending on the initiatives of the politicians. Further rapprochement 
between both sides would boost cooperation in different fields. 
                                                 
26 http://www.frontex.europa.eu/news/situational-update-migratory-situation-at-the-greek-turkish-
border-HATxN9 (access: 21/02/2013).  
27 Greece to Build Border Fence to Deter Illegal Immigrants: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/07/world/europe/greece-to-build-fence-on-turkish-border-to-curb-
illegal-immigrants.html?_r=0 (access: 21/02/2013).  
28 Erdal Şafak, Meriçe Duvar, Sabah Gazetesi, January 2, 2011.   
29 Greece completes anti-migrant fence at Turkish border: 
http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_17/12/2012_474782 (access: 21/02/2013) 
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Nevertheless, the role of the European Union should be relatively increased 
in order to avoid divisions at national level.   
 
 
4.3.3. Cross-Border Cooperation Between Bulgaria and Greece 
 
Soon after the end of communism in Bulgaria, the rights and the 
names of the Turkish minority were restored. The prospect of European 
integration and NATO membership aspirations in Bulgaria changed many 
things. Democratic state institutions were recreated in order to boost 
cooperation with western countries and particularly with neighboring states. 
Regarding this aspect, Greece was the most important country for Bulgaria to 
improve bilateral relationships with. Cross-border cooperation along the 
Bulgarian-Greek border, which remained closed for half a century during the 
Cold War, was subsequently launched. For Greece, the “threat from the 
northern Slavic neighbor” was a central issue of her national security policy30 
and remained as such until the mid-1990s. 
 
 The process of cooperation did not develop very fast due to 
contradictions which have existed for a long time between both countries. 
Especially having a minority group dominantly living in the border area which 
is not kin to either state created additional problems. Opening border 
crossing points was one the first issues discussed. Nevertheless, a solution 
was found through the creation of Euroregions in order to foster cross-border 
cooperation and the development of economic ties. Euroregion Evros-Meric-
Maritsa, Euroregion Delta-Rodopi, Euroregion Mesta-Nestos and Euroregion 
Strymon-Strouma were among the Euroregions created during the second 
half of 1990s and after 2000.  
 
                                                 
30 Ioannis D. Stefanidis, p. 28.  
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 With the opening of new border crossing points, people were able to 
travel easily and meet with members of the other nation across the border. 
However, due to a potential massive migration of people, a restriction was 
enacted in the form of a visa requested for Bulgarians to travel to Greece, 
which reduced cultural interaction. In 2001 when Bulgarian citizens began to 
travel visa-free to European countries, this showed also its effects in 
Bulgarian-Greek border crossings. Greeks were, for the most part, coming to 
Bulgaria for sightseeing and shopping, which was initially the case with 
Bulgarians traveling to Greece. However, due to the economic crisis in 
Bulgaria, cross border labor movement from Bulgaria to Greece soon began. 
The existence of such working communities across the border forced both 
states to cooperate in several other areas, such as social security and cross-
border law enforcement, etc.  
 
 In a short period of time, infrastructure was renewed and new border 
crossing points were opened at the Bulgarian-Greek border region. The 
figure 4 represents major border crossing points between border cities.  
 
After Bulgaria became full EU member in 2007, a new dimension of 
cross-border cooperation between both countries came to the fore. The 
cross-border European Territorial Cooperation Programme “Greece-Bulgaria 
2007-2013” was approved by the European Commission on 28/03/2008 by 
Decision C(2008)1129/28-03-2008.  The eligible area of the Programme 
consists of 7 Greek Regional Units(Evros, Kavala, Xanthi, Rodopi, Drama, 
Serres and Thessaloniki) and 4 Bulgarian Districts(Blagoevgrad, Smolyan, 
Kardzhali and Haskovo).   
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Figure 4: Sandanski(BG)31-Seres(GR), Gotse Delchev(BG)-Drama(GR), Svilengrad(BG)-
Orestiada(GR), Zlatograd(BG)-Xanthi(GR) and Ivailovgrad(BG)-Kiprino(GR) Bulgarian-Greek 
Border Region. Source: European Territorial Cooperation Programme Greece-Bulgaria 
2007-2013(Euroreg, project proposal 2007-2013).  
 
Briefly, the aims of the programme are indicated as: increasing the 
living standards of people in the region and enhancing the competitiveness of 
the area through the construction of new infrastructure. In geographical 
terms, a large part of the region is situated in mountainous territory; as such, 
the building of new infrastructure and the repair/reconstruction of existing 
infrastructure was viewed as being highly important, as this would increase 
the accessibility of the region and help attract foreign and domestic 
investment. However, such construction projects involving even the issue of 
infrastructure development seem to have become a victim of ethnic problems 
                                                 
31International code of the country; BG for Bulgaria and GR for Greece. 
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as it will be shown below with the case of CBC between Kardzhali and 
Komotini. Some parts of the CBC programme could not be realized on time 
or are lacking in progress. It should be noted here that this may be due to the 
domination of such issues by main-stream nationalists.  
 
 
4.3.3.1 Kardzhali-Komotini: Unique Example in the EU of Cross-Border  
Non-Cooperation 
 
 Discussing of cross-border cooperation between Bulgaria and Greece 
should not be conducted without mentioning the ties between Kardzhali and 
Komotini. Kardzhali is a city in the southern part of Bulgaria next to the 
border with Greece, predominantly settled by ethnic Turks. According to the 
last census made in 2011, 61% of its population is Turkish,32 though the 
methods used to conduct the census in question have been criticized by 
some. For example some people living in rural areas in Kardzhali were not 
counted as part of this census, despite the fact that they were living 
permanently in Bulgaria.33  
 
Another important fact about Kardzhali relates to the ethnic origin of 
the mayor and the political party of which he is a member. Hasan Azis was 
initially elected as mayor during the local elections in 2003, his party being 
the Movement for Rights and Freedom, known as the political party of the 
Turkish ethnic minority. As of the time of this writing, Mr. Azis remains still as 
mayor of Kardzhali, having been reelected two consecutive times.  
 
 On the Greek side, across the border from Komotini, the 
Turkish/Muslim minority is not as active in local or national political life. The 
Turkish/Muslim minority can be argued as being oppressed in some ways by 
                                                 
32 http://www.nsi.bg/ORPDOCS/Census2011_4.pop_by_ethnos.xls (Access: 19 October 2012). 
33 During an interview conducted in April 2011, people from villages near Kirkovo said that nobody 
came to visit them in during the official period of the census. 
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local institutions. For example, such institutions have imposed strict rules on 
such issues as property transfers and buying new property (it is almost 
impossible for a Turk to buy property from a Greek citizen, as local 
administration offices would not agree to process the property transfer 
application). With this being said, it is necessary to indicate that Greece’s EU 
membership has brought some liberalization to Western Thrace, but despite 
30 years having passed after Greece received full EU membership, minority 
living standards are relatively lower than those of the Greek majority. 
Discriminative measures taken by Athens restrict political participation of the 
minority, which was confirmed with the latest decentralization reforms 
accepted to foster regional development in lines with European integration.34 
 
Perhaps it may be found as awkward to compare the situation of the 
Turkish minority in Bulgaria with the Turkish/Muslim minority of Western 
Thrace due to the differences in percentage of the minority with the majority 
population. The Turkish minority in Bulgaria forms 11% of the total Bulgarian 
population, while Turkish/Muslim minority in Western Thrace constitutes only 
1.5% of the total Greek population. However, it cannot be denied that the 
political influence of the minority in Western Thrace is much larger than its 
number. Because of this political sensitivity, all the steps of its inclusion are 
blocked. Their interaction with the outside world is also seen suspiciously by 
the central government in Athens which blocks the creation of cross-border 
cooperation itself. One example of such governmental interference would be 
that of the signing of a protocol between the mayors of Kardzhali and 
Komotini in order to form twin city cooperation in 2010. Hasan Azis, as mayor 
of Kardzhali and Dimitris Kotsakis, mayor of Komotini, signed the protocol on 
23 September 2010.35 It took twenty one years after the fall of communism to 
initiate such a process for both cities. It would seem that such a delay was 
                                                 
34 Dia. Anagnostou (a), p. 111-112. 
35 Gundem Gazetesi, 1 Ekim 2010, No. 703, Year 14.  
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due to reluctance on the Greek side, as the Greeks are extremely sensitive to 
the unification of the Turkish minorities from both sides of the border.  
 
 Another example of Greek reluctance to improve cross-border 
cooperation in the area would be the opening of the Makaza-Komotini border 
crossing point. According to the cross-border European Territorial 
Cooperation Programme “Greece-Bulgaria 2007-2013”, rehabilitation of the 
road between Kardzhali and Komotini was envisaged together with the 
opening of a new border crossing point between Makaza and Komotini. The 
project was supposed to be finished by July 2009.  The Bulgarian section of 
the road was completed by the summer of 200936, while the Greek section 
has not been completed, as of the time of this writing. Among the main 
reasons for this delay is the reluctance on the part of Athens to launch a 
connection from both sides of the Rhodope Mountains, which would allow 
‘Turkish’ minority members to easily interact. Moreover, there have been 
many discussions on the Greek side on processes of property confiscation 
and the geographical position of the road. A plan suggested by government 
officials would have in effect confiscated large swaths of property which 
belong to ethnic Turks - mainly land used for agricultural purposes.37 As a 
result of opposition shown by minority members who suffered from previous 
confiscations, and complaining that they could not get compensation for 
earlier instances of such confiscation, there were some modifications made 
on the project covering the Greek area only. However, it would seem as 
though the Greek government will attempt to postpone the opening of the 
border to the latest possible date which might be the end of 2013.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=143434 (Access: 19 October 2012).  
37 Haber Gazetesi, 17 Aralik 2010, No. 714, Year 14.  
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Conclusion 
 
 In a changing world borders continue to change their meaning as 
well. The ‘other’ across the border began to be perceived as opportunity for 
economic development and trade through the European integration process. 
Perhaps this sharp shift would not be realized without the European project. 
However, despite this evolution, still cross-border cooperation is perceived 
as a process that should be initiated by politicians. Especially in countries 
where bilateral relations are problematic, initial support of state institutions 
might give a better opportunity for the development of cooperation.    
 
 Despite its great potential, the Greek-Turkish CBC is not developed 
due to the presence of other issues. The economic crisis currently Greece 
faces, might create additional possibilities to improve economic and social 
relations between both countries. Moreover, it is necessary to have 
guidance of Europe in such process in order to avoid further failures. The 
history has been reinterpreted according to the current conditions, and used 
as a tool by nationalists to create walls between the two nations. Therefore, 
political rapprochement between the two countries should be supported with 
social dialogue in order to make such policies long lasting. This perspective 
needs to focus more on coexistence and sharing rather than differences and 
hostilities.   
 
Decentralization of state power creates the basis for a solid 
cooperation process. Nevertheless, sharing certain type of power with 
regional authorities becomes conditional to mutual trust. In cases where 
minorities are living in the border areas, decentralization of power is not 
desired due to potential danger for irredentism. Mainly these problems exist 
in countries which have problem with the democracy as well. Obviously it 
can be very difficult to build cross-border cooperation in an environment 
which is highly sensitive in terms of security and threat perception. 
Therefore, the rights of minorities are limited and it is very difficult to take 
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steps to further the process of democratization. The existence of Turkish 
minorities in both parts of the Bulgarian-Greek border will continue to be a 
challenge for both countries in the future. Despite some ethnic tensions, 
cross-border cooperation continues to develop thanks to the 
Europeanization process, which might bring with it additional possibilities for 
more liberal minority rights in the region. 
 
 Currently, the organization of intercultural activities as part of cross-
border cooperation is the most important step to take after the opening of 
the new border crossing point between Kardzhali and Komotini. This is 
important not only to connect the Turks/Muslims with one another on both 
sides of the border, but also to increase their interaction with Bulgarians and 
Greeks, and eventually to create a situation of co-existence based on 
tolerance. Nevertheless, in order to achieve such a reality it is of immense 
importance to avoid such extreme forms of nationalism which poisoned all 
the Balkan peninsula in the past 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
BULGARIA AND GREECE: COMPARING THE DIFFERENT 
PERSPECTIVES OF INTEGRATION 
 
 
5.1. COMMUNISM VERSUS LIBERAL DEMOCRACY REGARDING THE 
INTEGRATION OF MINORITIES IN BULGARIA AND GREECE 
 
 Studying minority rights in Bulgaria  and Greece would not be 
complete without considering different approaches of the states and the 
influence of political systems. The situation of the Turkish/Muslim minorities 
in Bulgaria and Greece gives a perfect opportunity to evaluate the impact of 
policies followed during the Cold War period. The reason to make such an 
analysis stems from the fact that the integration of minority groups in both 
countries differs due to the diverse approaches to the issue of minority 
integration. While Bulgarian integration policy towards Turkish minority was 
dominated by the communist philosophy, the Greek policy was shaped 
through the liberal democratic system. The paths to modernity that have 
been chosen after the Second World War, determined to a great extent the 
way how minorities will be integrated into the society and continued their 
existence until today. However, as it has happened with the nationalism in 
the nineteenth century, communism and liberal democracy had been 
accepted by Bulgaria and Greece after their initial reinterpretation according 
to the national realities of both countries.1 In other words, these ideologies 
were used at the certain limit that they served for national goals. Perhaps it 
could go beyond the limits of this study to make a comprehensive 
comparison between communism and liberal democracy. Therefore, both 
                                                 
1 Maya Kosseva, Antonina Zhelyazkova and Marko Hajdinjak, European Dilemmas and Identity 
Construction on the Bulgarian Path to Modernity, in: Europe, Nations and Modernity, (Ed.) Atsuko 
Ichijo, Basingstoke, Palgrave and Macmillan , 2011, p. 87.  
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systems will be examined only based on certain criteria such as education, 
religion, social and political participation and integration of minorities in 
Bulgaria and Greece.  
 
 Two decades after the collapse of communism and current debates 
with the European integration and the ongoing problems with minorities 
make necessary to develop new methods and policies for the integration of 
minorities. The case with the Turkish/Muslim minorities in Bulgaria and 
Greece provides us with the unique opportunity to see the results of 
previous policies and to avoid mistakes made in the past. Before the 
independence of Greece and Bulgaria, Turks/Muslims constituted a single 
community, divided according to the Ottoman millet system. After initial 
independence of Greece and Bulgaria, they were separated with the 
borders, even relatives who remained on the opposite side of the border 
became foreigners while the time passed.2  
 
 Following the fall of communism, democracy in Bulgaria began to be 
discussed more, and treatment of minorities became a key political issue. 
Due to the systematic assimilation policies of the communist rule, the 
integration of Turkish minority did not attract the necessary attention of 
scholars in Bulgaria, neither there was such an evaluation of previous 
policies and their impact on the Turkish minority. All in all, previous studies 
dealing with the Turkish minorities in Bulgaria and Greece, focused mainly 
on the issue of rights and violations, and there was not much done for the 
comparative evaluation of minority integration. 
 
                                                 
2 Before the beginning of Cold War, the border between Bulgaria and Greece was not totally closed. 
According to the Neuilly Treaty, Bulgaria had the right to make trade through Aegean Sea. This 
situation affected also the Turkish minority in the area and its mobilization. They continued to visit 
their relatives in the opposite side of the border and Turks from the mountainous villages in the 
Bulgarian part were often going to buy food from Komotini, the closest Greek city. This situation 
continued until the end of the World War II. After the war, the control on the borders was 
strengthened, since it marked also the ideological division between the two countries.  
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 Post-Cold War period revealed different facts regarding the issue of 
minorities and their integration in Bulgaria and in Greece. The level of 
integration of Turkish/Muslim minorities in both countries showed significant 
differences which are having their effect up until now in various aspects of 
life such as social participation, political representation, education and 
religious organization and interaction between minority and majority. These 
aspects are not only relevant to the issue of rights granted to the minority, 
but also with the approaches of different political systems such as liberalism 
and communism, which reflected the concept of rights, equality and 
emancipation. 
 
 The establishment of the communist regime in Bulgaria was not 
unconditional. Communism has been adopted in a way to help the evolution 
of the Bulgarian national identity and modernization, through its philosophy 
of creating classless society. This methodology of ‘protecting the national’ 
and ‘adopting the foreign’3, created a ‘Bulgarian style communism’, which in 
the end turned into hard core nationalism. However, this policy made it 
necessary to recruit additional methods for the installation of a new system 
which was planned to be the tool of nationalism. Thus historical and national 
narratives were recreated to foster the unity of the nation and to create 
classless society to accomplish the ultimate goal of communism. The control 
of the political culture was accomplished by taking the nation’s history under 
control.4 In1978, BCP decided to celebrate 3rd March as national holiday in 
Bulgaria and to commemorate the Treaty of San Stefano. The creation of 
the unity of the nation has been seen as an opportunity to express the desire 
for a revision in favour of the recreation of Greater Bulgaria, which would 
have access to warm seas, and embrace Macedonia and Thrace.5 
 
                                                 
3 Maya Kosseva, Antonina Zhelyazkova and Marko Hajdinjak, p. 90.  
4 Walter A. Kemp, Nationalism and Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 
Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999, p. 95.  
5 Ibid., p. 181.  
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 The policy directed toward the Turkish minority had some inconsistent 
steps due to the conditions of that time. The period after the Second World 
War was very sensitive since the political situation in Bulgaria was not very 
stable, and posed certain risks for the creation of communist rule. More 
liberal policies toward the Turkish minority were adopted with the motive of 
having support of all circles of the society. Extreme policies limiting the rights 
of the Turkish minority were postponed to a later stage until the 
establishment of communist institutions was achieved. Therefore Turkish 
minority was allowed to use its own language and to form a culture along the 
lines of communist ideology. This ad hoc tolerance had two different goals; 
first, to have the support of the Turkish minority in the process of building the 
communism in Bulgaria, and second, to use the immigration waves for 
exporting the communist ideology to Turkey.6   
 
 The communist tolerant attitude continued only until 1958, when the 
Communist Party decided to embark on a new policy to create a monoethnic 
Bulgarian nation. These nationalist policies were conducted by justifying the 
construction of a single ‘classless’ nation in order to reach the level of true 
communism in Bulgaria. However, development of education in Turkish and 
separate Turkish culture has been supported at the extent that its 
development aims to support the building of communism in Bulgaria. Thus, it 
turned into a process of spreading communist ideals among the Turkish 
minority through massive educational campaigns in Turkish language, which 
were heavily loaded with communist propaganda. Gradual increase of 
education in Bulgarian to the detriment of the education in Turkish, has been 
supported with the objective of engaging the Turkish minority into the 
national process of building communism. The inclusion allowed Turks to 
participate equally in most aspects of social and political life in Bulgaria and 
                                                 
6 Maya Kosseva, Antonina Zhelyazkova and Marko Hajdinjak, p. 93.  
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to develop their own culture to some extent, albeit without emphasizing  their 
ethnic identity.7  
 
 The course of minority rights suddenly changed its nature, and the  
previously signed treaties with Ottoman Empire and Turkey were ignored by 
turning the issue of Turkish minority solely as an internal problem of 
Bulgaria. Meanwhile, Bulgarian authorities classified this problem as a lack 
of modernity among the members of Turkish minority. Marxist theory 
perforated minority education in Turkish8 aiming to increase the cultural level 
of Turkish minority and to help for its unification with the Bulgarian nation, 
which eventually, could help for the construction of proper communism in 
Bulgaria. Consequently, the communist rule created policies which had their 
effects on the Turkish minority and its organization in Bulgaria that continue 
to show their effect even today as it will be explained in this work.     
 
 Being identified as a Western style democratic state Greece created 
different pattern of exceptions9 with the treatment of the Turkish/Muslim 
minority in Western Thrace. The period after World War II created unique 
conditions in Greece. Being part of the Marshall Plan resulted with keeping 
the distance with Soviets. However, internal struggle between rightists and 
leftist who were largely supporting communism in Greece continued for 
decades. The coup d'état in 1967 constituted an interval for Greek 
democracy which was re-established in 1974, after the collapse of military 
regime, that could not sustain itself as a result of the Turkish intervention in 
Cyprus.  
 
 Nevertheless, regarding the situation of Muslim/Turkish minority in 
Western Thrace, chain of events that occurred under the auspices of Greek 
                                                 
7 Reshenie na Politburo na TsK na BKP (Decision of the Politburo of Central Committee of Bulgarian 
Communist Party), TsDA, F. 1B, op. 67, a. e. 3090, l. 7-31, 1984.  
8 Maya Kosseva, Antonina Zhelyazkova and Marko Hajdinjak, p. 93. 
9 Will Kymlicka, Justice and Security in the Accommodation of Minority Nationalism, in: Ethnicity, 
Nationalism and Minority Rights, (Eds.) Stephen May Tariq Modood and Judith Squires, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 148.   
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democracy, culminated into systematic violation of minority rights, which 
could be interpreted as contradicting with the equality principle in liberal 
democracy. Application of the Article 19 of the GCC to deprive Turks from 
the Greek citizenship and restrictions in property ownership, constituted 
clear violation to the Article 4 of the Greek Constitution that regulated 
equality of Greek citizens. However, these discriminatory regulations found 
their justification as ‘exceptional applications’ to protect the state from the 
common enemy, the Turks. In fact application of restrictive measures 
intensified in the period following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. 
Even readmission of Greece to the Council of Europe did not bring positive 
development to the rights of minorities which were neglected on regular 
basis.10  
 
 The political climate did not permit the improvement of minority rights 
since both political parties created in the post-1974 period followed 
nationalist rhetoric. Nea Demokratia (New Democracy) was created by 
Konstantinos Karamanlis as a centre-right party in 1974. On the other side, 
the same year, Andreas Papandreu established PASOK as centre-left party. 
However, within the realities of Greece, PASOK has been characterized by 
its socialist and nationalist tendencies.11 This exceptional co-existence 
shaped also the general attitude towards the rights of minorities, as this 
limited nationalist approach gave the opportunity to PASOK to take the 
necessary steps for the modernization of Greece in the process of European 
integration.   
 
It is necessary to indicate that, in the first decade of Greek EU 
membership, this modernization  was only limited to the economic aspects 
of integration.12 Therefore, it did not generate considerable changes for the 
rights of the Muslim/Turkish minority in Thrace, neither it produced positive 
                                                 
10 Dia Anagnostou (b), p. 339.  
11 Andreas Maschonas, “European Integration and the Prospects of Modernization in Greece”, Journal 
of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1997), p. 330.   
12 Ibid., p. 337.  
  
220
regulations for their integration as equal citizens of Greece. Deepening of 
segregation in Western Thrace between Muslims and Orthodox Greeks, 
created tensions in the beginning of 1990s which sent an alert to the 
politicians in order to take necessary measures for the modernization of 
Greek political life and the revision of Greek identity.   
 
Non-separation of the church-state affairs in Greece and the 
dominant position of the Orthodox Church created troubles for the 
modernization of the country, and excluded the non-orthodox population 
from the social structure by restricting their participation. Orthodoxy became 
the center of the Greek identity, and therefore, minority groups were 
perceived as a population who lacks the basic feature of ‘Greekness’.13 This 
situation, not only resulted with the exclusion of minorities, but also delayed 
significantly the Greek modernization process. In the Bulgarian case, 
considering the large number of minorities, communists revoked the 
privileges of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church with the first Constitution in 
1947. Separation of church and state was also determined with the 
constitution, which guaranteed freedom of conscience for all Bulgarian 
citizens.14 This change eliminated segregation on religious grounds and 
prevented the intervention of the church in state affairs. Thus, the Bulgarian 
Orthodox Church was turned into a normal religious institution with no 
political functions, which created equality between Muslims and Christian 
population in Bulgaria. This regulations would work very well, if communist 
rule would not have launched a systematic oppression to all religious 
institutions in Bulgaria. This policy of religious restrictions will be examined 
further under the section ‘the importance of religion’.  
 
 By looking at these two cases it could be possible to conclude that, 
Greek Orthodox Church was taking the advantage of liberal democracy to 
                                                 
13 Vasiliki Kravva, The Construction of Otherness in Modern Greece, in: The Ethics of Anthropology: 
Debates and Dilemmas, (Ed.) Pat Caplan, London, Routledge, 2003, p. 158.   
14 Spas Raikin, p. 171.  
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strengthen its position in all aspects of Greek social and political life, while 
Bulgarian Orthodox Church lost its superiority at the expense of communist 
political system. The shift in positions did not only affect the religious 
institutions, but also determined the process of modernity and conservatism 
in both states. Eventually, secularization and modernization of Bulgarian 
national identity paved the way for the inclusion of Muslim Turks in the first 
years of communism. Incentives offered for the inclusion of Turks, helped for 
the development of Turkish culture in Bulgaria and created new educational 
opportunities for the Turkish minority.15 Again, it could become a good 
example for the inclusion of national minorities if it would not transform into a 
forcible assimilation process of minorities. Certain exceptions in both 
countries, resulted with the creation of unique examples of communism and 
liberal democracy, which were shaped with the use of certain policy tools 
directed to regulate the lives of minorities in Bulgaria and Greece. Initially, 
their effects dominated also at certain level the discourse of minority rights 
and integration during the Europeanization process, as it will be examined 
below. 
 
 
5.1.1. Education as a Tool for Integration 
 
 As it has been expressed in previous chapters, education has been 
the main tool for the promotion of Greek and Bulgarian nationalism. 
Education remained also as a priority in the period following the 
independence of both states. This time it has been used as a new strategy 
to create the ‘other’ or boost the participation of the minority in social and 
economic life. Teaching of history became a powerful mechanism for the 
creation of collective ‘self’ and ‘other’.16 Formation of national culture and its 
distinctive features were mainly transmitted through the history syllabus in 
education. Without certain reference to the treatment of minorities, wars had 
                                                 
15 Bilal Şimşir, p. 192-193.  
16 Renee Hirschon, p. 86.  
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been mostly described as heroic events that saved the nation from the yoke 
of dominant powers. Nevertheless, this method of teaching history created  
hostile feelings among the majority that perceived minority members as 
remnants of the so-called era of ‘Ottoman slavery’. Therefore, oppressive 
policies towards minorities in both countries were justified as revenge for the 
five centuries long Ottoman rule. 
 
 In this context, state control of minority education became an 
important tool for the prevention of the development of minority culture. 
Somehow, developing a distinct culture has been perceived as a threat to 
the unity of the state, and therefore, these steps were strongly discouraged. 
In Bulgaria, communists became the first ones to claim the ‘monoethnic’ 
character of the Bulgarian nation and showed their limited support for the 
development of the Turkish culture by improving the educational level of the 
Turkish minority. Paradoxically in the aftermath of the creation of communist 
rule in Bulgaria, education in Turkish language and creation of new minority 
high schools made a peak. However, this support was not unconditional, as 
creation of these institutions and distribution of material printed in Turkish 
were directed to the same goal of spreading communism among the Turks. 
The nationalization of the Turkish schools in 1946, gave the possibility to the 
communists to control the syllabus taught in Turkish as well as to shape it 
according to their plans.17 The negative side of this policy was to restrict the 
development of the minority culture and of an independent Turkish 
intelligentsia. Meanwhile, it is necessary to indicate some positive aspects of 
the communist education policy, since it managed rapidly to reduce the 
illiteracy rate among the Turkish minority and affected the formation of 
communist Turkish intelligentsia in Bulgaria, who became actively involved 
in every aspect of the social and political life.   
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 The situation of the Muslim/Turkish minority in Greece was much 
more different as Greek State focused its efforts mainly on the policy of 
controlled inclusion of the minority in Thrace. The attempts to prevent Turks 
from developing Turkish consciousness became evident when education 
with Arabic letters was encouraged by Greek authorities.18 Provisions 
regarding the education in Lausanne Treaty were forced to the maximum 
limit since this attitude delayed the creation of minority high schools in 
Western Thrace until 1952. Before this date, many Turkish students 
graduated from minority high schools with limited knowledge in Greek did 
not have the opportunity to follow their education in Greece. Even the 
creation of two minority high schools was not enough for the needs of 
minority, and therefore, most of them preferred to continue their education in 
Turkey.  
 
 However, problems in Greece were not only limited to the lack of 
capacity. Due to discrimination and restrictions targeting minority members, 
obtaining education did not present a significant value for the minority 
members in Thrace. They were simply not accepted for public employment 
and opportunities in the private sector of Western Thrace were also not 
enough, since the area became the least developed region in Greece. 
Those who graduated from high schools and universities had the chance 
either to stay in Thrace and work in agricultural production or to leave the 
region in search of a better future. Nevertheless, Turks who obtained their 
education in Turkey or abroad had been labeled as suspicious as they did 
not pass through the Greek educational system. For Greek authorities, 
education became the center of the national transformation and 
homogenization process.19 The use of common language and the 
development of common symbols constituted pattern for the promotion of 
nationalist ideology. 
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 The content of the educational material in minority schools raised also 
another concern, since it was mainly shaped according to the systems of 
both countries. Bulgarian authorities supported education and publication of 
books, newspapers and other material in Turkish as long as they served to 
the aims of communist rule. After the nationalization of minority schools, this 
heavily ideological curriculum was strictly controlled through the well-working 
administrative system of the Communist regime.20 With the time passing, the  
curriculum in Bulgarian language had been extended to the detriment of the 
curriculum in Turkish, and in the last stage resulted with the total abolition of 
the education in Turkish. Meanwhile, periodical update of the educational 
material in Turkish reduced disparities between Bulgarians and Turks, which 
created almost equal profiles in both communities. Rising the intellectual 
level automatically boosted the development in cities, towns and rural areas 
in Bulgaria. It could provide even brighter aspects for the country if BCP 
would not take the process towards forcible assimilation.  
 
 In the case of Greece educational material have always remained as 
a main issue for the education of Muslim/Turkish minority. State authorities 
allowed the creation and management of minority schools at elementary 
level where education was conducted in Turkish and Greek. However, this 
formal application was filled with tiny detail that created huge differences 
between Christians and Muslims. According to the agreements between 
Turkey and Greece, books were printed in Turkey and circulated to the 
schools in Western Thrace after the initial approval of Athens. Greek 
authorities misused this process by delaying the approval of books sent from 
Turkey, and finally it turned into a big problem in 1990, when Muslim/Turkish 
students in Western Thrace did not want to use anymore the old Turkish 
books printed in 1960s21 and demanded for new books  to be approved. This 
event proved how education became a tool to control minority and to prevent 
the development of culture and intellectual level. These thirty years of 
                                                 
20 Maya Kosseva, Antonina Zhelyazkova and Marko Hajdinjak, p. 99.  
21 The Turks of Western Thrace, Human Rights Watch, p. 28. 
  
225
difference in educational materials increased the inequality between 
Muslims and Christians in Greece, which continue to have its effects until 
today. The establishment of Thessaloniki Pedagogical Academy (EPATH),  
constituted only an ‘institutionalization’ of this policy of ‘deliberate 
backwardness’ in Greece. Inadequate profiles of its graduates could not 
meet the needs of minority members, and therefore, both the academy and 
teachers were criticized for their shortcomings. 
 
 The way how education has been perceived as the center of the 
expansion of nationalist ideal in Bulgaria and Greece, affected also the 
educational policies towards minorities. In Bulgaria, the communist regime 
adopted an educational system favoring its claims for ‘monoethnicity’, while 
Greek liberal democracy, tried to sustain an educational system that was 
based on the continuous discrimination of the minority in Western Thrace.  
 
 
5.1.1.1. The Sensitive Issue of Education in Mother Tongue  
 
 The access to education in mother tongue presents certain problems 
in Bulgaria and Greece since both minorities claim Turkish as their mother 
tongue. Therefore, preference of the mother tongue automatically defines 
the ethnic origin as well. Since the creation of both states aside from their 
distinctive religious orientation as Muslims, both minority groups followed 
education in Turkish, which was their mother tongue. Nevertheless, in the 
post-World War II period, the right to have access to education in mother 
tongue has been revised periodically in order to distance Turkish minorities 
in Bulgaria and Greece from the influence of Turkey. The access to 
education in mother tongue has been provided conditional upon the creation 
of distinctive culture, appropriate to the nationalist theories and political 
regimes of both countries.  
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 The communist regime in Bulgaria, used the education in mother 
tongue as a tool to encourage the development of Communist Turkish 
culture which would have more similarities with the Bulgarian national 
identity and culture.22 Therefore, the development of secularist Turkish 
culture in Bulgaria has been supported widely via providing massive 
publications in Turkish language in order to adapt it easily into the 
communist realities in a later stage, when assimilation became inevitable. 
This process of partial tolerance proved that Turks are capable to form their 
own culture when they are offered with the opportunity to do so.23  
 
For the Muslim/Turkish minority in Thrace, education in mother 
tongue became a paradoxical issue when Greece denied the existence of 
Turkish minority in her territory, while at the same time, state provided 
education in Turkish at private minority schools. When Western countries 
criticized Greece for restrictions in minority education, Greek authorities tried 
to justify this policy as preventing ‘Turkification’ of the Pomaks and Gypsies 
in Western Trace.24 However, this did not reduce the demands of Pomaks 
and Gypsies to attend the private schools of the minority in Thrace. To 
counterbalance this demand and its effect on the development of distinctive 
ethnic culture in Western Thrace, the Greek State increased the curriculum 
taught in Greek and imposed to teach the history subject only in Greek 
language, while teaching of religion was conducted only in Turkish.25 This 
policy clearly demonstrated that the development of religious identity was 
more encouraged without certain ethnic attribution.  
 
Consequently, both in Bulgaria and in Greece the problem with 
education in mother tongue faced also the restrictions of opportunities after 
the graduation. Because those students who obtained education in mother 
tongue were also partially trained in the language of the majority. 
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Nevertheless, their knowledge in the language of the country was limited, 
therefore, the lack of possibility to continue the education in mother tongue 
in the following stage and limited professional opportunities, decreased the 
popularity of education among minority members as a tool for integration.   
 
Another detail regarding the education which has also affected the 
progress of minority children was the possibility to attend kindergartens. For 
the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, Communist regime provided kindergartens, 
which helped for the acquisition of the Bulgarian language before attending 
elementary schools. Muslim/Turkish minority in Thrace did not have this 
opportunity: therefore, students continued to have troubles for understanding 
the content of subjects or to express themselves thoroughly in Greek. Even 
today, kindergartens in Thrace are not sufficient to answer the needs of the 
members of minority, and government officials continue to ignore their 
requests to improve the situation.26  
 
The policy to restrict the Turkish language created obstacles for the 
social participation of minorities in both countries. The lack of knowledge in 
Greek, significantly restricted the social inclusion of the Muslim/Turkish 
minority in Thrace, which was the result of deliberate policies of the Greek 
State. In Bulgaria, this culminated into the total prohibition of the use of 
Turkish in public space, and Turks were allowed to be part of the system 
only as Bulgarians. After the fall of communism, proficiency in Bulgarian, 
became an opportunity for Turks to continue the struggle for their rights and 
peaceful solution of the ethnic problem.  
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5.1.2. The Importance of Religion in Bulgaria and Greece 
 
 As it has been tackled before, religion played an important role in 
Greek and Bulgarian national identity building process. It was also the 
influence of the Ottoman millet system that regulated social life according to 
the religious division. Therefore, some features of this system were copied 
and additional elements such as language and culture were added in order 
to create more distinctive identities out of the Ottoman Christian millet. 
National churches and their leading role in the national revival process, 
showed how intertwined are the relations between the church and politics. 
However, this heavily spiritual context also arose the issue of Muslims who 
became minorities in the newly established countries.  
 
 In the first years of their independence, religious rights were mostly 
respected due to different conditions that were not controlled by Bulgaria 
and Greece. Creation of modern Turkey and the secular character of the 
Turkish nationalism, became an incentive for Greek and Bulgarian 
authorities to encourage the development of a more religious Turkish 
culture, which would lose its contacts with the contemporary Turkish 
nationalism. In their attempt to deny the existence of a Turkish minority in 
Western Thrace, Greek authorities gave more importance to the religious 
education and even conducting education with Arabic alphabet.27 
Nevertheless, this conditional freedom had already created a paradox by 
establishing a hierarchy between Orthodox Church and Islam. In this aspect 
the Greek constitution created various contradictions: the equality of Greek 
citizens was guaranteed by the constitution, and the Article 3 of the same 
document declared the Greek Orthodox Church as the prevailing religion.28 
Moreover, the act number 1672/1939, gave an exclusive monopoly to the 
Greek Orthodox Church, as building new places of worship was subject to 
                                                 
27 Konstantinos Tsitselikis, p. 148.  
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the approval of the Orthodox Bishop, who has been granted with the right to 
define the height of mosque minarets.29 This regulation turned into a main 
obstacle for building new Mosques not only in Western Thrace but over all  
Greece, an created significant disadvantages for Muslims.  
 
 Organization of religious issues in Bulgaria was relatively different 
than in Greece, except some similar steps that were subject to the issue of 
the revision of national identity. In 1930s and until the first half of 1940s, the 
Bulgarian State tried to prevent the development of a secular Turkish 
culture, which would mean cultural homogenization of Bulgarian Turks with 
Turkey. Therefore, education was sought as a tool to prevent such thing 
from happening, and this shift brought the idea to cooperate closely with 
Chief Mufti in Sofia who was also against the development of secularist 
Turkish culture in Bulgaria.30 This cooperation continued for a certain period 
and was altered by the establishment of communist regime in Bulgaria. 
Communists perceived conservatism and traditional customs as an obstacle 
for the regime, and they supported the secular Turkish culture formally, only 
because it was congruent with the atheist communist ideology. 
 
 The Law of Faiths adopted in February 1949 not only placed the 
Bulgarian Orthodox Church and Islam under strict control of the state31, but it 
also created legal equality between Orthodox Church and Islam in Bulgaria. 
The Church and Chief Mufti in Sofia were forbidden to engage in educational 
activities among the youth, and their properties were also confiscated by the 
state. The religious non-alignment of the state, brought the prospect of the 
modernization in Bulgaria, which has been perceived as a necessary step to 
embrace all ethnic and religious groups under the flourishing Bulgarian 
Communist identity. However, this distance did not prevent communists from 
cooperation with the Chief Mufti and other regional muftis during the revival 
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process, when the names of Turkish minority were forcibly changed with  
Bulgarian ones.32  
 
 The status of the religion in Bulgaria and Greece, and changes 
caused by the political culture, affected significantly the reciprocal perception 
of minority and majority. Non-separation of the church and state in Greece 
gave the Orthodox Church superior power to define Greek national 
identity.33 Following the period of Greece’s EU membership, every effort to 
modernize the state met the resistance of the church, which did not want to 
step back from its dominant position. Moreover, those politicians who were 
in favor of a secular political structure were accused of being traitors.34 
Discussions for building the mosque in Athens revealed how strong was the 
equation between ‘mosque’ and ‘Turk’ in Greece. Church members also 
opposed the project by claiming it allegedly as the symbol of the Turkish 
yoke in Greece.35 In their view, building mosques outside of Thrace was out 
of consideration, since this area was the only non-homogenous region in 
Greece. Therefore, from the Greek point of view mosques constituted 
another symbolic indicator of the ‘otherness’ of population in Western 
Thrace.  
 
 In Bulgaria religious contestation did not reach such a level like in 
Greece neither during the communist regime nor after the establishment of 
the liberal democracy. This was a first result of the communist polices, which 
reduced significantly the role of religion, and state authorities did not allow 
the church to intervene in political affairs. Post-communist constitution 
accepted in 1991 gave a symbolic role to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church 
with the phrase ‘Orthodoxy is the traditional religious denomination of the 
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Bulgarian nation’.36 Furthermore, separation between state and church, 
limited nationalist assimilation policies only with the BCP, and it prevented 
confrontation at the religious level. After the fall of communism, relations 
between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria are relatively peaceful as 
dialogue between Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Chief Mufti in Sofia is 
usually based on mutual respect, rather than competition for political power. 
In addition, in the Greek case, religious segregation has been imposed by 
the political parties that are using the concept of ‘Hellenic-Christian 
civilization’ in order to increase their votes.37 In Bulgaria, nationalism had 
been restricted only to certain features and this prevented the exploitation of 
the religion for political goals.  
 
 
5.1.3. Social Participation and Political Representation of Minority 
Members 
 
 The issue of social participation in Bulgaria and in Greece has been 
widely shaped not only on the basis of the political systems but also 
depending on the policies directed towards minority members. The 
centralized economic development plan of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 
created massive changes in Bulgaria. Collectivization of land, affected to 
great extent the Turkish minority who was living in rural areas and working in 
the sector of agricultural production. However, the Communist regime 
launched an enormous modernization policy that aimed at the integration of 
urban and rural areas in Bulgaria and to reduce economic and cultural 
disparities.38 As a result of the comprehensive industrialization and land 
confiscation, all members of the society had been included in the process 
and women got the chance to participate equally in every aspect of life. For 
the first time in Bulgaria, women obtained the right to equal employment, 
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child benefit and access to universal health care regardless of their ethnic 
origin.39 Women from less developed rural areas were encouraged to 
participate in vocational courses to gain professional skills and to contribute 
into family income, which later would give them access to pension. Children 
were also provided with equal rights to education and this reduced the 
inequality at certain degree. These policies brought modernization to 
Bulgaria and it covered every aspect of life and reduced regional 
differences.  
 
 Regional inequality in Greece became the most resistant issue after 
the treatment of minority in Western Thrace. Greek Thrace was for long 
identified as the least developed region in Greece where traditional building 
technology and old agricultural methods were still in use.40 Excessive land 
expropriation limited also agricultural activities of the Muslim/Turkish minority 
and they were systematically disadvantaged compared to Greeks. The 
situation changed after the Greece’s EU membership and when European 
funds were also forwarded to Thrace. Nevertheless, their impact was limited 
due to additional restrictions imposed by the government. The division of 
jobs defined also the economic status of the minority in Thrace. While the 
influx of Greeks into the region was generally encouraged by offering public 
employment, Turks/Muslims were only supposed to work in the sector of 
agricultural production. Given the presence of periodical land confiscations, 
it could be possible to understand how minority members were deprived 
compared to Christian Greeks. Eventually, when modernization began to be 
discussed in Greece, privileged Greeks opposed changes which could 
provide equal rights for minority members in Thrace.41      
 
 The issue of political representation also went in line with other 
minority policies in both countries, and with some major changes in Bulgaria 
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following the collapse of communism. During the Cold War period, Turks in 
Bulgaria were allowed to enter the parliament as Bulgarian citizens, 
however, there was no certain reference to the ethnic identity. In Greece, the 
issue of political participation was conditional on not using ethnic allegiances 
- in this case also Turkish. Following the EU membership of Greece, in 
1980s Muslim/Turkish minority members from Thrace began to participate in 
the elections as independent minority candidates, which fueled discussions 
about ethnic self-identification in Greece.42 Following the use of Turkish as 
ethnic denomination, in 1990, the Greek State decided to impose a 
threshold which had been designed to prevent independent minority 
candidates. Eventually, up until now members of Muslim/Turkish minority in 
Thrace, are being elected to the Parliament from the lists of Greek political 
parties, which constitutes a tool for the control of political activities of the 
minority in Thrace.  
 
 The post-communist period witnessed significant changes for the 
political representation of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. The creation of 
MRF as the party of Turkish minority marked the biggest change in terms of 
political representation in Bulgaria. Although Article 11 (4) of the Constitution 
from 1991 explicitly prohibited the creation of a political party based on 
ethnic and religious ground, MRF managed to continue its existence as the 
non-official party of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. There is no doubt that 
the creation of MRF was also a result of communist policies. Because those 
people who obtained their education during the communism and managed 
to get an insight of the Bulgarian political system established MRF as a 
political party to protect the rights of minorities in Bulgaria. The most 
remarkable change in the process is the speed in the transformation, as a 
result of which MRF leadership managed to form a solid organization and 
took the leading role in the process by preventing violent ethnic conflict.  
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 MRF’s success was proven during the Bulgaria’s EU negotiation 
process.43 After the local elections in 2003, MRF became the second 
political power in terms of municipalities governed in Bulgaria. Education 
took a major role in the policies of MRF and many young people were 
encouraged to achieve Bachelor, Masters and Doctorate degrees abroad44 
in order to contribute into the transformation of Bulgaria during the transition 
process. Despite some ongoing problems with the rights of minorities MRF 
strives for further liberalization through its presence in the Bulgarian 
Parliament.  
 
 
5.2. THE FLOW OF CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION  
 
The scope of minority policies in Bulgaria and Greece affected also 
the construction of cross-border cooperation process. Decentralization of 
power became a necessity for the initiation of proper CBC, and this would 
involve sharing the power with minorities. Influenced heavily by the 
discourse of securitization, Greek authorities perceived decentralization as a 
suspicious step that may trigger claims for autonomy in Western Thrace. 
Therefore, border security discourse prevailed every aspect of CBC, and set 
the priority of Greek regional policy. It later became apparent when Greece’s 
CBC on the border with Turkey did not mark any progress for years. 
Moreover, it had almost the same effect in Bulgarian bordering regions 
where the Turkish minority predominantly lived.   
 
In the case of Bulgaria several factors affected CBC and this enabled 
the decentralization process to be spread steadily. The main issue for 
Bulgaria was the realization of necessary reforms in order to make progress 
in the Europeanization of the country and to reduce regional disparities.45 
                                                 
43 Iskra Baeva & Evgenia Kalinova, p. 76.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Vassilis Monastiriotis, p. 174.   
  
235
Since democratization of Bulgaria became also widely discussed, there was 
a strategy to expand the policy of decentralization and democratization 
together in order to increase the efficiency of the European integration. This 
process involved active participation of minority members, and they were 
trained together with Bulgarians in order to cope with the new challenges 
brought by the initiation of Europeanization. 
 
The presence of Turks in Bulgaria began to be perceived partly as an 
opportunity to attract more Turkish investments in order to reduce the 
unemployment. In Greece the situation was different, since Greek 
nationalists strongly opposed Turkish investments in Western Thrace.46 
Turkish businessmen who intended to buy land and build factory in Thrace 
were shown as the expansionist side of Turkey. Therefore, making 
investments in Greece became relatively less attractive for Turks due to 
restrictions imposed in Western Thrace. Hence, it became evident that 
priorities of both states defined also their commitment on the issue of CBC. 
While Bulgaria saw CBC as an opportunity for economic development, 
Greece perceived it as a challenge for national security in bordering regions 
with Turkey and partially with Bulgaria where predominantly Turkish 
population lived. 
 
Compared to the Muslim/Turkish minority in Thrace, political 
involvement of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, gave them significant power 
to initiate the cross-border cooperation with Turkey and Greece. Even after 
the initial plans for decentralization in Greece, it may take additional time to 
train the members of minority on the procedures of how to begin CBC with 
the neighbors on the other side of the border. Decentralization naturally 
involves division of power and sharing it with regional authorities, and 
therefore, reducing the segregation in mixed areas might bring the 
opportunity for efficient development in border regions. 
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5.3. REVISITING THE SO-CALLED “BULGARIAN ETHNIC MODEL” 
 
 The notion of Bulgarian Ethnic Model (BEM) has been praised in light 
of the violent ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. It was developed in 
1994 in a forum organized by the International Center for Minority Studies 
and Intercultural Relations (IMIR).47 The peaceful transition from 
communism to liberal democracy in Bulgaria, raised the popularity of BEM 
as a project to be promoted in the rest of the Balkans. Despite the notion of 
the model was already there, its definition became a problematic issue.  
 
 Nevertheless, everyone who believes in the existence of BEM, puts 
MRF in its center as the leading actor of the peaceful transformation process 
in Bulgaria. MRF’s creation and its legitimization as the non-formal political 
party of the Turkish minority were interpreted as presence of tolerance in 
Bulgaria.48  MRF also noted in its 2001 program the existence of BEM49 
while describing how in 1990 ethnic conflict in Bulgaria was prevented. 
Discussion of recent developments became necessary due to ethnic 
conflicts in the Balkans, and Bulgarian politicians strongly defended BEM as 
a potential for peaceful solution of problems.  
 
 However, Bulgaria’s European integration process, and challenges 
with the liberalization of minority rights, changed the direction of the 
discussions regarding BEM. First, there was a tendency among the 
academic circles to accept the process merely as a result of Bulgarian 
tolerance, rather than stressing the pressure of external powers such as 
United States and the European Union. There was a certain sensitivity not to 
recognize any foreign input in the process, which had something to do with 
the decision of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court that approved the 
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constitutionality of MRF. Despite the rumors that the decision of the 
Constitutional Court was affected with the influence of foreign powers, it was 
unacceptable to recognize the foreign intervention in the process. Therefore, 
MEB was widely acknowledged as the unique model developed in Bulgaria 
which facilitated the interethnic co-existence.  
 
 All positive points  listed by the politicians had some negative aspects 
that also restricted the participation of minorities in Bulgaria. The existence 
of BEM began to be questioned since it has only accommodated the Turkish 
minority and ignored Gypsies and Pomaks in Bulgaria.50 BEM has been 
presented as a product of the peaceful co-existence in mixed areas, 
however, local elections in Kardzhali, the city where 70% of the population is 
of Turkish origin proved something else. In 1999 UDF and BSP voters in 
Kardzhali unified in order to prevent the election of a Turkish mayor in the 
city, while in 2003 Turks were mobilized to elect a Turkish mayor in 
Kardzhali.51 This event simply revealed how ethnic allegiances are defining 
the voting behavior of ethnically mixed areas in Bulgaria. 
 
 The definition of the BEM is still problematic because of the existence 
of Article 11 (4) of the Constitution which prevents the creation of political 
parties on ethnic and religious grounds, and constitutes an obstacle for the 
political participation of minorities in Bulgaria. Event at MRF, official 
meetings and election campaigns are entirely conducted in ‘Bulgarian’, since 
the use of Turkish is being identified as an explicit reference to the ‘ethnic’ 
character of the MRF as a political party. When in June 2012, MRF 
expressed their opinion that they would like to conduct election campaign in 
Turkish, centre-right parties in the Bulgarian parliament vehemently opposed 
the idea52, which showed the conditions of tolerance in Bulgaria, a member 
of the European Union. 
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Conclusion 
 
 The Treatment of the Turkish/Muslim minorities in Bulgaria and 
Greece were subject to changes not only based at national level but also 
changes stemming from the ideological differences. Political systems 
influenced the process of integration of minorities and defined the lines of 
inclusion and exclusion through the use of education, social and political 
policies.  
 
 The Turkish minority in Bulgaria, took advantage of the strong 
educational system while in a later stage it became a tool for its assimilation. 
The economic and social development that Bulgaria underwent in the first 
years of communism, helped in reducing regional differences and facilitated 
the application of the central planned economy according to communist 
requirements. The massive inclusion in the process resulted with the 
economic development of Bulgaria and reduced inequalities between 
Bulgarians and Turks. Eventually, by working in common environments, 
mutual interaction became part of the daily life and helped for the 
development of friendly relations between the ethnic groups. It should be 
noted that the ethnic conflict in Bulgaria was also prevented thanks to the 
existence of such relationship between Turks and Bulgarians.  
 
 In the case of Greece, opportunities of the democratic regime were 
not available for the minority in Western Thrace as equal Greek citizens. The 
heavy presence of nationalism created long lasting exceptions in Western 
Thrace that were based on the inequality of the Muslim/Turkish minority. 
Nationalism was embedded in every structure of the Greek State, and 
continued to expand its influence to the detriment of the minority in Thrace 
by taking its strength from the presence of the ‘other’ in Greece. 
Consequently, this way of managing social and political affairs, constantly 
excluded Muslim/Turks and prevented their further integration as equal 
Greek citizens.     
  
 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This work has aimed to explore the minority rights in Bulgaria and 
Greece and the impact of the European integration. The national 
conditionality in the two states affected the way how European regulations 
were implemented. In return they have gradually shaped the policy of 
integration of minorities. Historical flow of nationalities questions proved to 
be more resistant issue and restricted the adoption of new standards for 
minority protection. The demands of Turkish/Muslim minorities in Bulgaria 
and Greece for more adequate minority protection system, met the 
resistance of nationalist policies that claimed the action as resurgence of 
minority nationalism. Social participation and political representation of 
minority members has been mostly restricted due to their ethnic identity that 
constituted the core of minorities question in Bulgaria and Greece.  
 
The need to create homogenous populations was the target since the 
establishment of the two nation states. Nevertheless, the way how they 
decided to realize their aims determined also their approaches to the rights 
of minorities. In Greece Greek language and Orthodox Church became the 
main components of the Greek identity which excluded the religious 
minorities from the nation building process. By strengthening the ethnic 
features of the Greek identity, Muslim/Turkish minority in Thrace became 
automatically the ‘other’ for Greeks. The presence of ethnically mixed 
population within the Greek borders had been interpreted as a weakness for 
the newly established state. Therefore, new methods apart from war were 
sought to create the homogeneity of the population in Greece which was 
crucial to protect the borders. The Greek-Bulgarian Convention for 
Reciprocal Emigration became the first example of the events to restrict the 
presence of foreign subjects that may jeopardize the security of new nation 
states in the Balkans. Despite the Convention for Reciprocal Emigration was 
designed to regulate voluntary emigration, the ideas of unitary state 
dominated by nationalist ideology, turned the voluntary emigration into 
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compulsory one. After solving the issue with Bulgaria, Greece focused on 
the situation of Muslim/Turkish minority.  
 
However, developments in the aftermath of the First World War, 
resulted with revision of the plan for homogenization of Greece. The Treaty 
of Lausanne marked the end of the Greek expansion. It regulated the 
compulsory population exchange that took place between Greece and 
Turkey and assisted for the homogenization of Greece by getting rid of the 
Turkish presence in its territory - except for the Muslim/Turkish minority in 
Western Thrace. Apart from including provisions for the compulsory 
population exchange, the Treaty of Lausanne granted certain rights to the 
Muslim/Turkish minority in Thrace. Nevertheless, the use of the term Muslim 
instead of Turkish in Lausanne Treaty became the major problem for the 
definition of the ethnic identity of the Muslim/Turkish minority.  
 
Nationalism in Bulgaria followed similar patterns like the Greek one. 
The revival process of Bulgarian nationalism became fact after the initial 
reinterpretation of national history, Bulgarian language and culture were 
turned as main indicators of its distinctive character. The establishment of 
the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870, marked the last stage of Bulgarian 
nationalism on its path for independence. After the Russo-Turkish War in 
1877-1878, the Treaty of San Stefano realized the aims for the creation of 
Greater Bulgaria in the Balkans. However, it was not accepted by Western 
Powers who did not want to see a big Slavic State in the Balkans as a close 
ally of Russian Empire. Therefore, by showing the lack of minority 
regulations on the Treaty of San Stefano, Western Powers designed the 
Treaty of Berlin, that reduced the size of independent Bulgarian State and 
imposed regulations for the protection of the rights of minorities. 
Consequently, this imposition established the path to organize 
comprehensive regulations for the protection of the rights of Turkish minority 
in Bulgaria.  
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The ethnic identity on the Turkish minority did not create any problem 
in the relations between Turkey and Bulgaria, at least regarding the 
definition of the minority’s (ethnic) character. The fact that sizeable Turkish 
minority left in Bulgaria and continued to live in geographically concentrated 
areas, made easier the conservation of their ethnic and religious identity.   
 
 The flow of the developments between in the Balkans attracted the 
attention of the Western Powers. Moreover, problems stemming from the 
interpretation of the treaties signed between Bulgaria and Greece resulted 
with the famous decision of the PCIJ regarding the Greco-Bulgarian 
Communities case in 1930. The definition of a ‘community’ provided by the 
PCIJ, is so far unique being the only definition offered by an international 
organization. This period marked the evolution of minority rights and the 
importance given to them. With the eruption of the Second World War, the 
development of minority rights stopped significantly, due to the violence that 
was spread all around Europe. 
 
 However, with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, post-Second World War period witnessed significant changes. The 
creation of Council of Europe resulted with the adoption of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which had a great impact for the liberalization 
of minority rights in Europe. Nevertheless, liberalization brought also some 
challenges together that restricted the efforts to find an international 
definition for the term ‘minority’. Francesco Capotorti’s study published in 
1977, revealed how contested was the definition of minorities in the 
international arena. Basically, every state wanted to retain its authority to 
define minorities in its territory, and this attitude prevented the adoption of a 
universal definition.  
 
 After avoiding the topics subject to controversy, the UN took the 
initiative to bring in further positive regulations for minorities through the 
adoption of Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Convention on the 
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Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Meanwhile, in Europe the 
strength of European integration resulted with positive developments in the 
area on minority rights. Following the collapse of Communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe, European integration had been perceived as an opportunity 
to increase the standards of minority protection.   
 
 Copenhagen Criteria became an assessment for the Eastern 
European countries that aspired EU membership. The adoption of the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities raised 
promises of better standards for minority rights in Europe. The fact that there 
was no common definition included in any aspect of the post-Cold War 
regulations dealing with minority rights, proved the reserved stance towards 
the rights of minorities in Europe.  
 
  The national realities in Greece and Bulgaria resulted with the 
differentiation of minority integration policies. Especially the impact of post-
Second World War polices dominated the whole issue, since these were the 
most coherent aspects of minority treatment in both countries. By becoming 
close ally of the Western countries, Greece adopted liberal democracy and 
the rights of minority in Western Thrace became subject to the regulations 
accepted in Lausanne Treaty. Bilateral relations between Greece and 
Turkey affected the situation of minority in Thrace as well.  
 
 The evolution of Greek nationalism and the lack of modernization, 
created certain methods which deteriorated the conditions of the minority in 
Thrace. The invention military surveillance zone, land expropriation and 
restrictions for social and economic participation, aimed to control the size of 
the Muslim/Turkish minority in Thrace. Eventually, the problems in bilateral 
relations with Turkey developed the concept of reciprocity for the treatment 
of minorities in Greece and Bulgaria. Therefore, instead of following the 
European and international standards, Greece chose to use the limits of 
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liberal democracy which culminated into systematic violation of minority 
rights in Western Thrace.  
 
 The eruption of conflict in Cyprus has been used by Greek 
nationalists as a justification for oppressive policies in Western Thrace. 
There were theories that closer state control on minorities in Thrace is 
necessary to prevent the creation of a second Cyprus. This policy of seeing 
the minority in Thrace as the fifth column of Turkey, blocked every attempt to 
improve the conditions of the Turkish minority in Thrace. Greek authorities 
used the education as tool to sustain their policies that were based on 
certain disadvantages of minority members. Despite the fact that education 
in mother tongue has not been denied, the way it was carried, degraded the 
educational profile of the minority.     
 
 The post-1945 period brought also different challenges for Bulgaria. 
The adoption of the communism in Bulgaria, made the BCP as leading 
power. The establishment of communism demanded formation of a strong 
central system that would help to control every aspect of life in Bulgaria. In 
the first years of communism, Turks were offered with extensive rights that 
enabled the development of the educational and cultural profile of the 
Turkish minority in Bulgaria. However, following the consolidation of 
communism in Bulgaria, the rights granted to the Turkish minority were 
revoked suddenly. The Turks began to leave Bulgaria massively as a result 
of deteriorating treatment of minorities.  
 
Subsequently, BCP launched the policy of ethnic integration which 
aimed to reduce the differences between ethnic groups in Bulgaria. They 
adopted a policy to unify Bulgarian nation and to create a classless society. 
Nevertheless, this policy had more to do with the rights of minorities than the 
communist development of Bulgaria. After the initial reinterpretation of the 
Bulgarian nationalism in 1960s, BCP began slowly to initiate the revival 
process which became known as ‘name changing campaign’. Revival 
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process was a brutal action conducted by the BCP that changed forcibly the 
names of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria with Slavic-Bulgarian names. The 
name changing campaign in 1984, provided the basis for the claims of BCP 
that there are no Turks in Bulgaria.  The policy of assimilation had been 
supported with a total ban of the Turkish language in every aspect of life. 
Eventually, the assimilation campaign was terminated in 1989 and part of 
the Turks were expelled from Bulgaria. The rights of the Turkish minority 
were partially restored with the Bulgarian Constitution from 1991.  
 
All these developments undermined the situation of Pomaks who 
were identified as Bulgarian speaking Muslims. Pomaks used to live in the 
region of Rhodope Mountains that is divided between Bulgaria and Greece. 
However, since the early years of Bulgarian independence, Bulgarian 
authorities tried to assimilate them in every occasion and this changed their 
perception in the region. As a result of the Bulgarian assimilationist polices 
part of the Pomaks began to identify themselves as Bulgarians, while others 
continued to claim that they are Turkish. On the other side, Pomaks in 
Greece were count as  Muslim minority and their rights were regulated 
according to the provisions of Lausanne Treaty. The aim of Bulgarian 
authorities by the assimilation of Pomaks was to take them off from the 
protection of Turkey. Because according to several treaties signed between 
Turkey and Bulgaria, Turkey was the kin state of the Muslim population in 
Bulgaria. Therefore, there was partial accomplishment of the Bulgarian goals 
in this process.  
 
The fall of communism and the popularity of the European integration, 
affected both Greece and Bulgaria. Greece’s EU membership created 
relatively limited impact on minority rights due to the tendency to perceive 
European integration only as an economic issue. In the beginning of 1990s 
amid new changes in Eastern Europe, the situation of Muslim/Turkish 
minority in Thrace became problematic following the ethnic self-identification 
as Turkish. The inter-ethnic tensions in Greece proved that policies 
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restricting the rights of minorities did not brought positive effect, and 
therefore, several changes were made to fix some discriminatory provisions. 
Despite there were significant revisions of some old unfair regulations, the 
impact of the European integration was limited due to the nationalist input in 
the process. The denial of Greek institutions (mainly courts) not to apply 
some of the decisions given by the ECtHR, clearly demonstrated the limited 
impact of the European integration in Greece.  
 
In the case of Bulgaria, European integration began only after the fall 
of communism, when EU membership arose as an option for the country. 
Peaceful transition from communism to democracy was set as the main goal 
to preserve the ethnic peace. Restoration of the rights of Turkish minority 
was a crucial step in this process. Following the creation of MRF, Turkish 
minority got the chance to be represented in Bulgarian Parliament, and this 
has made the politics as an area for further demands for the liberalization of 
minority rights. When Bulgaria was accepted as candidate for EU 
membership, this raised hopes for further liberalization of minority rights in 
Bulgaria. However, during the negotiation process, the situation of the 
Turkish minority was mostly ignored both by the EU and Bulgaria, since it 
had been perceived as a politically sensitive issue. Therefore, this limited the 
impact of the European integration in Bulgaria only to the peaceful 
transformation of the country from communism into liberal democracy.  
 
Meanwhile, EU had also an impact in the development of cross-
border cooperation between Bulgaria and Greece. Bulgaria’s transition 
process was mostly devoted to decentralize the state power which was 
heavily affected by the communist ideology. Following the fall of 
communism, migration waves that took place in Bulgaria, caused regional 
disparities which dramatically changed the economy. The focus towards big 
cities fostered regional differences and this resulted with isolation of the 
border regions that were less populated. Therefore, CBC has been 
perceived as an opportunity in Bulgaria to improve the economy of border 
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regions and to enhance their potential for investments. In the Greek case it 
was not that easy to end up restrictions in border regions which were 
perceived as the walls of defense from enemy. The existence of 
Muslim/Turkish minority in Thrace, made it also difficult to realize the 
necessary reforms for the decentralization of power. Bilateral relations 
continued to determine the progress of CBC not only between Greece and 
Bulgaria but also between Greece and Turkey.  
 
As a result of all these policies and strategies followed by Greece and 
Bulgaria, the integration of the Turkish and Muslim minorities showed 
different levels. In the beginning of twentieth century they began the their 
journey from the same point. However, today totally different conditions are 
created as a result of the policies of both countries. Comparing their overall 
status, reveals different facts. The Turks in Bulgaria do not have their own 
private schools, while Muslim/Turkish minority in Thrace continue to operate 
private minority schools (although with relatively lower educational quality 
compared to the Greek schools). In the area of political representation, 
despite all limitations, the Turks in Bulgaria are more active through the 
MRF. The minority in Thrace, has limited access and role in politics, and this 
reduces their chances to influence key political decisions that affect their 
situation.  
 
The sensitivity of the minority issues in Bulgaria and Greece always 
dominated political and social discourse. The hopes that European 
integration would push for liberalization of minority rights were overwhelmed 
by the nationalist discourse in both countries. Continuous tensions led to the 
different interpretations of minority rights that became subject to national 
reevaluation process. Their eventual revision, reduced the impact of the 
integration of minorities, which turned the process as ongoing segregation 
as it is in the case of Greece.  
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The adoption of more fair minority standards in Bulgaria and Greece 
needs to be conducted as a transparent process that considers the needs of 
minority rather than their difference as a potential threat. Perceiving minority 
rights as necessity for the integration of all citizens, might give better results 
than classifying them as privileges offered to the ‘other’ groups. Changing 
this aspect must be in line with changing the profile of minority majority 
relations, since in most cases minorities are depicted as the fifth column 
rather than equal citizens.  
 
The EU played significant role in the democratization processes of 
Bulgaria and Greece. However, there is this tendency that this impact could 
be increased if there more coherent policy towards minority rights in the two 
countries. The economic aspects of the European integration dominated 
also the institutional structure, and this has limited EU’s capacity to insert its 
influence in the liberalization of minority rights. Giving more priority to the 
rights of minorities would help also in the process of European integration by 
preventing further segregation at national level.  
 
  
  
APPENDICES  
 
Appendix-1 
 
Bulgaria According to the San Stefano Treaty, 1878:  
 
 
 
Source: http://world.actualno.com/Makedonskite-bylgari-predlagat-federacija-
mejdu-Makedonija-i-Bylgarija-news_406381.html (access: 9/11/2012).  
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Appendix-2 
 
Bulgarian According to the Treaty of Berlin, 1878: 
 
 
Source: "An Historical Atlas" by Robert H. Labberton, E. Elaxton and Co., 
1884. 
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Appendix-3  
 
Territorial Expansion of Greece: 
 
 
 
Source: http://bigblue1840-1940.blogspot.be/2012/06/greece-hermes-
heads.html (9/11/2012).  
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Appendix-4  
 
THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE  
(Signed on 24 July 1923) Between Turkey and Allied Powers British Empire, 
French Republic, Kingdom of Italy, Empire of Japan, Kingdom of Greece, 
Kingdom of Romania, and Serb-Croat-Slovene State:  
SECTION III. 
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES. 
ARTICLE 37. 
Turkey undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 38 to 44 shall be 
recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official 
action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, 
regulation, nor official action prevail over them. 
ARTICLE 38. 
The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection 
of life and liberty to ali inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, 
nationality, language, race or religion. 
All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or 
private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be 
incompatible with public order and good morals. 
Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of 
emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the 
territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish 
Government for national defence, or for the maintenance of public order. 
ARTICLE 39. 
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same 
civil and political rights as Moslems. 
All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal 
before the law. 
Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish 
national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for 
instance, admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the 
exercise of professions and industries. 
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No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of 
any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in 
publications of any kind or at public meetings. 
Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities 
shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of 
their own language before the Courts. 
ARTICLE 40. 
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same 
treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In 
particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at 
their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any 
schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right 
to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein. 
ARTICLE 41. 
As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those 
towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals 
are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the 
instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the 
medium of their own language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish 
Government from making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in 
the said schools. 
In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish 
nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities, these minorities shall be 
assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums 
which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other 
budgets for educational, religious, or charitable purposes. 
The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the 
establishments and institutions concerned. 
ARTICLE 42. 
The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem 
minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures 
permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs 
of those minorities. 
These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of 
representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of 
the minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the Turkish 
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Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in 
agreement an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers. 
The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, 
synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-
mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorisation will be granted to the 
pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said 
minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not 
refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institu- tions, any of 
the necessary facilities which are guaranteed to other private institutions of 
that nature. 
ARTICLE 43. 
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall not be compelled 
to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their faith or religious 
observances, and shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their 
refusal to attend Courts of Law or to perform any legal business on their 
weekly day of rest. 
This provision, however, shall not exempt such Turkish nationals from such 
obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Turkish nationals for the 
preservation of public order. 
ARTICLE 44. 
Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect 
non-Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of 
international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League 
of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of the majority of 
the Council of the League of Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy and 
Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent to any modification in these 
Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the 
League of Nations. 
Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall 
have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger 
of infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon 
take such action and give such directions as it may deem proper and 
effective in the circumstances. 
Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or 
of fact arising out of these Articles between the Turkish Government and any 
one of the other Signatory Powers or any other Power, a member of the 
Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an 
international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations. The Turkish Government hereby consents that any such dispute 
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shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court 
of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final 
and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the 
Covenant. 
ARTICLE 45. 
The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-
Moslem minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the 
Moslem minority in her territory. 
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258
 
 
 
 
Source: Destroying Ethnic Identity: the Turks of Greece, New York, Helsinki 
Watch Report, 1990. 
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Appendix-6 
 
POPULATION BY DISTRICTS AND ETHNIC GROUP IN 
BULGARIA AS OF 1.03.2001  
Districts Total Bulgarian Turkish Gypsies Other Not stated Unknown
Total 7 928 901 6 655 210 746 664 370 908 69 204 62 108 24 807
Blagoevgrad 341 173 286 491 31 857 12 405 5 519 4 242 659
Burgas 423 547 338 625 58 636 19 439 3 728 1 919 1 200
Varna 462 013 393 884 37 502 15 462 9 866 3 830 1 469
Veliko Tarnovo 293 172 259 099 22 562 6 064 2 495 2 014 938
Vidin 130 074 118 543 139 9 786 528 553 525
Vratsa 243 036 223 692 2 000 14 899 608 984 853
Gabrovo 144 125 131 494 9 109 1 611 939 615 357
Dobrich 215 217 164 204 28 231 18 649 1 588 1 854 691
Kurdzhali 164 019 55 939 101 116 1 264 385 4 565 750
Kyustendil 162 534 152 644 146 8 294 416 508 526
Lovech 169 951 152 194 8 476 6 316 891 1 522 552
Montana 182 258 157 507 235 22 784 649 322 761
Pazardzhik 310 723 261 260 20 448 23 970 1 461 2 978 606
Pernik 149 832 145 642 108 3 035 375 270 402
Pleven 311 985 280 475 16 931 9 777 1 702 2 135 965
Plovdiv 715 816 621 338 52 499 30 196 7 274 2 869 1 640
Razgrad 152 417 67 069 71 963 8 733 1 444 2 739 469
Ruse 266 157 213 408 37 050 9 703 3 076 2 071 849
Silistra 142 000 84 178 48 761 6 478 1 461 656 466
Sliven 218 474 163 188 22 971 26 777 3 193 1 597 748
Smolyan 140 066 122 806 6 212 686 250 9 696 416
Sofia-cap. 1 170 842 1 124 240 6 036 17 885 13 652 4 645 4 384
Sofia 273 240 253 536 654 16 748 821 661 820
Stara Zagora 370 615 319 379 18 529 26 804 2 400 2 308 1 195
Targovishte 137 689 76 294 49 495 9 868 324 1 259 449
Haskovo 277 478 224 757 31 266 17 089 1 143 2 302 921
Shumen 204 378 123 084 59 551 16 457 2 344 2 350 592
Yambol 156 070 140 240 4 181 9 729 672 644 604
 
 
 
Source: http://www.nsi.bg/Census_e/Ethnos.htm (access: 10/11/2012).  
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Appendix-7 
 
Picture taken from the area near Makaza, Bulgaria showing the signboard of 
the project co-financed by the EU to construct a road and border crossing 
point designed between Makaza (BG) – Nimfea (GR). 
  
 
 
 
Source: the author.  
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